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Justice is not to be taken by storm. She is to be wooed by slow advances.
Benjamin N. Cardozo'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1986 the Missouri General Assembly repealed ten sections of
the Missouri Annotated Statutes regulating abortion and adopted

1.

B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 133 (1924).
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twenty new provisions regulating abortion.2 One month before the
new law became effective, a class action was filed in federal district
court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of
seven of the new provisions regulating abortion.3 The district court
ruled that six of the challenged provisions were wholly unconstitutional
and that the seventh provision was partially unconstitutional. 4 The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects except one. 5 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
circuit court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.6
After sixteen years and as many major abortions cases, 7 the Supreme Court in Webster altered its analysis of state laws regulating
abortion. The Court upheld all of the challenged provisions of the
Missouri abortion law that were properly before the Court and indicated that state legislatures may enact more substantial abortion regulations than prior abortion cases had suggested.8
2. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 662 F. Supp. 407, 411 (W.D. Mo. 1987), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); MISSOURI
SENATE COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOR H.R. 1596, 83d Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1986)
[hereinafter H.R. 1596].
3. Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 410-11.
4. Id. at 430. The court enjoined enforcement of these provisions. Id.
5. Webster, 851 F.2d at 1073. The court of appeals reversed the district court's holding
that the state's restriction on using public funds to perform or assist nontherapeutic abortions
was unconstitutional. Id. at 1084; see infra text accompanying note 81. The state did not appeal
the district court's determination that Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.039 (Vernon 1989), which requires
doctors to personally advise abortion-seeking patients as to whether the patients are pregnant,
was unconstitutional. See Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 413-15.
6. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). The state did not appeal to the Supreme Court the lower courts'
determination that Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.025 (Vernon 1989), requiring all abortions on fetuses
of at least 16 weeks gestational age to be performed in a hospital, was unconstitutional. See
Webster, 851 F.2d at 1073-74; Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 416-17.
7. The prior major abortion cases have been the following- Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Sinopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506
(1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981);
Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S.
519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court also has heard many less significant and collateral cases
involving the abortion controversy since 1973. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495
(1988); Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (per curiam); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54
(1986); Guste v. Jackson, 429 U.S. 399 (1977); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975); Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); see also United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72-73 (1971)
(upholding District of Columbia abortion statute against vagueness challenge, but declining to
consider privacy arguments).
8. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058. The most expansive abortion decisions include the following.
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747 (invalidating statute requiring printed state material regarding
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The Court's judgment in Webster is not surprising. The trend toward moderating the abortion privacy doctrine enunciated in Roe v.

Wade9 and its progeny has been apparent in the Court's voting trend
in abortion cases 10 and in the increasing alarm at expansive applications
of that doctrine expressed by the growing number of dissenters."

risks and alternatives to abortion to be provided, requiring reports, requiring a standard-of-care
for abortions of viable fetuses, and requiring a second doctor to be available when a doctor performs
an abortion on a viable fetus); City of Akron, 462 U.S. 416 (invalidating statute requiring
abortions after the first trimester be performed in a hospifal, requiring minors under age 15
seeking abortion to obtain parental consent, requiring disclosure of the facts of fetal development
and alternatives to abortion, imposing a 24-hour waiting period, and requiring disposition of
fetal remains in a humane and sanitary manner); Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622 (invalidating Massachusetts law requiring minors seeking abortion to attempt to obtain parental consent and
requiring parental notification to be before a judicial bypass hearing); Colautti, 439 U.S. 379
(invalidating standard-of-care requirement applicable to postviability abortions); Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (invalidating statute requiring spousal consent, requiring parental consent, and prohibiting saline amniocentesis abortions); Doe, 410 U.S. 179 (invalidating statute requiring abortions be performed in hospitals, be approved by abortion committees, and be given two-doctor
confirmation); Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (invalidating Texas criminal abortion law, holding that abortion
abortion is a fundamental right, rejecting state interest in protecting fetal life before viability,
and adopting 'trimester framework" analysis).
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. Roe was decided in 1973 by a 7-2 vote. Id. at 115. In 1976 the vote in Danforth was
6-3. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52. Thornburgh was decided in 1986 by a 5-4 vote. Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 747. In 1987 the Court was split evenly, 4-4, in Hartigan.Hartigan,484 U.S. at 171.
The impact of new appointments is obvious. President Reagan's three appointees to the
Supreme Court, Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, all voted with the majority in Webster.
See Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3040. But the political factor easily can be overstated. Although
Justice Stevens was appointed by a conservative Republican President, Ford, since 1985 he has
voted consistently for expanding the abortion privacy doctrine. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772 (Stevens, J., concurring); City of Akron,
462 U.S. at 416. He also dissented in Harris, 448 U.S. at 349 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (also
serving as a dissent in Williams, 484 U.S. at 358).
Only five Justices have voted consistently in the abortion cases. Justices Blackmun (appointed
by strict constructionist, President Nixon), Brennan, and Marshall have voted consistently to
invalidate abortion restrictions and regulations. Justices Rehnquist and White (the latter appointed by Democrat President Kennedy) have voted consistently to uphold restrictions. Justice
Stevens has voted to uphold some abortion restrictions. See H.L., 450 U.S. at 420 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 652 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 101 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor has voted consistently to uphold abortion regulations since she has joined the Court,
but on narrower grounds than Justice White. See Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3058 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment); Thornmburgh, 476 U.S. at 814 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) Webster was the first abortion case in which Justices Scalia and Kennedy cast
recorded votes. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3040; id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment).
11. Within the Court signs of a significant, growing concern arose about excessive applications
of the abortion privacy doctrine. For example, Justice Powell broke with Justice Blackmnun and
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Webster presented an ideal opportunity for modifying the abortion
privacy doctrine because the challenged provisions of the Missouri law
involved only collateral regulations of, not direct prohibitions of, abortion. Moreover, Webster was widely expected to have major2 significance regarding the future of the abortion privacy doctrine.'1
The Webster decision, however, did not revolutionize constitutional
doctrine. The Court's judgment and holding were narrow. The Court
upheld the challenged abortion regulations, but did not overturn or1
even modify the most controversial elements of Roe or its progeny. 3
The prevailing plurality proposed to eliminate two substantial elements
of the Roe doctrine, 14 but the judgment of the Court stopped short of
doing so. 15

voted to limit the expansion of the abortion privacy doctrine in all five of the funding cases
prior to Webster. See Williams, 448 U.S. at 358; Harris, 448 U.S. at 297; Poelker, 432 U.S. at
519; Maher, 432 U.S. at 464; Beal, 432 U.S. at 438. Further, Justice Powell wrote the opinion
for the Court in the Maher and Beal cases. Justice Stewart filed separate concurring opinions
in Roe, 410 U.S. at 167 (Stewart, J., concurring), and Danforth, 428 U.S. at 89 (Stewart, J.,
concurring), and broke with Justice Blackmun in the last three major abortion cases he heard,
writing the opinion for the Court in H.L., 450 U.S. at 413; Williams, 448 U.S. at 360; and
Harris, 448 U.S. at 300. In Thornburgh Chief Justice Burger, who had voted with the majority
in Roe, 410 U.S. at 115, strongly dissented against what he viewed as an unjustified and
excessive extension of the principles of Roe, and called for re-examination of the Roe decision.
Thor burgh, 476 U.S. at 782 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's incisive dissenting
opinions in City of Ak-ron, 462 U.S. at 452 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), also enhanced the credibility and seriousness of the
criticisms of Roe.
12. General awareness that the Court in Webster might alter the abortion privacy doctrine
was evident when substantially more amicus briefs were filed in Webster than had ever been
filed in a Supreme Court case. A record 76 amicus briefs were filed. Docket Sheet at 1-5,
Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605-AFX); telephone interview with Kathy Arberg,
Assistant Public Information Officer, United States Supreme Court (June 14, 1989) (the previous
record was 58 amicus briefs filed in the 1978 affirmative action case, University of Cal. Regents
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 268-70 (1978)). In Webster 46 amicus briefs supporting the appellant,
Missouri, were filed by organizations and individuals ranging from the federal government
(Solicitor General) to the Alabama Lawyers for Unborn Children, Inc. Thirty amicus briefs
were filed in support of the appellees, Planned Parenthood and Reproductive Health Services,
by "[mIore than 300 organizations, including virtually every major medical and health association
in the country" and 896 American law professors. The Alan Guttmacher Institute, Washington
Memo, Apr. 19, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter Washington Memo, Apr. 19, 19891; see also Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services: Taking Sides, NAT'L L.J., May 1, 1989, at 28-29; The Alan
Guttmacher Institute, Washington Memo, Mar. 7, 1989, at 1. Likewise, the unprecedented media
coverage of the case manifested a general expectation that some significant change in constitutional law was possible.
13. See infra notes 152-93 and accompanying text.
14. Id.
15. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
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Yet, the Webster decision represents a major development in Supreme Court analysis of abortion cases from four perspectives. First,
Webster signified an important shift in the direction of the evolving
abortion privacy doctrine. The Court made several noteworthy adjustments to the doctrine.' 6 More importantly, the Court initiated a search
for a less radical formulation of the abortion privacy doctrine and
suggested a willingness to consider some of the profound issues neglected in Roe. 17 Second, Webster revived concern about matters of
constitutional structure, system, and legitimacy. It reaffirmed the modern value of federalism and the continuing importance of legislative
self-government. s Third, Webster demonstrated that constitutional
consensus is the critical test of constitutional legitimacy. 19 The Webster
decision effectively reopened legitimate societal and political dialogue
'regarding abortion policy, dialogue indispensable to the evolution of
constitutional consensus and facilitative of more tolerance and truth
than Roe v. Wade has produced. 20
But, perhaps the most significant facet of Webster is how the Court
approached the opportunity to change constitutional doctrine. The
Court adopted a conservative approach to changing the abortion privacy doctrine, an area of law characterized by sudden and dramatic
developments. Webster reveals a new vision of the process of constitutional adjudication; a preference for the gradual development of constitutional doctrine; and a prudent, case-oriented method of analysis
in lieu of an abrupt and sweeping jurisprudential approach.21
II.

WEBSTER'S IMPACT ON THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE

Because of the significance of other dimensions of the Webster
decision, the details of the Missouri abortion regulations and the lower
courts analysis of them will soon be forgotten. Nevertheless, those
regulations and the lower courts' rationales for invalidating them illustrate why the Supreme Court in Webster addressed more basic issues
and why the Court adopted a new approach in analyzing them.
A. Legislative DeclarationThat Life Begins at Conception
The preamble to the Missouri Act, section 1.205, provides, "1. The
general assembly of this state finds that: (1) The life of each human
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes

149-51 and accompanying text.
205-55 and accompanying text.
256-300 and accompanying text.
301-25 and accompanying text.
326-57 and accompanying text.
358-94 and accompanying text.
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being begins at conception; (2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health and well-being. . . ."2 Before conducting the
trial, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion in limine to bar
the state from introducing any evidence supporting this legislative
finding.23 Then, not surprisingly, the district court held this legislative
declaration unconstitutional, reasoning that Roe v. Wade and City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health3 mandated that a
state "may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify [its]
abortion regulation[s]." 26 The district court refused to consider proffered evidence about the veracity of the legislative declaration, finding
it would be "inappropriate . . . to conduct an inquiry into such a

22. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.1(1)-(2) (Vernon 1989). The next paragraph of this section
grants rights to fetuses:
The laws of this state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf
of the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights, privileges, and
immunities available to other persons .... subject only to the Constitution of the
United States, and decisional interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme
Court ....
Id. at § 1.205.2; cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) ("The
unborn child is a human being from the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal person for
purposes of the unborn child's right to life."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.0 (West Supp.
1989) ("Mhe unborn child is a human being from the time of conception and is, therefore, a
legal person for purposes of the unborn child's right to life."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-102
(1989) ("The legislature reaffirms the tradition of the state of Montana to protect every human
life, whether unborn or aged . . . . [W]e reaffirm the intent to extend the protection of the
laws of Montana in favor of all human life.").
23. Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 413. See generally Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role
of Facts and Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 655, 697-720
(1988) (arguing that lower courts should be free to rely on new facts and to arrive at rights-protective constitutional results that vary with existing precedent, especially in the context of
abortion).
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
26. Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 413 (citing City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 416; Roe, 410 U.S. at
162). Roe struck down a Texas criminal abortion law prohibiting all abortions except those
necessary to preserve the life of the mother. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65. In City of Akron, the
Court declared unconstitutional an ordinance requiring doctors to inform their patients that "the
unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception." City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 444.
The district court also cited Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747 (1986), see Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 413, in which the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania statute requiring that women seeking abortion be provided with printed materials, including a statement that "[tihe Commonwealth of Pennsylvania strongly urges you to contact them
before making a final decision about abortion." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 761. In Justice
Blackmun's words, the statute was "nothing less than an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth's message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informed-consent dialogue
between the woman and her physician." Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., majority opinion).
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difficult and philosophical question" as whether human life begins at
conception.- Thus, the legislative "findings" about the beginning and
legal status of human life in utero, in sections 1.205.1(1) and (2), were
"invalid as a matter of law."
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling.2 The appellate court agreed that the state's argument that life begins at conception was legally irrelevant.30 Additionally, the court of appeals emphasized that the statutory provisions stating when life begins were
not neutral because they were contained in a bill regulating abortions.31
The Supreme Court reversed.3 The Court addressed two attacks
on the Missouri legislative preamble. The first, relied on by both
courts below, was that the Roe and City of Akron dicta prevented
the Missouri state legislators from expressing a statutory viewpoint
that life begins at conception.3 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority,3 noted that the lower courts had "misconceived ... the
City of Akron dictum," which meant only that abortion restrictions
otherwise invalid under Roe were not justified by 'the State's [belief
about] when life begins." Moreover, the Court had emphasized previously that Roe "'implies no limitation on the authority of a State to
make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion.' ''36 The Missouri legislative declaration that life begins at conception could be
'37
read "simply to express that sort of value judgment.

27.

Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 413.

28. Id.
29. Webster, 851 F.2d at 1076. Judge Arnold of the appellate panel, dissenting in part,
found no facial constitutional infirmity in the legislative finding that life begins at conception
and would have upheld it except as it applied to restrict abortion. Id. at 1085 (Arnold, J.,

concurring in part, dissenting in part).
30. Id. at 1076 n.7 (majority opinion).
31. Id. at 1076-77. It would have substantive impact because it could affect the interpretation
of statutes in many areas including torts and property. Id. at 1076. The legislative caveat that
the declaration was subject to decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Constitution did
not save the provision because the bill directly violated Supreme Court decisions holding that
states may not declare when life begins in the abortion context. Id. at 1076-77.
32. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3050.
33. Id. at 3049-50.
34. The majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Scalia. See id. at 3046. Justices O'Connor and Scalia wrote separate opinions. See id. at

3058 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment); id. at 3064 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
35. Id. at 3050 (majority opinion).
36.
37.

Id. at 3050 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
Id.
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The Court also rejected the appellees' argument that the preamble
could have restrictive effects upon in vitro fertilization and contraception. The Court noted that state courts had not yet applied the state
statute to these areas and stated that there would be 'time enough" for
courts to consider this argument should the state courts apply the preamble to restrict such activities s9 Thus, the appellees' claim of potentially extreme applications of the preamble interfering with contracep40
tives and artificial conception was nonjusticiable.
Three other opinions addressed the constitutionality of the preamble. In concurrence Justice O'Connor noted that the "intimations of
41
unconstitutionality [were] simply too hypothetical" to be considered.
However, she warned that the state could violate the Griswold v.
Connecticut- doctrine by applying the preamble to interfere with post3
fertilization contraception or artificial conception technology4

In dissent Justice Blackmun argued that the preamble was uncon-

stitutional for several reasons.- First, it was not "abortion-neutral"
because the Missouri legislature intended the preamble to provide
"the backdrop" for its abortion regulations.45 Second, it placed an

impermissible "burden of uncertain scope" on the abortion decision46

and thereby burdened the use of contraceptive devices that operate
after fertilization.

47

38. Id. at 3050 (citing the appellees' brief).
39. Id.; see id. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
40. Id. at 3050 (majority opinion).
41. Id. at 3059 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3059 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment)
(citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479). Justice O'Connor warned that "[ilt may be correct that the
use of postfertilization contraceptive devices is constitutionally protected by Griswold and its
progeny." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). She then noted
that "nothing in the record or the opinions below indicates that the preamble will affect a
woman's decision to practice contraception." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring
in the judgment).
44. Id. at 3067 (Blackmnn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun
could not bring himself to admit that the Court was beginning to jettison pieces of the abortion
doctrine he created. Rather, it was "the plurality (with whom Justice O'Connor on this point
joins)" that was doing so. Id. at 3068 n.1 (Blaclmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
45. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
46. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The exception in the preamble
for decisions by the Supreme Court was impermissibly vague because it was "dependent on the
uncertain and disputed limits of our holdings, [which] will have the unconstitutional effect of
chilling the exercise of a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy." Id. (Blaclnun, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
47. Id. (Blacknun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, focused on two perceived
flaws in the Missouri declaration that life begins at conception. 48 First,
he pointed out that the Missouri statute declared that conception occurred at fertilization, contrary to recent medical opinions that conception occurs at the time of implantation. 49 He argued that, if the preamble interfered with the use of postfertilization contraceptives, the
0
preamble would be unconstitutional under Griswold v. Connecticut.5
Legislative action which interfered with late contraception or early
abortion before the "seed has acquired the powers of sensation and
movement" 51 would be unconstitutional because "a State has no greater
secular interest in protecting the potential life of an embryo that is
still 'seed' than in protecting the potential life of a sperm or an unfer'52
tilized ovum.
Second, Justice Stevens argued that the preamble violated the
establishment clause because only a theological distinction exists between contraceptives that operate before fertilization and contraceptives that operate in the first few weeks after fertilization.5 Pointing

48. Id. at 3079 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens also
asserted that the Missouri preamble violated the Constitution insofar as Roe and its progeny
prohibit the state from adopting "a theory of life that overrides a pregnant woman's rights."
Id. at 3083 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
49. Id. at 3080 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens did not
indicate whether, for this reason alone, he would strike down the Missouri preamble. Id. at
3079 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). However, this factor adds an ironic
touch to the Webster dissents because Justice Blackmun argued in his opinion that criticisms of
the abortion cases that chastised the Court for acting too much like a national medical board
were unfounded. Id. at 3074-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
50. Id. at 3081 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Griswold, 381
U.S. at 485-86).
51. Id. at 3085 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The fact that "the vast
majority of abortions are actually performed" during the first several weeks of pregnancy was
of profound concern to him. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
52. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens suggested that
abortion during the "first several weeks" of pregnancy, possibly the first 40-80 days, was
constitutionally protected. Id. at 3083-84 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
By tracing this period for unrestricted abortion to St. Thomas Aquinas, id. at 3083 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), he apparently would invoke the historical branch of
substantive due process forming a zone of privacy to protect against legislation reflecting the
moral significance of modern knowledge about the beginning of prenatal life.
53. Id. at 3082-83 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The Court directly
repudiated the establishment clause argument in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980).
To describe respect for the wonder of human creation as merely theological grossly understates
the significance of the event. Moreover, obvious medical and biological differences exist between
an unfertilized sperm or ovum and a fertilized zygote: fertilization has occurred. The process
of division, the multiplication of cells, and the complexity of the organism are also differences;
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specifically at St. Thomas Aquinas and the "leaders of the Roman
Catholic Church," Justice Stevens argued that Missouri's preamble
served no secular purpose and was an "unequivocal endorsement of a
religious tenet of some... Christian faiths."5 The Court could sustain
the preamble only if the preamble furthered some legitimate secular
purpose, such as military or economic interests. From the economic
perspective, Justice Stevens opined that abortion made imminently
more sense than childbearing.5 Justice Stevens maintained that the
national debate over abortion "reflects the deeply held religious convictions" of many citizens, thus the Missouri legislature could not take
a position in the debate signaling 'its endorsement of a particular
religious tradition."'
The Webster decision upholding the Missouri legislative preamble's
declaration that life begins at conception was unremarkable. Previous
court dicta prohibiting a state from adopting a theory of when life
begins had specific reference to a direct, substantial abortion restriction. 7 The Missouri legislative finding that life begins at conception
was distinguishable from the Akron requirements that doctors espouse
that position in their private consultations with their patients A5 In
59
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians& Gynecologists,
City of Akron, and Roe, the direct state intrusion into the doctor-pa-

in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer, these are critical differences. In terms of genetic
development, genetic engineering, potential for twins, and identification of genetic defects,
significant differences also exist. Of course, the order in limine may have prevented the introduction of evidence of "secular purposes" to support these arguments.
54. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3082-83 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
55. Id. at 3083-84 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This observation is
seriously debatable. The aborted fetus will never repay to the state the cost of his or her
abortion. For publicly funded abortions, other taxpayers will have to recoup the cost. The public
costs of childbirth (and in some cases the subsequent childrearing costs born by the welfare
system) are undoubtedly greater than the costs of abortion. However, the child who was not
aborted will perhaps pay back the state in funds and services, including tax payments and
military service.
56. Id. at 3085 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see infra note 337 and
accompanying text. Justice Stevens's opinion did not make clear whether he found the Missouri
preamble unconstitutional because it was too religious or not religious enough. He chastised the
Missouri legislature for taking a position in the abortion debate that reflected a 'theological
position" on when life begins. However, he also seemed to criticize the legislature for not
recognizing the historic (Catholic) position comparing an unfertilized sperm or ovum to an embryo
during the first 40 days of gestation. See Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3084 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
57. See City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 444.
58. See id. at 423-24.
59. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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tient relationship created the constitutional defect. The Missouri legislative finding, on the other hand, involved no intrusion into the physician-patient relationship, but was pure political speech.
The true significance of the Webster Court's upholding the legislative declaration that life begins at conception lies in the rejection of
an extreme interpretation of Roe that would prohibit the official ex-

pression of community views that contradict the Roe orthodoxy

°

A

growing number of judges and commentators had adopted this rigidly
doctrinaire reading of the abortion cases.61 In this context, the Court's
rejection of this interpretation of Roe is indeed a significant point.
Webster cut off a branch of the Roe abortion privacy doctrine that
was ominously inconsistent with the concept of free and robust debate
that lies at the heart of the first amendment protection of political
speech.6
60. Professor Michael Perry noted, 'The Court's reasoning in Roe necessarily entails the
proposition that no governmental action can be predicated on the view that in the previability
period abortion is per se morally objectionable." Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly
Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L.
REV. 1113, 1115-16 (1980) (citations omitted).
61. See, e.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1985); Charles v. Carey, 579 F. Supp.
464 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding several sections of an Illinois statute restricting abortions unconstitutionally vague), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir.
1984), appeal dismissed sub nom. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986); Margaret S. v.
Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d
230, 512 N.E.2d 691 (1987) (denying cause of action for wrongful birth to hemophiliac who, but
for negligent medical advice of the defendants, would have been aborted). But cf. Women's
Servs. v. Thorne, 636 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding a Nebraska statute requiring preabortion
warning of possible mental and medical risks along with a 48-hour waiting period did not violate
the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment). See generally Parness,
Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the Potentiality of Human Life, 22
HARv. J. LEGIS. 97, 120 n.92, 142 n.197 (1985). Surprisingly, 7 of the 13 federal judges
and Justices who heard the Webster case accepted this position also (i.e., the district court, two
circuit judges, and four dissenting Supreme Court Justices).
62. It would have been remarkable for the Court that held dial-a-porn was protected expression, see Sable Communications v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989), and upheld flag burning as
constitutionally protected political speech, see Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989), not to
uphold a legislative preamble declaring that life begins at conception as a protected form of
political speech as well. Ironically, three of the Justices who had upheld flag-burning in Johnson
voted in Webster to hold that the Constitution forbids elected legislators from expressing their
belief that life begins at conception in a legislative preamble. Justice Blackmun and Justice
Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's statement in Johnson that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Id. at 2544. If
the Webster dissenters and the lower courts had prevailed, the Court would have judicially
revised the first amendment to omit expressions of fact or opinion contradicting the properiety
of abortion from the protection of the free speech clause. See infria note 334 and accompanying
text.
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B. ProhibitionAgainst Using Public Resources, Facilities,
and Employees to Perform or Assist Nontherapeutic Abortions

Section 188.205 of the Missouri Annotated Statutes prohibits expending public funds "for the purpose of performing or assisting an

abortion, not necessary to save the life of the mother."- Section
188.215 applies the same restrictions on the use of any public facilfties,-

and section 188.210 applies the same restrictions to public employees

"acting within the scope" of their public employment.6 Many other

states have adopted similar restrictions on the use of public resources
to facilitate abortion.
The district court invalidated all three restrictions prohibiting the
use of public resources to perform or assist abortions.67 According to
the district court, the state's restriction on the use of public funds or employees to perform or assist nontherapeutic abortions could have been interpreted to prohibit the use of public money or employees to transport
women prisoners who desired and were willing to finance abortions to
abortion facilities.r This possible failure to provide appropriately for
what the court considered a "serious medical need" violated the eighth

amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.69
The district court also held unconstitutional the restriction on the
use of public facilities for performing or assisting nontherapeutic abor63. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.205 (Vernon 1989).
64. Id. § 188.215.
65. Id. § 188.210.
66. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 50 (funding facilities and employees restrictions);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.1630 (1981) (facilities restriction); id. § 35-196.02 (Supp. 1988)
(funding restriction); COLO. REV. STAT. 3H 26-4-105.5, 26-15-104.5 (Supp. 1988) (funding restrictions); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 5-5, 6-1, 7-1 (Smith-Hurd 1988) (funding restriction);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3-3 (Burns 1983) (funding restriction); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715
(Baldwin 1989) (funding restriction); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.34.5 (West Supp. 1989)
(funding restriction); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.28 (West Supp. 1989) (funding restriction); id.
§ 256B.40 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989) (funding restriction); id. § 393.07 subd. 11 (West Supp.
1989) (funding restriction); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-6.1 (West 1981) (funding and facilities
restrictions); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.55(C) (Anderson 1989) (funding restriction); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1989) (funding restriction); id. tit. 62, §
453 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (funding restriction); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 28-6-4.5 (1984)
(funding restriction); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-18-4 (Repl. vol. 1989) (funding restriction); WIS.
STAT.ANN. § 59.07 (136) (West 1988) (funding restriction); id. § 66.04(1)(m) (West Supp. 1989)
(funding restriction); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-117 (1988) (funding restriction). See generally infra
note 107.
67. Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 407.
68. Id. at 428-29.
69. Id. The district court's opinion did not note that Missouri's own construction of these
provisions would allow for the prisoner transportation that the district court deemed mandatory.
Id. at 407.
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tions.7° The district judge distinguished the Supreme Court's decision
in Poelker v. Doe,7' which upheld a St. Louis policy prohibiting the
performance of nontherapeutic abortions in a public hospital, 72 as a
cost avoidance case. The plaintiffs in Webster had presented evidence
that some patients were willing to pay for nontherapeutic abortion
services in a public facility; thus, no loss or expenditure of public
funds would occur. 74 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit in Nyberg v.
City of Virginia75 had emphasized the "fundamental difference" between restrictions on the expenditure of public funds alone and restrictions which had the secondary effect of restricting access to public
facilities where safe abortions could be performed. 76 In Nyberg the
appellate court held that the city could not prohibit a municipal hospital's staff physicians from performing nontherapeutic abortions. 77 Although the public facility involved in Nyberg was the only hospital in
the community, 7 the district court in Webster opined that "the grava' 79
men of the holding was that there was no direct public expenditure.'
The court of appeals reversed the district court's finding that the
Missouri prohibition on the use of public funds was unconstitutional. 8°
The appellate court accepted the Missouri Attorney General's interpretation of "assist" to mean direct participation in the abortion procedure
and not to bar expenditure of public funds to escort or transport
prisoners to doctors' offices for privately-funded abortionsAs The appellees did not appeal this ruling to the Supreme Court.
However, the court of appeals unanimously affirmed the district
court's judgment invalidating the restriction on using public facilities
or employees for nontherapeutic abortions 2 Nyberg, rather than
Poelker, controlled because banning access to public facilities for pri-

70.

Id. at 428.

71. 432 U.S. 519 (1976).
72. Id. at 521-22.
73. Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 428 (citing Poelker, 432 U.S. at 520).

74.
75.
Nyberg
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 428 n.55.
667 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1982), appeal denied, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983); see also
v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 891 (1974).
Nyberg, 667 F.2d at 758.
Id. at 758-59.
See id. at 756.
Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 428.
Webster, 851 F.2d at 1084.

81. Id. The appellate court emphasized, however, that it was not rejecting the eighth
amendment analysis of the lower court; rather, it was accepting an interpretation of the statute
that made it unnecessary to reach the issue. Id. n.17.
82. Id. at 1082-85.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss5/1

14

Wardle:
"TimeV.Enough":
Webster
v. Reproductive
SERVICES Health Services and the Pr
HEALTH
REPRODUCTIVE
WEBSTER

vately paid abortions presented "a totally different issue" than the
m Missouri's restricting the use of public
issue raised in Poelker.
facilities "clearly narrow[ed] and in some cases foreclose[d] the availability of abortion to women" by increasing the cost and delay of
abortion. For essentially the same reasons, the circuit court also held
that the restriction on the use of public employees to perform or assist
abortions was unconstitutional., Since the state "recouped" all its
costs for its employees' services, it had no legitimate basis for denying
the use of public servants to assist abortions. 6
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and upheld the
Missouri restrictions on the use of public facilities and employees to
"perform or assist" elective abortions. The Court noted that "'the
Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure'"
fundamental liberties. 8 The Court cited three of its earlier cases that
upheld restrictions on the use of public resources to provide access to
abortions.s Quoting one of them, the Court reasoned that "'[t]he State
may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on
access to abortions that was not already there."'' Poelker was indistinguishable from the present case. 91 Having earlier upheld public re83. Id. at 1081.
84. Id. It could also "prevent a woman's chosen doctor from performing an abortion because
of his unprivileged status at other hospitals." Id.
85. Id. at 1083. The Court stated, "Just as a statutory prohibition on access to public
facilities for privately-paid abortions constitutes such a government-created obstacle, so too does
Missouri's ban on public employees performing or assisting abortions." Id.
86. Id.

87. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3050-53.
88. Id. at 3051 (quoting Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct.
998, 1003 (1989)).
89. Id. at 3051-53 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) (withholding of federal
funds for certain medically necessary abortions upheld because it was rationally related to the
legitimate governmental purpose of promoting childbirth); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521
(1977) (St. Louis policy to publicly finance childbearing hospital services without providing such
services for nontherapeutic abortions upheld); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (Connecticut welfare regulation, under which Medicaid payments were distributed to cover childbearing
expenses but not nontherapeutic abortions, upheld)).
90. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3051 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
91. The Court noted the similarity of the facts in Webster and Poelker.
The suit in Poelker was brought by the plaintiff "on her own behalf and on behalf
of the entire class of pregnant women residents of the City of St. Louis, Missouri,
desiring to utilize the personnel, facilities and services of the general public hospitals
within the City of St. Louis for the termination of pregnancies."
Id. at 3053 n.9 (quoting Doe v. Poelker, 497 F.2d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 432 U.S.
519 (1977)).
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fusal to fund abortions, the Court noted that "it strain[ed] logic [for
the Court] to reach a contrary result for the use of public facilities
and employees." The fact that all of the state's costs would be "recouped when the patient pays" for an abortion in a public facility or
for using public employees also did not require the state to allow its
facilities or employees to be used for abortion.9 Moreover, the decision
whether or not to use public resources to facilitate abortions was
"'subject to public debate and approval or disapproval at the polls,'
and 'the Constitution did not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes,"' from choosing to restrict the use of its public resources for the purpose of abortion.Justice O'Connor concurred in this portion of the Court's opinion
and emphasized that upholding the Missouri restrictions on the use of
public facilities and employees to perform or assist abortion simply
"follow[ed] directly" from the previous decisions upholding state and
federal restrictions prohibiting the funding of nontherapeutic abortions. 9, She reiterated that "conceivable applications of the ban on the
use of public facilities .. would be unconstitutional."9 However, the
fact that some extreme, hypothetical circumstance could be conceived
in which application of the statute might be unconstitutional was no
basis for invalidating the statute on its face "since [the Court had]
not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of
the First Amendment." 97
In dissent Justice Blackmun argued that these resource allocation
restrictions were unconstitutional.9 He noted that "strong dissents"

92. Id. at 3052. Furthermore, just as 'the [sitate may 'make a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds,'
surely it [could] do so through the allocation of other public resources, such as hospitals and
medical staff." Id. (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
93. Id. at 3052-53. The Court stated, "[N]othing in the Constitution requires states to

enter or remain in the business of performing abortions." Id. at 3052. The Court noted that if
the state had a monopoly on all of the hospitals and physicians, or if the state barred doctors
that performed abortions in private facilities from using public facilities for nonabortion

purposes, the state might have gone too far. Id. at 3052 n.8. However, "[t]he State need not
commit any resources to facilitating abortions, even if it can turn a profit by doing so." Id. at 3052.
94. Id. at 3053 (quoting Poelker,432 U.S. at 521); see infra text accompanying notes 304-12.
95. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3059 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
96. Id. For example, if private hospitals were subject to the ban on the use of public
resources simply because they used public water and sewage lines, or leased state-owned equipment or land, a more difficult constitutional question could be presented. Id.
97. Id. at 3059-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment) (citing
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
98. Justice Stevens separately adopted Justice Blackmun's analysis of this issue. Id. at 3079

(Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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existed in the funding cases. 9 He further argued that the Court could
distinguish the funding cases because the Missouri restrictions on the
use of public facilities and employees could effectively "assure that
abortions are not performed by private physicians in private institutions."'1 Justice Blackmun disagreed with the definition of "public
facility" that included institutions, equipment, and physical assets
"owned, leased, or controlled" by the state. 1 1 He warned that "by
defining as 'public' every health-care institution with some connection
to the State, no matter how attenuated," the Court was allowing
Missouri to coerce women into bearing unwanted children. 10 2 The public
facility restriction would "leave the pregnant woman with far fewer
choices, or for those too sick to too poor to travel, perhaps no choices
at all. ' 103 Thus, the Missouri restriction on the use of public facilities
and employees was an "aggressive and shameful infringement on the
right of women to obtain abortions."0 °
Given the clarity of the constitutional principles laid down in the
five previous abortion funding cases and the factual and legal similarity
of the issues in Poelker 05 the Webster Court's decision upholding

99. Id. at 3068 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Of course, the
same could be said about many other cases, including Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in
which Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the majority. Compare id. at 116 (Blackmun, J.,
majority opinion) with id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) and id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
What Justice Blacknun apparently meant was that the decisions of the Court in those funding
cases were wrong and should be overturned. However, he could not say so explicitly, because
later he had to argue very strongly that the doctrine of stare decisis has particularly important
application to abortion cases. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3078-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
100. Id. at 3068 n.1 (Blacknun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis in
original). Justice Blackmun apparently forgot that the restriction of public funding upheld in
the five prior abortion-funding cases meant, for indigent women, precisely "that abortions [would]
not [be] performed by private physicians in private institutions." Indeed, the impact of the
restrictions on the use of public facilities and employees on abortions '"performed by private
physicians in private institutions" is significantly less than the impact of restrictions on public
funding, since public funds are much more easily transportable to private abortion providers
than are public facilities or public employees.
101. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The statutory language does
not clearly indicate whether "public facility" includes assets that the state leases for its own
use or whether it includes facilities located on land leased by private enterprises from the state.
Justice Blackmun gave the abortion regulation the latter, more inclusive interpretation. See
infra text accompanying notes 102-04.
102. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3068 n.1 (Blacknun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
His reasoning ignored the caveats of the majority's and Justice O'Connor's opinions.
103. Id. at 3068 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
104. Id. at 3068-69 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
105. See supra note 91.
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Missouri's public resource restriction was hardly novel. 106 However, the

applications of the abortion privacy doctrine accepted by the lower
courts and urged by the dissenters in the Supreme Court magnify the
significance of this holding. Lower courts have invalidated restrictions

on the use of public resources to facilitate abortion even though the Supreme Court has declared such restrictions constitutional. °0 Commentators also have called for the rejection or defiance of the abortion-funding decisions.les The lower court decisions in Webster can be read as
a direct challenge to the Supreme Court abortion-funding decisions.
Thus, the Webster decision unequivocally reaffirmed the principle of
state freedom not to provide public resources to facilitate abortions
established in Maher v. Roe 0 9 and Poelker.

106. The warning conveyed by the majority, see Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058 n.8 (majority
opinion); supra note 93, and reiterated by Justice O'Connor, see Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3059
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment); supra note 97, about the limits
on the power of the state to restrict the use of monopolistic public facilities, or to punish public
employees for private, legal conduct, is more noteworthy. The next critical point of abortion
litigation over public resource restrictions may focus on quasi-monopolistic impact: when the
only facilities in which abortions may be performed in a state or a substantial geographic region
or subdivision of a state are public facilities to which the ban applies.
Two arguments the lower courts had relied upon for invalidating the public resource restrictions were not repeated, relied upon, or endorsed even by the dissenters at the Supreme Court
level. The dissenters in the Supreme Court failed to resurrect the "prison case" scenario - the
hypothetical argument, which was repudiated by the circuit court, see Webster, 851 F.2d at
1083-84, that the Missouri statute could be interpreted to prohibit the use of public funds or
employees to transport and escort female prisoners for privately paid abortions. Likewise,
Justice Blackmun in dissent partly eschewed the "petty burdens" argument of small increased
costs, transportation expenses, and minor delays, featured prominently in the lower court decisions. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3071 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
Webster, 851 F.2d at 1084.
107. See, e.g., Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 667 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1981) (city could not
prohibit staff physicians from performing abortions for paying patients at the only hospital in
the community); Valley Family Planning v. North Dakota, 661 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1981) (statute
prohibiting abortion referrals conflicted with mandate of Title X of the Public Health Service
Act). But cf. D.R. v. Mitchell, 645 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1981) (statute providing that state would
give medical expenditures for abortion only if the life of the mother was in danger upheld
against equal protection and due process challenges); Women's Health Servs. v. Maher, 514 F.
Supp. 265 (D. Conn. 1981) (Connecticut regulation providing public funds for abortion only when
the woman's life would otherwise be endangered did not create an equal protection or due
process violation); Roe v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 113 Ariz. 178, 549 P.2d 150 (1976) (statute
prohibiting certain kinds of abortions at a teaching hospital was constitutional because it was
a teaching facility and abortions were available elsewhere).
108. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1340-62 (2d ed.
1988); Perry, supra note 60; Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights,
Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARv. L. REv. 330 (1985).
109. 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding Connecticut welfare regulation under which Medicaid
payments were distributed to cover childbearing expenses but not nontherapeutic abortions).
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C.

ProhibitionAgainst Using Public Funds to
Encourage or Counsel Abortion

Section 188.205 of the Missouri Annotated Statutes prohibits the
expenditure of public funds "for the purpose of encouraging or counseling a woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her life." 110
Section 188.210 likewise restricts public employees, and section 188.215
similarly restricts the use of public facilities., The district court held

that the restriction on "encouraging or counseling" nontherapeutic
abortions in all three sections was unconstitutionally vague, relying,
inter alia, on the Supreme Court's upholding the right to disseminate
commercial information regarding abortion. 1 Moreover, rejecting a
narrow construction of the statute supported by the Missouri Attorney

General,1 1' the district court reasoned that the provisions interfered
with the constitutionally protected discretion of physicians to advise
their patients about abortion and erected a "significant barrier to a

woman's right to consult with her physician and exercise her freedom
of choice."1 4 By allowing counseling for only therapeutic abortions,

the provisions violated the Supreme Court rule prohibiting "a state
[from imposing] 'an increased risk to the life or health of the
woman.' "11

110. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.205 (Vernon 1989).
111. Id. §§ 188.210, .215.
112. Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 425 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)). However,
the district court's reliance on Bigelow to justify the application of a strict scrutiny standard of
vagueness was misplaced. Bigelow involved general restrictions on all abortion advertising,
private or public, Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812-13, whereas the Missouri statutes involved restrictions
only on publicly funded advocacy activities. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 188.205, .210, .215 (Vernon
1989).
113. The district court rejected the Missouri Attorney General's interpretation that § 188.205
applied only to "state and local officials responsible for expending public funds" because the
language "certainly [was] broad enough" to include "anyone who (was] paid from" public funds.
Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 425. The Missouri Attorney General had argued that the statute was
intended to forbid only "affirmative advocacy" of nontherapeutic abortions, but the district court
rejected this interpretation because the statutory language "encouraging or counseling" elicited
such "vastly different interpretations of the scope of the forbidden activity" that it was obviously
unconstitutional, just like the loyalty oaths invalidated in the 1960s. Id. at 426. This logic is
classic bootstrap.
114. Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 427. The court reasoned that it would violate medical ethics
for a physician to fail to advise or counsel a health-preserving abortion. Moreover, no legitimate
state interest existed for prohibiting counseling or encouraging because patients who paid for
their own abortions at public facilities would fully reimburse the state's costs for the physicians'
time to give that advice. Id. at 427-28, 428 n.55.
115. Id. at 427 (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 770) (emphasis added in Webster).
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The court of appeals unanimously affirmed the district court's holding.116 Rejecting the state's narrowing construction, the court held
that the restriction on counseling or encouraging nontherapeutic abortions interfered with constitutionally protected rights of free speech
and free choice regarding abortion. 117 A Ninth Circuit decision upholding a similar Arizona ban on state support for "counseling" abortions
was distinguished because the Arizona statute in that case was more
precise than and significantly different from Missouri's statute.118 Alternatively, the appellate court found the restriction on state employees' counseling or encouraging nontherapeutic abortions an unconstitutional state-erected obstacle to patients' access to medical judgment.1 1 9

116. Webster, 851 F.2d at 1077-80; id. at 1085 (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
117. Id. at 1077-80 (majority opinion). The court rejected the state's construction of its own
statute because the scope of the prohibition "appeared literally to be much broader than the
interpretation offered by the state," and the state's interpretation was inconsistent with principles
of statutory construction laid down by the Supreme Court in Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379
(1979). Webster, 851 F.2d at 1077-78 (citing Colautti, 439 U.S. 379). The court of appeals thus
read Colautti as establishing a curious rule of statutory construction that a court should not
interpret an abortion statute to render one part inoperative if another interpretation was possible
to render the entire statute unconstitutional. Id. at 1078. However, the court noted that the
word "counsel" was "fraught with ambiguity" and already had had the "pernicious effect" of
causing publicly employed healthcare personnel to be advised to make no comment relative to
abortion unless the abortion would be necessary to save the life of the mother. Id. at 1078 n.l1.
118. Id. at 1078-79 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 718 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1983)).
The circuit court's effort to distinguish PlannedParenthood,718 F.2d 938, because the Arizona
Attorney General previously had interpreted Arizona's statute narrowly is disingenuous because
the circuit court refused to accept the narrowing interpretation offered by the Missouri Attorney
General. See id. at 1078. The court's argument that the language in the Arizona statute was
"sufficiently different" to justify a different outcome in the case was particularly unpersuasive
because the court failed to identify what the differences were and why they were so significant
in constitutional analysis as to cause the court to reach the opposite conclusion.
119. Id. at 1079-80. The court noted that the restriction could cause a state-employed doctor
to violate his professional duty to convey all the information he thinks his clients need. Id. at
1079 n.12. If imposed on all doctors, such a requirement would clearly be unconstitutional; the
fact that the state imposed the requirement solely on public employees or contractors did not
save it. The court stated, "'The state's limitation on doctor-patient discussions reflects a state'
choice for childbirth over abortion in a way that prevents the patient from making a fully
informed and intelligent choice." Id. at 1080. This statement was ironic in light of the lower court's
decision that the state could not protect the woman's right to be informed whether or not she
was pregnant. Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 413-16. Finally, the court of appeals noted that the
funding cases were "completely inapt" because the effect of the statute was to erect an obstacle
in the path of women seeking uncensored medical advice. Webster, 851 F.2d at 1080. Judge
Arnold separately opined that these provisions violated the first amendment by restricting
speech on the basis of content. Id. at 1085 (Arnold, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Notably, both the district court and the circuit court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that this
funding restriction unconstitutionally infringed upon academic freedom in violation of the first
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The state chose to appeal only that portion of the circuit court's
judgment that invalidated the restriction on the use of public funds
to counsel or encourage abortion. The Supreme Court unanimously
accepted the state's saving construction of the appealed provision and
vacated the judgment with instructions to dismiss that portion of the
complaint.2 Chief Justice Rehnquist first addressed the question of
statutory interpretation and accepted the state's argument that section
188.205 was "simply an instruction to the State's fiscal officers not to
allocate funds for abortion counseling." Since the appellees had asserted that they were not adversely affected by that construction of
the statute, a case or controversy no longer existed on the issue, and
the Court unanimously agreed that the challenge to this provision was
moot.' 21 In her concurring opinion Justice O'Connor added a caveat
that construing section 188.205 to "prohibit publicly employed health
professionals from giving specific medical advice to pregnant women"
would revive the controversy.1'2
D.

Viability Testing

Section 188.029 of the Missouri Annotated Statutes requires a doctor who "has reason to believe" that the fetus is of at least twenty
weeks gestational age to determine whether the fetus is viable before
performing an abortion. m The statute further provides that "[in making this determination of viability, the physician shall perform . . .

amendment by forbidding instruction on certain subjects. See id. at 1084 n.18 (majority opinion);
Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 429-30. The circuit court held that none of the plaintiffs had standing
to raise the issue. Webster, 851 F.2d at 1084 n.18. Although none of the plaintiffs was a medical
student, three plaintiffs were physicians "associated with the University of Missouri Schools of
Medicine," Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 411. The circuit court never explained why the physicians
would lack standing to raise the issue.
120. Webster, 109 S.Ct. 3053-54; id. at 3060 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring
in the judgment); id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment); id. at
3069 n.1 (Blackmnn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 3079 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
121. Id. at 3053 (majority opinion).
122. Id. at 3060 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). Justice
Blackmun made a similar observation. Id. at 3069 n.1 (Blackmnun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Since Justice O'Connor cast the swing vote on all other issues, it may have been
prudent for the State of Missouri not to have appealed the invalidation of Mo. ANN. STAT. §
188.210 (Vernon 1989), which prohibits public employees from counseling or encouraging women
regarding nontherapeutic abortions.
123. Mo. ANN. STAT. § i88.029 (Vernon Supp. 1989). While the 20-weeks gestation point
is before viability, the four-week error-range makes the viability determination reguirement
appropriate at that point. Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 423.
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such medical examinations as are necessary to make a finding of the
gestational age, weight, and lung maturity of the unborn child.' ' 2 The
district court held that the first sentence of this provision was constitutional because the provision obligated the doctor only to make a determination of viability and did not interfere with his discretion in the
method of determination.2 However, rejecting the Missouri Attorney
General's narrowing construction, the court invalidated the second
part of the requirement which specified age, weight, and lung maturity
viability tests. 2 6 Reading the statute as requiring all three tests in
all cases, the district court held that the statute violated the Supreme
Court's declaration in Colautti v. Franklinm prohibiting the "'legislature [and] the courts [from] proclaim[ing] one of the elements entering
into the ascertainment of viability ...[to] be ...weeks of gestation[,]
fetal weight[,] or any other single factor."'' '

124.

Mo. ANN.

STAT.

§ 188.029 (Vernon Supp. 1989). Many states have similar statutes. See

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2301, -2301.01 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-16-706 (1987); FLA.
STAT. § 390.001(5) (1989); IDAHO CODE § 18-608(3) (Repl. vol. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 81-26 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-7 (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 707.10 (West 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.780 (Baldwin 1989); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:87.5 (West 1986); id. § 40:1299.35.4 (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.415,
.412(3) (West 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-108, -109(1)(c) (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §
28-330 (1985); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4161 (McKinney 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04
(Repi. vol. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-732, -734 (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3210-3211 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-307, -308 (Repl.
vol. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.15 (West Supp. 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-104 (1988).
125. Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 421. The district judge also rejected the plaintiffs' contention
that, because the statute did not provide an explicit exception for situations in which the health
of the mother is endangered, the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 423. Emphasizing the
court's duty to "seek to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent if possible," the district
court accepted the state's argument that the statute should be read in harmony with a previously
enacted section providing that a postviability abortion is not prohibited when necessary to
preserve the life or health of a woman. Id. The court's unexplained rejection of the Attorney
General's interpretation of the testing provision was ironic because here, two paragraphs later,
the court emphasized its duty to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. Id.
126. Id. The plaintiffs expert witness had testified that fetal weight tests cost $125-250
and were unreliable. Lung maturity tests or amniocentesis could add another $200-250 to the
cost of abortion, could not be performed usefully until at least 28-30 weeks of gestation, and
imposed additional health risks for both the pregnant woman and the fetus. Id. at 422. However,
uncontradicted testimony confirmed that ultrasound measurements were the only tests that
provided sufficient information to determine viability at 30 weeks gestational age or before. Id.
The Missouri Attorney General argued that the statute required only such examinations to be
performed as were necessary and effective to make the required viability finding (i.e., ultrasound
only, unless the fetus was substantially older), but the district judge rejected that interpretation
without explanation. Id. at 423.
127. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
128. Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 423 (quoting Colautti, 439 U.S. at 388).
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The court of appeals tersely affirmed, stating that "the Supreme
Court [had] squarely addressed this point" and that the Missouri legislature had "precisely" violated Colautti by requiring doctors to determine gestational age, weight, and lung maturity. 12 The appellate court
emphasized that without any exceptions or qualifications "the statute
plainly declares that[,] in determining viability, doctors must perform
''
tests to find gestational age, fetal weight and lung maturity. 130
1. Interpreting the Viability Statute
Despite the apparent violation of Colautti, the Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts and upheld the viability testing requirement.
The Court first concluded that the lower courts had erred in rejecting
the Missouri Attorney General's statutory interpretation that the
specified tests need be performed only when necessary to determine
viability. 131 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, noted that
the lower courts had failed to consider the second sentence of section
188.029 in the context of the whole law, its object, and its policy and
had violated the rule of construction that mandates that courts should,
when possible, interpret statutes to avoid constitutional problems.132
The second sentence could make sense only if it were read to require
useful tests; otherwise, the first sentence emphasizing the doctors'
discretion and professional judgment would be rendered meaningless. 33 Additionally, the lower courts violated Missouri's own canons
of statutory construction concerning legislative intent and reasonable,
14
harmonious construction. 3
Justice O'Connor concurred, agreeing that the lower courts committed plain error in rejecting the state's reasonable interpretation of its
own statute. The lower courts also erred in adopting the "contradictory
nonsense" construction of the second sentence. The second sentence
did not require viability testing in situations when such testing would

129. Webster, 851 F.2d at 1074-75.
130. Id. at 1075 n.5.
131. Id at 3054 (plurality opinion, consisting of Rehnquist, C.J. and white and Kennedy
JJ.) [hereinafter (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion)]; id. at 3060 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment); id. at 3066 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in

the judgment) (Scalia failed to specifically state the "plain error" position, but he clearly accepted
the state's interpretation of its own statute); see infra note 135.

132. Id. at 3054 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 3054-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
134. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
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be careless and imprudent "in the particular medical situation before
the physician." 135
The four dissenters argued that the Supreme Court was obliged
to defer to the lower courts' interpretations of state law. 136 Both Justice
Blackmun's and Justice Stevens's dissenting opinions emphasized that
the plain language of the second sentence, standing alone, required
viability testing at all times, even when unreasonable, ineffective, and
costly, and the lower courts had interpreted the statute accordingly. 137
2. Conflicting With Constitutional Doctrine
After accepting the state's statutory construction, the Webster
Court faced the question of whether the Missouri viability testing
provision, so construed, violated the abortion privacy doctrine estab13
lished by Roe and its progeny. A majority concluded that it did not. 8
Justice O'Connor (the only justice to vote with the prevailing side on
all of the issues) read the abortion precedents narrowly and emphasized
that the Colautti dictum did not forbid states from requiring appropriate viability testing. In her view, the lower courts' fatal mistake was
their erroneous interpretations of the breadth of the Missouri testing

135. Id. at 3060 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). Justice
O'Connor apparently wanted to underscore the need for deference to the reasonable judgment
of the attending physician.
Justice Scalia, also writing separately, accepted Missouri's interpretation of its statute without
explanation. Id. at 3066 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("it will sonetimes
require a physician to perform tests that he would not otherwise have performed") (emphasis
added). While Justice Scalia declined to join part II-D of the plurality opinion, he criticized only
the restraint of the constitutional analysis, not the statutory construction. Id. at 3066-67 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
136. Id. at 3069 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 3079-80 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
137. Id. at 3069-70 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 3080 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). None of the dissenters, however, argued that
the lower court construction correctly incorporated the Missouri legislature's intent. Indeed,
Justice Stevens acknowledged that the state's construction of its own statute was "the most
plausible nonliteral construction." Id. at 3079 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
138. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057-58. However, had the Court accepted the lower courts'
interpretation of the viability testing provision, the question remains whether the Court also
would have accepted the lower courts' conclusion that the provision was unconstitutional. The
four dissenters, who agreed with the lower courts' construction of the statute, stated that the
provision would have been unconstitutional, not only under Roe, but also because it would "not
pass constitutional muster under even a rational-basis standard." Id. at 3070 (Blackinun, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 3080 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). The majority, however, declined to speculate upon this question.
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requirement. 139 Reading Thornburgh, Colautti, and City of Akron narrowly, Justice O'Connor saw no conflict between the proper narrow
interpretation of section 188.029 and the proper narrow application of
the prior decisions of the Supreme Court regarding viability regula-

tion. 140
Justice Blackmun's plurality agreed that the state's interpretation
'
of the viability testing statute posed "little or no conflict with Roe."'
Adopting a significantly different position from the one he took in
Thornburgh and Colautti,'1 Justice Blackmun agreed that "[n]othing
in Roe, or any of its progeny, holds that a state may not effectuate

139. Id. at 3062 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). Actually, the
district court based its holding that the viability testing statute was unconstitutional upon the
dictum of Colautti. Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 423 (citing Colautti, 439 U.S. at 388). The district
court stressed 'that the final sentence of Section 188.029 [was] an impermissible legislative
intrusion upon a matter of medical skill and judgment. . . . [The State may not dictate that
a physician make a 'finding' [of] gestational age in order to determine viability." Id. After
presenting this analysis, the trial court added as a postscript that it "also rejected] defendants'
interpretation that only those tests which [were] 'necessary' to do so must be performed" because
"[t]he State may not dictate either the tests or the findings which enter into a decision whether
or not a fetus is viable." Id.
The circuit court cited with approval the district court's determination that constitutionally
"'[t]he State may not dictate either the tests or the findings which enter into a decision whether
or not a fetus is viable."' Webster, 851 F.2d at 1074 (quoting Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 423)
(emphasis in district court's opinion). By requiring specific findings or tests relating to the
viability determination, the circuit court was convinced that the Missouri statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 1074-75. Under that analysis the statute would be unconstitutional even if the
court accepted the state's construction. In a footnote the circuit court affirmed the district
court's rejection of the state's interpretation of its own statute. Id. at 1075 n.5. Thus, under
the view of the abortion privacy doctrine adopted by both the lower courts in Webster, the
Missouri viability testing requirement was unconstitutional whether interpreted broadly or narrowly.
140. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3060-63 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment). This narrowing reading of past abortion cases by Justice O'Connor was consistent
with her approach to the Roe and City of Akron dicta about a state adopting a theory of when
life begins. See supra notes 33 & 41 and accompanying text. The Rehnquist plurality's broad
reading of the viability cases, albeit honest, seems inconsistent with their narrow reading of
the Roe and City of Akron dicta about state adoption of a theory of life. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text. The four dissenters' narrow reading of the viability precedents was inconsistent with their very broad reading of the Roe and City of Akron dicta about a state adoption
of theory of life. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
141. Id. at 3070 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
142. Compare Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 766 (Blackmun, J., majority opinion) (recognizing
that recordkeeping and reporting provisions that are reasonably directed to the preservation of
maternal health and that properly respect a patient's confidentiality are permissible) with Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388, 392 (1979) (Blactmun, J., majority opinion) (recognizing that
viability may be a legitimate concern in drafting abortion statutes).
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its compelling interest in the potential life of a viable fetus by seeking
to insure that no viable fetus is mistakenly aborted."' Thus, the
state's interpretation of the statute "could be upheld effortlessly under
current doctrine.'" Therefore, Justice O'Connor and the four principal
dissenters constituted a majority holding that the viability testing
provisions were not unconstitutional under the abortion precedents.
The Rehnquist plurality disagreed. They found the Missouri statute, even construed narrowly, to conflict with the Court's prior abortion viability decisions. Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that Roe
and its progeny had emphasized the state's inability to restrict previability abortion. 145 That rule constituted the third prong of Roe's
"trimester framework.' 146 He noted further that, if section 188.029
"regulates the method for determining viability, it... superimpose[s]
state regulation on the medical determination of whether a particular
fetus is viable" in violation of Colautti.147 Moreover, he argued, if
Missouri's viability tests increased the costs of "second-trimester abortions," the testing requirement conflicted with the Akron holding that
regulations substantially increasing the cost of second-trimester abor48
tions were unconstitutional.1
The Webster Court's decision regarding viability testing indicates
a significant shift in the abortion privacy doctrine. First, the Court
unanimously repudiated the lower courts' broad reading of the abortion
precedents. Five Justices held that both lower courts had given those
decisions unnecessarily expansive application and noted that the Missouri statute, as construed by the state, presented an easy case that

143. Id. at 3070-71 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Likewise, the
minimal additional costs of such tests "would be merely incidental to, and a necessary accommo-

dation of, the State's unquestioned right to prohibit nontherapeutic abortions after the point of
viability." Id. at 3071 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

144. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens separately
agreed that the viability testing requirement, if construed as the state urged, "is constitutional
and entirely consistent with our precedents." Id. at 3079 (Stevens, J., concurring in part,

dissenting in part).
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 3055 n.14 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
See id. at 3056 n.14 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163).
Id. at 3056 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) (citing Colautti, 439 U.S. 379).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) (citing City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 434-35).

Writing separately, Justice Scalia noted that it was "an arguable question" whether the
Missouri viability testing provision violated Roe and its progeny. Id. at 3066 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). However, he concluded that the statute conflicted
with the Roe doctrine for the same reasons set forth by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and he sharply
criticized Justice O'Connor's analysis of the question. Id. at 3066 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment).
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could be "upheld effortlessly"'149 under the proper, narrow reading of
the precedents. The other four Justices argued that the lower courts
had not misread the unnecessarily broad language in the precedents
and proposed to restrictively modify the precedents. But, the Court
unanimously agreed on the propriety of a narrow reading of the abortion cases dealing with viability. Inasmuch as the Court thrice previously had invalidated legislative efforts to restrict postviability abortions,'5 and only once had upheld postviability regulation, 5 ' the Webster Court's shift to a narrow reading of the precedents invalidating
postviability restrictions represents a notable alteration in the understanding of the abortion privacy doctrine.
3.

Modifying the Roe Trimester Framework

The last question the Court addressed in Webster was the big issue:
"Should the Roe v. Wade ... trimester approach. . . be reconsidered
• . . in favor of a rational basis test?"'15 2 Although eight members of
the Court were willing to address the issue, they split four-to-four,
and that stalemate effected no modification of Roe.'0 Thus, while
Webster hardly constitutes a ringing endorsement of the Roe abortion
privacy doctrine (unless the ring is a death knell), the hard core of
that doctrine "[flor today, at least, . . . stand[s] undisturbed."' Al-

most.
While the Court appropriately may reconsider the validity of a
doctrine announced in a prior case even when reconsideration is un-

149. Id. at 3071 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("the testing provision,
as construed by the plurality[,] is consistent with the Roe framework and could be upheld
effortlessly under the current doctrine").
150. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768-71; Colautti, 439 U.S. 379; Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 388-89 (1976). Many lower courts have invalidated post-viability regulations based on broad interpretations of the Supreme Court viability cases. See, e.g., Charles v.
Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984), appeal dismised sub nom. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S.
54 (1986); Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976); Planned Parenthood v. Carey,
686 F. Supp. 1089, 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La.
1980).
151. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
152. Brief for Appellants, at ii, Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605).
153. Four Justices clearly answered in the affirmative, see infranotes 160-65 and accompanying text, three clearly answered in the negative, see infra notes 169-92 and accompanying text,
and one voted in the negative but hinted how the Court might salvage or recast Roe. See infra
note 193.
154. Id. at 3079 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Actually, the Webster
decision mortally wounded Roe's trimester framework but no official report of its demise has
been made. See infra text accompanying notes 205-09.
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necessary to the disposition of the case at bar, 1 5 a "venerable principle
of [the] Court's adjudicatory processes" demands the Court refrain

from doing

So.

15 6

Invoking this principle, Justice O'Connor declined to

address the big issue. She found "no necessity to accept the state's
invitation to re-examine the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade."'' 5 7
She reminded her brethren that "'[i]t is not the habit of the Court to
decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary
to a decision of the case."' ' She cautioned against hastily accepting
the task of reconsidering the Roe doctrine. Future cases would arise
and the Court would have 'time enough to reexamine Roe ....
159
carefully."

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, would have abandoned the "rigid trimester analysis" of Roe.' 60 He noted that the Roe
trimester framework resembled "a code of regulations rather than a
body of constitutional doctrine," placing the Court in the position of
acting "as the country's 'ex officio medical board.' ' 1 6' Such rigid detail
was inconsistent with the "notion of a Constitution cast in general

155. Cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82 (1938) (Butler, J., dissenting) (no constitutional question was argued in the lower courts or at the Supreme Court level); id. at 90-92
(Reed, J., concurring in part) (proper to overturn Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), but improper
to reach constitutional issue).
156. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Immigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39
(1885)).
157. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3060 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
158. Id. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)).
159. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor
reiterated her previous criticisms of Roe and its progeny, noting that she "continue[d] to consider
[Roe's trimester framework] problematic." Id. at 3063 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment). She criticized the way the City of Akron Court "distorted and misapplied
its own standard for evaluating state regulation of abortion" and alluded to an "undue burden"
standard of judicial review of abortion regulations. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment). In a dissenting opinion in an earlier abortion case, Justice O'Connor
suggested that this standard of review would be preferable to Roe's trimester framework. See
City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3062
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment) (noting the "degree of state
regulation" as a significant factor).
160. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3056 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion). The principle of stare
decisis does not preclude the Court from reconsidering prior constitutional interpretations that
have proven "'unsound in principle and unworkable in practice."' Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality
opinion) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)).
161. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3056-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
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terms. '' 162 He perceived no reason "why the state's interest in protect-

ing potential human life should come into existence only at the point
of viability" and not before. 16 While acknowledging that a pregnant
woman desiring an abortion could assert a due process interest, Chief
Justice Rehnquist argued that the state legislatures had the responsibility to deal with "'the most politically devisive domestic legal issue
of our time."'1I Thus, without overturning Roe, the Rehnquist plurality "would [have] modif[ied] and narrow[ed] Roe and succeeding
c as es . ,,,

Justice Scalia wrote separately to express his desire not just to
effectively overrule Roe, as the Rehnquist plurality opinion would
have done, but to "do it more explicitly." 166 He would not have "needlessly . . . prolong[ed the] Court's self-awarded sovereignty over a

field where it has little proper business."1 67 He pointedly rebutted
Justice O'Connor's argument that the Court had no business addressing
the big issue in this case and chastized the plurality for their unduly
cautious approach towards correcting the serious folly of Roe.16

162. Id. at 3056 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion). Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), from Roe because in Griswold the Court "did not

purport to adopt a whole framework, complete with detailed rules and distinctions" or to resolve
"once and for all by reference only to the calendar... the competing claims and constitutional
interests at stake." Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3057-58 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) (citing
Griswold, 381 U.S. 479).
163. Id. at 3057 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
164. Id. at 3058 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) (quoting id. at 3079 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
165. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
166. Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
167. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
168. Id. at 3064-66 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). For Justice
Scalia the only issue in the case was whether the Missouri statute was constitutional. That issue
required the Court to ascertain the test for constitutionality, Roe or something else. Id. (Scalia,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). While by straining the Court could have
upheld the statute under the Roe constitutional standard, good reasons existed for the Court
to reconsider the abortion privacy doctrine. Moreover, Justice O'Connor herself had reconsidered
other constitutional doctrines in other cases. Id. at 3064-65 (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment) (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706, 727-29 (1989)
(outlining criteria for race-based remedies); Perry v. Leeke, 109 S.Ct. 594, 599-600 (1989) (sixth
amendment violation to deprive defendant right to confer with counsel during trial); Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (overruling prior holding that a "deprivation" of liberty or property
could occur through negligent governmental acts)).
Justice Scalia listed four "valid reasons" reasons for "go[ing] beyond the most stingy possible
holding" in Webster. Id. at 3065 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
First, Roe had created "a chaos that [was] evident to anyone who can read and count." Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). Second, the basic issue was political
and Roe had distorted "the public perception of the role of this Court." Id. at 3064-65 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). Third, under Roe, states could not vindicate
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Justice Blackmun, author of the Roe opinion, wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion in Webster, reaffirming Roe, in which two other justices
joined. 169 He chastised the plurality for "needlessly reaching out to
address constitutional questions that [were] not actually presented"

by its "aggressive misreading" of the Missouri statute and by its

"needlessly wooden" reading of Roe and its progeny.170 The plurality
had manipulated the case "in the hope of precipitating a constitutional
crisis," so that it could, by "[b]ald assertion masquerad[ing] as reason-

ing," prevail without bothering to persuade. 171 He taunted Chief Justice
Rehnquist for failing to "even mention, much less join, the true jurisprudential debate" regarding the existence and scope of the unwritten
constitutional right to privacy.17 2
Justice Blackmun described the 'trimester framework" as "Roe's
analytic core,"'1 which was designed to effectuate the fundamental
constitutional right to privacy and which "safeguard[ed] the right of
women to exercise some control over their own role in procreation."' 1

their interests by legislation. Id. at 3066 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment). Finally, by avoiding the question, the Court faced "a mansion of constitutionalized
abortion-law, constructed overnight in Roe, [which had to] be disassembled door-jamb by doorjamb, and never entirely brought down, no matter how wrong it may be." Id. at 3067 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
169. Id. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Because "Roe would
not survive the plurality's analysis," he feared the decisions the future might bring. Id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Blackmun's opinion in Roe drew the
support of six other Justices. Sixteen years later, in Webster, only two others would sign his
opinion. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens dissented separately without joining the Blackmun opinion. Id. at 3084 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); see infra note 193.
170. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3069 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
171. Id. at 3070, 3072 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
172. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Blackmun's opinion was inconsistent because he condemned the plurality for failing to stretch to address this constitutional
question while at the same time he condemned the plurality for reaching out to address the
constitutional question concerning the trimester framework.
173. Id. at 3071 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
174. Id. at 3073 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[F]ew decisions
are 'more basic to individual dignity and autonomy'. . . [than] the uniquely personal, intimate,
and self-defining decision whether to end a pregnancy.") (quoting Thornburgh,476 U.S. at 772).
Justice Blackmun engaged here in making the same type of "[bald, assertion[s]" without
explanation for which he earlier had condemned the plurality. Id. at 3071 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). For example, why is the practice of abortion per se "basic to
individual dignity and autonomy"'? Id. at 3073 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772). Justice Blackmun described abortion as "the right
to make the uniquely personal, intimate, and self-defining decision whether to end a pregnancy."
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772).
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The trimester framework demanded "accommodations between individual rights and the legitimate interests of government"; the trimester
doctrine was "necessary to the wise and just exercise of [the] Court's
paramount authority to define the scope of constitutional rights."'175
Justice Blackmun noted that "vast areas of... constitutional jurisprudence" were equally as complex as the Roe trimester framework 76 and
that "'critical elements' of countless constitutional doctrines nowhere
appear[ed] in the Constitution's text."' 77

After defending the trimester framework, Justice Blackmun identified "viability" as the critical transition point in the abortion privacy
doctrine when the state's interest becomes sufficiently compelling to
justify general abortion prohibitions. 178 Justice Blackmun identified six
reasons why viability should remain the critical cutoff point in the
abortion privacy doctrine. First, keeping viability as the cutoff point

He also might have noted that abortion is a pretty significant "other defining decision" as well,
because "the other" is "defined" out of existence. Ironically, Justice Blackmun invoked the
"general principle, [or] the "'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to
society as a whole""' Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 777 n.5 (Stevens, J. concurring) (quoting Fried, Correspondence, 6
PHIL. & PUBL. AFF. 288-89 (1977))). The irony is that the central point of the abortion controversy is that, under the Roe abortion privacy doctrine, an actual, existing being, a person-in-themaking, does not belong to himself or herself, but belongs to and is totally at the mercy of another.
175. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). He asserted that, ironically,
the plurality accepted Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which did not protect any
state interests, and condemned Roe, which at least sought to accommodate state interests at
some point. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3072 n.7 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
176. Id. at 3073-74 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting "release
time" programs for religious instruction, helicopter fly overs, and interference with attorneyclient contact).
177. Id. at 3072 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
178. Id. at 3074 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Professor John Hart
Ely's criticism of the Court's viability approach in Roe went right to the heart of the problem:
'The Court's defense [of why viability is the critical point] seems to mistake a definition for a
syllogism." Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
924 (1973).
Justice Blackmun also criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist for not explaining his assertion that
the state's interest in potential life is compelling throughout pregnancy, not merely after viability.
Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3074 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Perhaps,
Chief Justice Rehnquist was merely mimicking Justice Blackmun's approach in Roe. The better
explanation may be that Chief Justice Rehnquist was not selecting a new cutoff point, but was
recognizing the existence of an interest which the Court previously had noted existed throughout
pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63; see also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981)
(distinguishing parental consent abortion law from other medical procedures on grounds the
state has a unique interest in "full term pregnancies"); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977)
(state has "legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth"); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,
446 (1977) (state has important interest in promoting childbirth).
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would balance a pregnant woman's interests with the state's interest
in potential human life. 179 Second, viability "mark[ed] that threshold
moment prior to which a fetus cannot survive separate from a
woman."' 18 Third, until the fetus can survive separately, it could not
"reasonably and objectively be regarded as a subject of rights or interests distinct from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant

woman."181 Fourth, viability was "an easily applicable standard for
regulating abortion."' Fifth, the viability cutoff point provided a
pregnant woman "ample time to exercise her fundamental right... to
terminate her pregnancy."' Finally, viability was a wise cutoff point
because "'an "anatomic threshold" for fetal viability [occurs at] about
23-24 weeks gestation'... [and thus] will remain[ ] no different from
what it was at the time Roe was decided."' 184 Thus, "logic and science
compelled" that viability constitute the critical transition point.'5

179. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3075 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The
same claim could be made with respect to any other point in the process of prenatal development,
from conception to birth. This reasoning does not explain, however, why viability, as opposed
to some other point in prenatal life, should be the critical point for constitutional analysis.
180. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The Court offered this
justification in Roe, and thus it is subject to the same criticism. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
181. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun did not
explain the reasoning behind this conclusion. For example, why should total biological independence be deemed an indispensable prerequisite for legal protection? For purposes of wrongful
death claims, wrongful life claims, homicide and feticide statutes, and trusts and wills claims,
many states regard the fetus as the subject of rights and interests distinct from, and equal or
in some cases paramount to, those of the pregnant woman, even before the fetus is viable. See
generally Wardle, Rethinking Roe v. Wade, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REv. 231, 252-54 ("prenatal life
of the fetus is recognized and respected in other areas of the law"). Many infants, medical
patients, and elderly are as completely, and much more inconveniently and expensively, dependent as fetuses. Are laws protecting their lives also unconstitutional?
182. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3075 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Of
course, the same could be said of many other points in prenatal development. If the lower
courts in Webster are to be believed, viability is perhaps not such an easy standard to apply.
183. Id. at 3075 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This argument begged
the question as a justification for subordinating the preservation of fetal life to feminist convenience. Justice Blackmun did not explain why the Court must give priority to a woman's desire
to terminate her pregnancy for any reason.
184. Id. at 3075, 3076 n.9 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting
Brief for American Medical Association, et al., as amici curiae, at 7). Justice Blaclmun therefore
rejected Justice O'Connor's criticism that Roe is "on a collision course with itself." Id. at 3076
n.9 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting City of Akron, 462 U.S. at
458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting opinion)). Justice Blackmun was both forgetful and mistaken on
this point. See infra text accompanying notes 241-44.
185. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Justice Blackmun next attacked Justice Rehnquist's standard of
review as "nothing more than a dressed-up version of rational-basis
review." 1 He saw three significant problems with Justice Rehnquist's
standard. First, it would overrule Roe. 187 Second, the standard was
too vague. iss Third, it "completely disregard[ed] the irreducible
minimum of Roe" because it extended no extraordinary protection to
the "limited fundamental constitutional right to decide whether to
terminate a pregnancy."19 According to Justice Blackmun, the Bill of
Rights placed some subjects beyond the reach of the democratic process, beyond the vicissitudes of political controversy, and beyond the
reach of majorities; a woman's decision whether or not to have an
abortion fell "within that limited sphere"19° Finally, the author

186. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
187. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
188. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This criticism, however,
contradicted his earlier charge that Chief Justice Rehnquist's standard of review was "nothing
more than" the well-established "rational-basis review." See supratext accompanying note 186.
189. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The plurality's gratuititous
indication that Roe survived their decision was mere pretense, he argued. He pointed out that
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion contained an "implicit invitation to every State to enact more
and more restrictive abortion laws," all of which would have to be upheld under "the plurality's
non-scrutiny." Id. at 3077 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). However,
recognition of a "compelling state interest" in protecting incipient life in utero would not, as
Justice Blackmun suggested, id. at 3076-77 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part), automatically mean that any or all abortion regulations or restrictions, including the
nineteenth-century Texas criminal abortion prohibitions, see Roe, 410 U.S. 113, would be constitutional. To pass "strict scrutiny," legislation that unduly burdens or infringes upon a fundamental right not only must serve a compelling state interest, but also must be "narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." Id. at 155 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut,
479 U.S. 485 (1965)); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (statute interfering
with the right to marry cannot be upheld unless it furthers important state interests and is
tailored to effectuate only those interests); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686
(1977) (regulations infringing on procreation decisions only may be justified by compelling state
interests, and the statute must be drawn narrowly to further only those interests); cf. Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (although family privacy is not beyond
regulation, the goals must be legitimate and the nexus important). Thus, some types of regulation
may sweep more broadly than necessary to protect carefully defined compelling state interests.
190. Id. at 3077 n.11 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice
Blackmun's invoking of the Bill of Rights was inapt because neither the text nor the history of
the Bill of Rights mentions the right to privacy or the right to abort. See infra text accompanying
note 273. Nor did Justice Blackmun explain why, in a nation founded on the belief that governments "deriv[e] their just Powers from the [c]onsent of the [governed," The Declaration of
Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776), the nondemocratic branch of the government is responsible
for creating such rights. The issue is not whether the Court is the "guarantor" of unwritten
constitutional rights, but whether the Court is the legitimate source and creator of them.
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of Roe vigorously invoked the doctrine of stare decisis and accused the
'
plurality of "discard[ing] a landmark case of the last generation."191
9
2
Overturning Roe' would send hundreds of thousands of women into
the hands of back-alley abortionists, "all in the name of enforced morality or religious dictates or lack of compassion," and allow the state
'to conscript a woman's body."'
E.

Webster's Immediate Doctrinal Impact

Justice Blackmun's declaration that Webster did not make "a single,
even incremental change in the law of abortion"' is inaccurate. Webster substantially cut back the doctrines of Thornburgh and City of
Akron. First, the Webster Court rejected the Thornburgh method of
interpreting state statutes dealing with abortion. 19 Thrice, the Webster
Court accepted the state's interpretation of its own statute, which the
lower courts had rejected. 196 Thus, the Court repudiated Thornburgh's

191.

Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3077 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

192. Justice Blackmun pointed out that it would be the first time the Court overturned a
decision that secured a fundamental personal liberty. Id. at 3078 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (This conveniently ignored the Court's last repudiated experiment
was substantive due process.). It would upset "millions of women... [who] have ordered their
lives around the right to reproductive choice." Id. at 3077 (Blacknun, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). According to Justice Blackmun, abortion had "become vital to the full
participation of women in the economic and political walks of American life." Id. (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
193. Id. at 3077-78 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
did not endorse Justice Blackmun's analysis of whether to overturn Roe. Justice Stevens agreed
that "no need [existed] to modify even slightly" Roe in order to uphold § 188.029. Id. at 3079
(Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Nevertheless, he took the opportunity to
question why any regulation of abortion in early pregnancy was unconstitutional. He emphasized
that, for at least some period in early pregnancy, the state may not restrain the decision to
practice birth control. Id. at 3081 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Without
endorsing the trimester framework, Justice Stevens suggested that "Missouri [had] the burden
of identifying the secular interests that differentiate the first 40 days of pregnancy from the
period immediately before or after fertilization when, as Griswold and related cases established,
the Constitution allow[ed) the use of contraceptive procedures to prevent potential life from
developing into full personhood." Id. at 3084 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(emphasis added). His opinion thus may be read as proposing an alternative to the trimester
framework analysis of the Roe abortion privacy doctrine.
194. Id. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
195. See id. at 3057 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
196. An unanimous Court accepted the state's interpretation of its statute restricting the
use of funds to encourage or counsel abortion. Id. at 3053-54 (majority opinion); id. at 3058
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment); id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment); id. at 3069 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part); id. at 3079 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Five Justices accepted
the state's construction of its preamble declaration. Id. at 3050 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality); id.
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"unprecedented cannon of construction" under which a "'permissible
reading of a statute [restricting abortion] is to be avoided at all
costs."'197 The Webster Court's message was unmistakable: plausible constructions of state statutes offered by the state, which render constitutional decisions unnecessary or which render the statute sustainable
under constitutional doctrine, are preferred and must be accepted by
the federal courts. This standard of construction is a marked departure
from previous cases. Second, the Webster Court eschewed the City of
Akron and Thornburgh Courts' expansive reading (what Justice O'Con-

nor called distorting and misapplying)19 of the abortion precedents.19
Third, the Webster Court subverted the doctrinal result of Thornburgh,
i.e., invalidating postviability regulations, by upholding previability
regulations to protect the viable fetus. 200 Fourth, the Webster Court
curtailed the City of Akron and Roe dicta, which courts had interpreted
to forbid official expressions of belief about the beginnings of life. 20 1
Finally, Webster repudiated the "bad intent" principle applied in
Thornburgh and City of Akron.2 The dissenting Justices in Webster
would consider the "bad" intent of legislatures as an element of con-

at 3058-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment); id. at 3064 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). Likewise, five Justices upheld the state's
interpretation of its viability provision. Id. at 3054-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion); id.
at 3066 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment); id. at 3066 n.* (Scalia,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). As Justice O'Connor noted, the Court
"accepted the State's every interpretation of its abortion statute and... upheld, under...
existing precedents, every provision of that statute which [was] propererly before [the Court]."
Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
197. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 812 (White, J., dissenting)); see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 407 (1979)
(White, J., dissenting) (noting the Court's incredible construction of the Pennsylvania statutes);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 99-100 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (majority
interpretation of statute was reading it 'through a microscope," effectively "attributing to the
Missouri Legislature the strange intention of passing a statute with absolutely no chance of
surviving constitutional challenge").
198. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3063 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
199. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772 (under Roe, states are not free to persuade women
to continue pregnancy); City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 416 (under Roe, ordinance regulating
second trimester abortions amd requiring parental consent for very young invalid).
200. See supra notes 123-51 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 22-62 and accompanying text.
202. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 771; City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 443-45. The circuit court
used the bad intent principle to find unconstitutional the declaration that life begins at conception,
Webster, 851 F.2d at 1075-76, the restriction on state resources to counsel or encourage abortion,
id. at 1080, and the prohibition on public employees performing or assisting abortions. Id. at 1083.
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stitutional analysis.2° The majority declined to accept that approach,
indicating that the intent to restrict or regulate abortion to the full
extent permitted under the Constitution was not a "bad" intent. The
likelihood that otherwise valid state legislation is intended to deter or
will deter some women from choosing abortion is no longer an acceptable reason for courts to strike down abortion legislation.2°4
F.

Webster's Significancefor Future Modifications of
the Abortion Privacy Doctrine

The Webster holdings modified and moderated the Roe abortion
privacy doctrine without fundamentally changing it. However, the
Webster decision is far more important for the doctrinal changes it
signified than for the changes it immediately achieved. Webster signified the potential for change regarding the trimester approach, privacy principles, the "right to life," and the standard of review for
deciding the constitutionality of statutes regulating abortions.
1. Replacing the Trimester Doctrine
In Webster most of the Supreme Court Justices favored replacing
the Roe abortion privacy doctrine. 205 Justice Scalia would have overruled Roe explicitly.2°6 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and
Justice Kennedy would have abandoned the "trimester framework"
and would have recognized a compelling state interest in protecting
potential human life throughout pregnancy. 2°7 Justice O'Connor emphasized the problematic nature of Roe's trimester framework and
stated that she would have examined previability regulation under a
standard different from the strict-scrutiny standard used in Roe and
its progeny. m Even Justice Stevens declined to join Justice Blackmun's
reaffirmation of Roe and wrote a separate dissenting opinion suggesting an alternative to the Roe rule that viability is the point at which
the state has an interest in protecting prenatal life. 2 °9 These opinions

203. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3068 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); id. at 3080, 3084-85 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
204. Cf. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (state has compelling
interest in protecting human life "'throughout pregnancy"') (quoting City of Akron, 462 U.S.
at 415 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
205. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3066 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment).
206. Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
207. Id. at 3056-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
208. Id. at 3063 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
209. Id. at 3084, 3085 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see supranote 193.
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suggest that in time the Court will forego the trimester framework
and adopt a more flexible approach requiring less judicial supervision
and providing more legislative responsibility.
2. Rethinking Privacy Principles
Webster reveals the Court's search for a less radical formulation
of constitutional privacy. 21° The privacy rationale underlying the abortion privacy doctrine has proven to be particularly inadequate. The
abortion privacy doctrine itself overreaches and is not well tailored
to the principle of privacy.11

210. While seven members of the Court supported the notion that a woman's decision to
obtain an abortion is a constitutionally protected liberty during at least some part of pregnancy,
see id.at 3055 n.14 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion); id. at 3072-73 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part); id. at 3081 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(Justices O'Connor and Scalia did not express their views on this point), only four Justices
invoked the broad privacy rationale. Id. at 3072-73 (Blackmn, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part); id. at 3081-82 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
211. In his dissenting opinion in Webster, Justice Blackmun attempted to restate a theoretical
justification for the Roe doctrine. Once again, his principal argument was framed in terms of
autonomy. The following excerpts illustrate his views: "few decisions are 'more basic to individual
dignity and autonomy,"' Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3073 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 722); within "that 'certain private sphere of individual
liberty,"' id. (Blackmn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 722); "uniquely personal, intimate, and self-defining decision," id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); "the "'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others
nor to society as a whole,"' id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 777 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Fried, supra note 174, at
288-89)); "the right of women to exercise some control over their own role in procreation," id.
at 3077; "that limited sphere of individual autonomy," id. at 3077 n.11 (Blacknun, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part); "the right to exercise some control over her unique ability to bear
children." Id. at 3077 (Blacknun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.
He made two other arguments in support of the Roe doctrine: (1) equal rights - abortion
choice is "vital to the full participation of women in the economic and political walks of American
life," id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); the plurality "casts into darkness
the hopes and visions of every woman in this country," id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); "millions of women, and their families, have ordered their lives around the
right to reproductive choice," id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); abortion
choice is "basic to individual dignity," id. at 3073 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part); and (2) realistic necessity - abortion protects women from "the physical labor and
specific and direct medical and psychological harms that may accompany carrying a fetus to
term," id. at 3077 (Blackmnn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); "hundreds of thousands
of women, in desperation, would defy the law and place their health and safety in the unclean
and unsympathetic hands of back-alley abortionists," id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); "many women, especially poor and minority women, would die or suffer
debilitating physical trauma." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Autonomy, choice, and privacy truly are major dimensions of the
abortion issue. Fear of the exercise of governmental power to curtail
independence always has concerned the American people.212 Pregnancy
is a matter of profound female and familial significance because of the

great, life-altering responsibility that comes with parenthood. Restricting abortion, however, is hardly tantamount to "conscript[ing] a
woman's body and to forc[ing] upon her a 'distressful life and future.' '' 213 Pregnancy results from a previously made choice,24 besides
providing an opportunity for further choice. Less severe methods of
alleviating, even altogether avoiding, the* "distress" of parenthood
exist. One can agree that the Constitution protects "the right of women
to exercise some control over their own role in procreation ' '21 without
accepting the premise that previability abortion is an absolutely "private choice" for a pregnant woman to make, irrespective of her circumstances and irrespective of any other interests of her spouse, her
partner, her family, the fetus, or society.26 Could not a legal realist
say that the abortion privacy doctrine, despite its female-liberation
rhetoric, actually exploits pregnant women by imposing on them alone

(not men, not couples, not families, not society) the burden of eliminating the problem of unwanted pregnancies?
The use of the concept of "privacy" in the abortion context conceals
the conflict between important values regarding abortion. The concept

212. See, e.g., D.

ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION

17-19 (1988);

Beschle, Autonomous Decision Making and Social Choice: Examining the "Right to Die," KY.
L.J. 319, 346 (1988-89).
213. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3077 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 153).
214. Pregnancy resulting from rape is the obvious, and only, exception to this observation,
and the ensuing autonomy analysis would not apply in the case of rape.
215. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3073 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 3077 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
216. Professor Mary Ann Glendon emphasized this point by demonstrating that American
abortion law, compared to the abortion law in other western nations, is "in a class by itself' at
the extreme libertarian end of the spectrum. M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN
WESTERN LAW 24 (1987). "If we were to broaden our field of comparison to include the seven
Warsaw Pact nations, we still would not find any country [in Europe] where there is so little
restriction on abortion in principle as there is in the United States." Id. at 23-24. "Today, in
order to find a country where the legal approach to abortion is as indifferent to unborn life as
it is in the United States, we have to look to countries which are much less comparable to us
politically, socially, culturally and economically, and where concern about population expansion
overrides both women's liberty and fetal life." Id. at 24 (emphasis in original). She cited Roe as
a prime example of the excess of individualism, whereby Americans expressed themselves in
language of isolation. Id. at 22-24, 42-45, 52-55, 112-16. "When applied to the family, the right
[of privacy] to be let alone often turns out in practice to be the right to leave others alone [i.e.,
to abandon responsibility to dependent-others]." Id. at 57; see also id. at 2, 14 tab. 1, 20, 22.
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of "privacy" helps the courts and society pretend that by prohibiting
state restrictions of abortion they are making no decision at all but
simply are deferring to individual autonomy. Thus, the notion of pri2
vacy masks decisions as nondecisions. 17
The Constitution undoubtedly protects some historically essential
relationships, choices, and decisions even though they are not described specifically anywhere in the text or the text of the amendments. 218 Recognition of some "unwritten" fundamental rights is historically justifiable 219 and essential to maintain and effectuate fundamental values which, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were

considered extralegal prerequisites for constitutional government. Because of our expanded conception of legal rights, the Court must
transform some of those eighteenth-century extralegal principles into
twentieth-century constitutional rights to preserve the complete
scheme of powers and liberties established in the Constitution.-O
The obvious problem with unwritten constitutional rights is determining what they are. Because the "right to privacy" means all things

217. J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AIERICA IN THE SEVENTIES 153-62
(1979) [hereinafter J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE]. 'The mask in law is a social construct
willingly used by a lawyer or a judge to permit him to suppress a human being without guilt
.... His mind attends to the fiction and is untroubled by what the fiction may hide." Id. at
154; see also J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS IN THE LAW 17-28 (1976) (the term "person"
comes from the Latin persona, which was a type of mask or disguise worn by an actor); cf. J.
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27, 38-39 (1921) ('Persons" are whomever

the legal system chooses to endow with legal rights and duties; whether the unborn are persons
'isa matter which each legal system must settle for itself."). See generally Beschle, supra note
212, at 322. It may be no coincidence that the Critical Legal Studies movement has sprouted
since the creation of the abortion privacy doctrine in Roe. See generally M. KELAN, A GUIDE
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1987) (first annual Conference on Critical Legal Studies
convened in 1977); Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J.
461 (1984) (viortually all of the material listed was published after 1975).
218. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (parental rights); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (foreign language in
school).
219. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IX; THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton); G. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 536-43 (1969); Levy, Bill of
Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 258-306 (2d ed. 1987).
220. See generallyJ. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THEAMERICAN REVOLUTION,
THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 3-9 (1986). "Eighteenth-century constitutional rights, however,
were not twentieth-century constitutional rights." Id. at 4. For example, Montesquieu distinguished '"manners" and "customs" from "laws" and noted that manners and customs were inappropriate subjects for legal regulation. II C. MONTESQUIEU, DE SECONDAT THE SPIRIT OF

LAW 23:14. Montesquieu was the most frequently quoted nonbiblical writer during the period
of 1760-1805, particularly during the decade of 1780 when the Constitution was drafted and
ratified. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-CenturyAmerican PoliticalThought, 78 Amf. POL. SCI. REV. 189-97 (1984).
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to all people, it invites judicial overreaching. Roe is a prime example.
The Webster plurality's open discussion of the Roe doctrine's flaws
foretells a future redefinition of the abortion privacy doctrine.Y1
3. Recognizing the Right to Life
Webster laid the groundwork for future consideration of the scope
of constitutional protection of the "right to life," including its prenatal
penumbras. 22 Five members of the Court have concluded that a compelling state interest exists for protecting unborn life throughout pregnancy.us Although the significance of the "right to life" for the founders

221. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion). This idea was the
thrust of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion regarding viability. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality
opinion). It also served as the predicate for Justice Scalia's opinion. Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 3084-85 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
222. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
223. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057; Thornburgh, 462 U.S. at 460 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
see also Record at 34-37, Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (No. 88-605).
Considering the lengthy dissenting opinion he wrote addressing the "great jurisprudential
issues" and attempting to justify Roe, Justice Blackmun's failure to address the issue of why
the constitutionally protected "right to life" does not extend to life before viability was a serious
omission. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057 (Blacknun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
In Roe Justice Blackmun brushed aside this question with an unconvincing technical argument,
Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 (only "persons" enjoy the right to life and fetuses are not persons), and
a disingenuous demand for certainty. Id. at 159 (Court is incapable of answering the question
"[w]hen those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are
unable to arrive at any consensus"). However, the technical argument mixed cause and conclusion:
if the Court had extended right to life protection to unborn human beings, then they would,
constitutionally be "persons." The demand for certainty was simply transparent. The Roe Court's
recognition of constitutional protection in the privacy "penumbras," id. at 152-53, rendered the
Court's grudging, technical analysis of the protection afforded by the "right to life" clause of
the fourteenth amendment inconsistent. The Court never before has insisted on operating in "a
stratosphere of icy certainty." Hughes, Address of the Chief Justice Honorable Charles Evans
Hughes, 13 A.L.I. PROC. 61, 64 (1936). As Hughes noted,
How amazing it is that, in the midst of controversies on every conceivable
subject, one should expect unanimity of opinion upon difficult legal questions! In
the highest ranges of thought, in theology, philosophy and science, we find differences of view on the part of the most distinguished experts, - theologians,
philosophers and scientists. The history of scholarship is a record of disagreements.
And when we deal with questions relating to principles of law and their application,
we do not suddenly rise into a stratosphere of icy certainty.
Id.
Professor Bickel observed, as well, that "[e]ven when the law pretends to be a science, it
is not, after all, mathematics." A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
97 (1970); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 64143 (1968); Glover, Matters of Life
and Death, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 30, 1985, at 19, 20, col. 4.
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of the Constitution is undeniable,2 modern constitutional theory has
not elaborated the full significance of the "right to life." Three dimensions of this right merit consideration. First, the balance between
individual freedom and governmental power struck in the Constitution
did not guarantee merely that those who were alive then would be
able to enjoy life, liberty, and property; the Constitution protects the
interests of future generations as well.m The Constitution is not bound
exclusively to the here and now.22 Even "our life points beyond itself
to our offspring, to our community, to our species." Thus, one
dimension of the "right to life" may guarantee that the exercise of
liberty and the pursuit of happiness by one individual will not deprive
another (even unborn) individual-in-being of the "life" prerequisite to
the enjoyment of constitutionally protected opportunities.
Second, the "right" to life stands as a bulwark against the "wrong"
of unjustified killing. The Anglo-American legal tradition never has
deemed the destruction of human life, in whatever stage or condition,

In contrast, the prevailing plurality (four Justices) specifically asked the question of whether
the constitutionally protected right to life merits consideration before viability. See supra text
accompanying note 163. Justice Stevens suggested that sentience (similar to the common law
notion of "quickening") is the critical point at which the interest in protecting the right to life
may be effective. See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text. Apparently, Justice Stevens's
test for the scope of the right to life is the ability to suffer. One wonders what that portends
for the right to persons who are asleep or comatose. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408
(Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240
(1989). On the other hand, the premise underlying viability is apparently dependence. Webster,
109 S. Ct. at 3075 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("as it loses its dependence
on the uterine environment").
224. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S.
1776); J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE, supra note 217, at 5-8; J. REID, supra note 220, at
19-20.
225. U.S. CONST. preamble ("and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity"); J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
288 (1984 ed.) (first published as 2-3 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (1840)) ("We are
.);
providing for our posterity, for our children & our grand children...
id. at 376 ("We should consider that we are providing a Constitution for future generations and
not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the moment."); id. at 551 ("As we are laying the
foundation for a great empire, we ought to take a permanent view of the subject and not look
at the present moment only."); see also C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 395-96
(1953).
226. As Edmund Burke, a contemporary and admirer of the American Founders, stated,
"[Society] is a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born." E. BURKE, Reflections on the Revolution
in France, in BURKE SELECT WORKS 1, 114 (E. Payne ed. 1881).
227. D. CALLAGHAN, SE rING LIMITs: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY 48 (1987).
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a purely private matter.m The worst chapters of human history teach

an unmistakable lesson about the terribly corrosive effect of killing
on individuals and societies that accept killing as a solution to social
problems.3 Killing, especially the killing of human beings, has a
brutalizing effect on the killer and society. 23° The "right to life" guarantee may be an intended bulwark against this social degradation.
Third, the moral expectations of a society verify and vindicate its
claim to liberty. The Roe doctrine, including the ethic of unrestricted

abortion-for-convenience that it has spawned, fundamental conflict with

228. Terminating the life of any creature, or more bluntly, killing, is an act of greatest
concern to society and to the law. Whether it be livestock raised to be slaughtered and eaten,
wild game to be hunted in sport, ice-locked whales, stray dogs, or even dangerous and destructive
insects, the state exercises significant control over the killing of most creatures. Four common
reasons counsel the exercise of great caution in permitting the killing of any living creature.
First, killing is a dangerous act. Sometimes in the process of killing the targeted creature, other
creatures are placed in jeopardy, are unintentionally injured, or are even killed. Second, killing
is an irremediable act. If the killer makes a mistake, no way exists to restore the lost life.
Third, the principle of respect for all life is a widespread, if latent, cultural value. From this
perspective, killing is the last alternative. For food provision, crop protection, medical experimentation, and wildlife management, the largest part of modern society believes that no practical
alternative to killing creatures exists. Still, laws requiring humane treatment in the killing of
animals underscore the persistence of some strain of this principle. Fourth, principles of nonviolence, mercy, and compassion discourage needless killing. Killing is a violent act, and dying
connotes pain and often produces fear in sentient creatures.
When the creature whose death is contemplated is a human being, states traditionally have
adopted even stricter regulations because the state's interests are more compelling. The state's
interest in restricting the killing of human beings - protecting what Jefferson believed to be
their first "inalienable" right - has been a matter of special priority in American legal doctrine
and political theory for more than two hundred years. See The Declaration of Independence
para. 2 (U.S. 1776). When killing concerns a human creature, the four common reasons for state
concern apply with increased significance, and several additional reasons exist for this particular
concern. First, respect for the equal worth of human beings is a fundamental principle of democracy. American political theory rejects the notion that the law generally can determine whose lives
are not worth living. See Sherlock, Liberalism, Public Policy and the Life Not Worth Living:
AbrahamLincoln on Beneficent Euthanasia,26 AM. J. JURIS. 47 (1981); see also R. SHERLOCK,
PRESERVING LIFE: PUBLIC POLICY AND THE LIFE NOT WORTH LIVING 15-74 (1987). Second,

ubiquitous religious values based on love or fear of the Creator of all life and His unequivocal
injunction, '"Thou shalt not kill," provide moral constraint. Exodus 20:13. Finally, the fear of
human nature and of the brutalizing, decivilizing effects of killing, reinforced by long, lamentable
chapters of history, counsel great care and constraint.
229. "'Death, once invited in, leaves his muddy bootprints everywhere." J. NOONAN, A
PRIVATE CHOICE, supra note 217, at 177 (quoting J. UPDIKE, COUPLES 380 (1968)).

230. See Glover, supra note 223, at 23. As Justice Brennan once noted, "[I]f the deliberate
extinguishment of human life has any effect at all, it more likely tends to lower our respect for
life and brutalize our values." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 303 (1972) (Brennan., J.,
concurring).
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the moral expectations necessary for the preservation of liberty and the
perpetuation of constitutional government, as sharply and significantly
as did the practice of slavery. 23 1 Perhaps, the "right to life" clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments require preservation of a vision
of the worth of life encompassing some degree of real protection for
even previable human developing life.
4.

Moderating the Standard of Review

The Webster decision suggested a more moderate standard of review for laws regulating abortion.23 2 With respect to Missouri's restriction on the use of public resources to further abortion, the Court
applied a rational-relation standard of review.2 The plurality also
applied a less-than-strict-scrutiny standard of review to the viability
regulations.2 Justice O'Connor indicated in concurrence that the degree of scrutiny that the Court should apply must be proportionate
to the degree of state intrusion upon a protected activity.2 She rejected applying the first amendment "overbreadth" doctrine to abortion cases23 6 and alluded to an "undue burden" standard of analysis,
23 7
which she had suggested and explained in earlier dissenting opinions.

Justice Blackmun argued in dissent that strict scrutiny should be the
minimum standard of review for all laws concerning abortion.m Thus,

231. If Lincoln rhetorically could wonder whether "every drop of slave's blood drawn with
the lash had to be repaid with another drawn with the sword," A. LINCOLN, Second Inavgural
Address, in 8 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHA!i LINCOLN 332, 332-33 (R. Basler ed.
1953) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS], modern Americans should wonder what the consequences of Roe and nearly two decades of unrestricted abortions will be for American society.
232. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3042-43. The Court distinguished collateral regulations,
which do not directly prohibit private abortion, and prohibitions of private access to abortion,
which directly restrain the abortion choice. See id.
233. Id. at 3051-52. The Court applied the same standard of review in the abortion funding
cases. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470
(1977).
234. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3055-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
2,35. See id. at 3062-63 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
236. Id. at 3060 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
2.37. Id. at 3063 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). See generally
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("judicial scrutiny of state regulation of
abortion should be limited to whether the state law bears a rational relationship to legitimate
purposes..., with heightened scrutiny reserved for instances in which the State has imposed
an 'undue burden' on the abortion decision"); City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 461-68 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia criticized this approach as being just as subjective and costly for the
principle of self-governance as the Court's flawed standard in Roe. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3066
n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
238. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3075-76 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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while the Webster Court did not classify the precise contours of the
standard of review it would apply in future cases, a majority of the
Court indicated it would not continue to apply the strict-scrutiny standard of Roe to all abortion restrictions. 239
Modifying the standard of review of abortion regulation is appropriate for three reasons. First, the Roe strict-scrutiny standard has
evolved into "a per se rule under which any regulation touching on
abortion must be invalidated if it poses 'an unacceptable danger of
deterring the exercise of [the right to privacy]."' 40 Yet, well-established
constitutional principles provide that regulations having harmless, collateral, or insubstantial impacts upon other fundamental liberties do
not trigger application of the strict-scrutiny standard of review.1

Significant intrusions upon fundamental rights are necessary before
the Court will apply strict scrutinyA4 In fact, even the Court's early
239. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
240. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 829 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 767-68 (majority
opinion)).
241. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977) ("State legislation which has some effect
on individual liberty or privacy may not be held unconstitutional simply because a court finds
it unnecessary, in whole or in part.").
242. In Roe the Court declared that "[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the
Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state
interest."' Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (citing Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963)). However, in all three of the cases relied on by the Court, the degree of intrusion that
triggered the strict-scrutiny standard was substantial. In Kramerthe Court reviewed legislation
which denied citizens the right to vote. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626-27. In Shapiro the Court
reviewed classifications which penalized the exercise of the fundamental right to travel. Shapiro,
394 U.S. at 634. In Sherbert the Court emphasized that the denial of benefits to persons who
practiced certain religious beliefs effectively penalized them for exercising their first amendment
rights. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. 1 am indebted to Professor Richard Wilkins for this insight.
Since Roe the Court has continued to require a significant intrusion upon fundamental rights
before applying strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (Court
reasoned that a "critical examination" is appropriate "when a statutory classification signifiwantly
interferes with the exercise of [the] fundamental right" to marry.) The Zablocki Court found
that rigorous judicial scrutiny is appropriate when legislation "interferefsj directly and substantially with the right to marry" and citizens "suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of
choice in an area in which [the Court has] held such freedom to be fundamental." Id. at 397
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). Further, "the Court has yet to hold
that all regulation touching upon marriage implicates a Tndamental right' triggering the most
exacting scrutiny." Id. at 403 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). In Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the Court found that state laws 'may 'significantly interfere
with decisions to enter into the marital relationship.' . . . That kind of interference, however,
is not a sufficient reason for invalidating every law reflecting a legislative judgment that there
are relevant differences." Id. at 499 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). "[T]he usual judicial deference"
is unwarranted when the government "undertakes such intrusive regulation [of a fundamental
protected right]."). Id.
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abortion decisions indicated that legislation regulating abortion was
not subject automatically to strict-scrutiny review. Only abortion regulations that unduly burdened the decision to abort triggered the
application of the strict-scrutiny standard.
Second, the Supreme Court in Roe emphasized that the right to
abortion privacy "cannot be said to be absolute."2 Yet, as the Webster
lower court decisions demonstrated, applying strict-scrutiny review
to regulations only collaterally impacting upon the abortion decision
inflates the scope of the unwritten right to privacy to near-absolute

dimensions.2 5 Nothing in the nature of abortion or the history of its

6
practice in America justifies such a favored status for abortion.2
Finally, the strict-scrutiny standard applied in Roe and its progeny
fails to pay deference to the structure of our democracy.24 7 As Justice
Powell stated, "A test so severe that legislation can rarely meet it
should be imposed by the courts with deliberate restraint in view of
the respect that properly should be accorded legislative judgments. " M
Repeated confrontations between the life-tenured judiciary and the
elected representatives of the people erodes the confidence of the
people in their judiciary.2 9

243. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980) (unequal subsidizing of abortion and other
medical services not unduly burdensome); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) (right to
seek abortion unduly burdened); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) ("right protects the
woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy"); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977) (state's refusal to subsidize nontherapeutic
abortions not unduly burdensome); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66 (1976)
(interference was unduly burdensome); Roe, 410 U.S. at 156 ("statute's infringement upon Roe's
rights"); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (regulation unduly restricted the
physician's rights and the woman's right of privacy).
244. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154; see also Maher, 432 U.S. at 473; Doe, 410 U.S. at 198 ("[A]
pregnant woman does not have an absolute constitutional right to an abortion on her demand.").
245. See supra notes 22-137 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986). Like the right to practice
sodomy, the broadly defined right to abortion privacy is neither 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty ...
[such that] neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed,"
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), nor is it "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition," Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
247. Those decisions are prime examples of one of the oldest and most oft-repeated criticisms
of the judicial abortion doctrine: the judges who created it and applied it "are not restrained
by a modest conception of the judicial function but will be activists when a statute offends their
policy preferences." A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 54 (1976).
248. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 705 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment).
249. Justice Powell noted in his concurrence to United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974):
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Excessive judicial review by federal courts of state abortion legis-

lation has been one of the most controversial and highly criticized
exercises of judicial power in the history of our nation.25 Numerous
legal scholars, including prochoice advocates, have criticized the abortion decisions for failing to articulate a persuasive principle that transcends mere "political judgment."'5 But, the standard of judicial review in abortion decisions of the Supreme Court has exacerbated the
obvious subjectivity. The abortion cases even have suggested that the

constitutionality of abortion regulations might depend upon such disparate factors as (1) the trimester of pregnancy regulated, 2 (2) prevailing medical opinions,2 and (3) legislative motives.25
Webster took the first step toward moderating and clarifying the
standard of judicial review of abortion regulations. Webster indicated
that the Court will defer to the state's reasonable policy judgment
when the state's challenged abortion legislation does not substantially
and directly curtail the private decision to choose abortion. In such
cases the Court will apply the rational-relation standard of review.2

[R~epeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch
and the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The public confidence essential to the former and the vitality
critical to the latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the
utilization of our power to negative [sic] the actions of the other branches.
Id. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring).
250. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 221-22 (White, J., dissenting); see also A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27-30 (1975); A. Cox, supra note 247, at 113; J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE

CHOICE, supra note 217, at 20-32; Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Berger Court, in THE
BERGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 198, 212 (V. Blasi ed. 1983);

Ely, supra note 178; Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159 (1974); Freund, Storms Over the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A.
J. 1474 (1983); Wardle, supra note 181, at 231.
251. A. Cox, supra note 247, at 13-14. Even federal judges charged with the duty of
developing the abortion privacy doctrine have "labelled Roe v. Wade massive 'judicial legislation."' Caldeira, Judges Judge the Supreme Court, 61 JUDICATURE 208, 212 (1977) ("For these
judges, the justices' opinions in Roe lacked sufficient reasoning to justify this judicial excursion
into the field of morals.").
252. See, e.g., City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 431-34; Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
253. See, e.g., City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 431.
254. See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763-71.
255. See id. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 461-67 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). A majority of the Court also has indicated that it is ready (in an appropriate
case) to uphold even some direct and substantial abortion restrictions if necessary to effectuate
the "compelling" state interest in protecting premature life. See supra note 223 and accompanying
text.
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III.

AUXILLIARY PRECAUTIONS: THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY

A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on
the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of
auxiliary precautions.

A.

Roe's Restructuring and Webster's Restoration

Roe v. Wade effected a substantial reallocation of law-making powers between the state legislatures and the federal judiciary. 7 Roe so
curtailed the legislative role that it rendered the American abortion
lawmaking process unique among western democracies.2 More importantly, the American abortion lawmaking process deviates from the
constitutional scheme of federalism and self-government.2 9 By constitutionalizing the abortion issue, the Roe Court placed the process
of developing abortion policy largely beyond the control of the states
and the legislative process. Roe foreclosed significant legislative initiative and political debate, processes widely and effectively utilized to

address the abortion issue. 260 Ironically, by depriving state legislatures
of the power to determine the legality of abortion, the Roe Court
terminated the very process by which a constitutional consensus regarding abortion could emerge.
Legislation restricting abortion is one of the oldest and most persistent expressions of self-government in America. In 1821 Connecticut

256.

THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison).
257. Indeed, after Roe it seemed that the government of the United States consisted of
one branch of government, rather than three, at least with respect to abortion issues.
258. From the comparative point of view, abortion policy in the United States is "singular
...because [it] was not worked out in the give-and-take of the legislative process." M. GLENDON,
supra note 208, at 24-25. To a greater extent than in any other developed country in North
America or Western Europe, the courts in America "have shut down the legislative process of
bargaining, education, and persuasion on the abortion issue." Id. at 2; see also id. at 25, 44-47,
62. Even compared to non-Western nations, the degree to which the American judiciary has
curtailed the legislative process is remarkable. For instance, in Japan, which has an extremely
liberal abortion law and a practice of abortion comparable to that in the United States, the
legislature established and has continued to debate and modify the nation's abortion policy. See,
e.g., S. COLEMAN, FAMILY PLANNING IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 18-29, 57-86 (1983); Wagatsuma,
Induced Abortion in Japan, in BASIC READINGS ON POPULATION AND FAMILY PLANNING
IN JAPAN 101-11 (M. Muramatsu 3d ed. 1985); Ishihara, A History of the Eugenic Protection
Law, 53 SANFUJINKA CHIRYO 391 (1986) (copy and translation in author's possession); Ishii,
The Abortion Problem in Family Law in Japan: A Reconsideration of Legalized Abortion
Under the EugenicProtectionLaw, 26 ANN. INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 64, 69 (Mar. 1985).
259.

See infra text accompanying notes 326-57.
WARDLE & M. WOOD, A LAWYER LOOKS AT ABORTION 33-44

260. See generally L.

(1982) (discussing reforms in abortion law prior to Roe that allowed abortions when "justified").
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became the first state to adopt a statute prohibiting abortion. 2 1 By
1861 more than two-thirds of the states had adopted statutes prohibiting abortion, and by the end of the nineteenth century virtually every
state had enacted legislation prohibiting most abortions.2 This abortion legislation was substantially identical to the common law which
for many centuries had prohibited abortion in England and America.2
The enactment of abortion legislation essentially codifying the common
law expressed the preference of citizens in these young democracies
to have their elected representatives, not judges, determine abortion
law (even if the result was essentially the same). Today, the persistence of state legislatures in enacting abortion legislation, despite more
than a decade of judicial hostility, continues this historic preference
26
for legislative rather than judicial policymaking regarding abortion. 3
Legislation regarding abortion is inevitable.26 The only question
is whether the state legislatures or the federal courts will take the

261. See generally id. at 30 (using the history of abortion law in Connecticut to exemplify
the legal treatment of abortion in the United States) (citing CONN. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 14, 16
(1821) (based on Lord Ellenborough's Act (Miscarriage of Women Act), 1803, 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58
(enacted to prevent 'malicious" abortions)).
262. See generally J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978) (tracing evolution of abortion policy in the United States from tolerance
in 1800 to antiabortion legislation in 1900); Delapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology,
Morality, and Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 389-407 (1979); Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Needfor Life ProtectiveAmendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250 (1975); Quay, Justifiable
Abortion- Medical and Legal Foundations,49 GEo. L.J. 395 (1961); Witherspoon, Reexamining
Roe: Nineteenth Century Abortion Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 29 (1985).
263. As early as the thirteenth century, Bracton had declared that the abortion of a 'formed
or quickened" fetus constituted common law homicide. 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 341 (Thorne ed. 1968) (G. Woodbine trans.); see also 3 E. COKE, THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50-51 (rev. ed. 1979) (1st ed. 1628). While over time,
the relevance of "quickening" increased and the severity of sanctions imposed decreased, the
basic approach of prohibiting abortions generally and making narrow exceptions for cases of
necessity remained remarkably constant. See L. WARDLE & M. WOOD, supra note 260, at 28-29.
Blackstone's COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, published on the eve of the
American Revolution, summarized the common law regarding abortion:
Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual;
and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the
mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise,
killeth it in her womb; or if anyone beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body,
and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder was by the ancient
law homicide or manslaughter. But the modern law doth not look upon this offense
in quite so atrocious a light, but merely as a heinous misdemeanor.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130-31.
264. See infra text accompanying notes 316-21.
265. See id.
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initiative. The Webster Court returned to the historic pattern of state
legislative initiative, partially removing the judicially erected barriers
that have prevented the legislative process from operating effectively
266
to settle public policy regarding abortion.
The Webster Court took a significant step to restore federalism by
reinstating the state legislatures in the role of determining the substance of abortion laws. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion endorsed
the primary role of the legislature in establishing abortion policy.2 7

266. State legislators may not welcome this message. No longer can they blame the Court
for the policy or the law. They must deal with what clearly is a "hot" political issue, and they
must share the burden and the blame for the law.
267. For the Court he quoted with approval from Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977), in
which "t]he Court emphasized that the Mayor's decision to prohibit abortions in city hospitals
was 'subject to public debate and approval or disapproval at the polls,' and that 'the Constitution
does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a preference
for normal childbirth."' Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3053 (quoting Poelker, 432 U.S. at 521 (1977);
see also id. at 3051 (discussing cases in which the Court upheld state and city regulations
providing aid to pregnant women choosing childbirth over abortions). For the plurality Chief
Justice Rehnquist strongly endorsed the primary role of state legislatures in determining abortion
policies through democratic processes:
There is no doubt that our holding today will allow some governmental regulation
of abortion that would have been prohibited under the language of cases such as
Colautti... and Akron ....
But the goal of constitutional adjudication is surely
not to remove inexorably "politically divisive" issues from the ambit of the legislative process, whereby the people through their elected representatives deal with
matters of concern to them . . . . The dissent's suggestion, . . . that legislative
bodies, in a Nation where more than half of our population is women, will treat
our decision today as an invitation to enact abortion regulation reminiscent of the
dark ages not only misreads our views but does scant justice to those who serve
in such bodies and the people who elect them.
Id. at 3058 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion). He added that "[t]he goal of constitutional
adjudication is to hold true the balance between that which the Constitution puts beyond the
reach of the democratic process and that which it does not." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality
opinion).
Likewise, Justice Scalia's concurrence expressed particular concerns about the "costs" that
the abortion privacy doctrine was having "for the Court and for the principles of self-governance."
Id. at 3066 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). He noted, in the
first place, that "most of the cruel questions posed [were] political and not juridical," id. at 3064
(Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment), and that the political branches of
government were more appropriate targets for "the sort of organized public pressure" that the
abortion cases, particularly Webster, had generated. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring
in the judgment). Furthermore, abortion was "a political issue," id. at 3065 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment), and the Court's "self-awarded sovereignty over a field
where it [had] little proper business," id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment), had done "great damage" to the Court by "continuously distort[ing] the public
perception of the role of [the] Court." Id. at 3065 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment).
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Justice O'Connor's concurrence did not discuss her view of the proper

role of state legislatures in setting abortion policy.m She cited, however, her dissenting opinions in City of Akron and Thornburgh, which
outline her support of federalism in the form of state legislative
power. 269
Yet, a strong minority are reluctant to trust the resolution of
abortion policy to the democratic processes. Justice Blackmun's sharp
dissent expressed his fears that state legislatures will re-enact "the
severe limitations that generally prevailed in this country before January 22, 1973,' ' -7 the date of the Roe decision. 271 He perceived a
"coercive and brooding influence" in the state legislatures and thus
"fear[ed] for the future."'' He argued that "'the very purpose of a
Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the Courts."' He acknowledged that abortion "involves the most

268. As a former state legislator herself, Justice O'Connor might have a particularly well-informed opinion on the subject.
269. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3053 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment) (citing Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); City of Akron, 462 U.S.
at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). In Thornburgh she emphasized, "[T]he Court is not suited
to the expansive role it has claimed for itself in the series of cases that began with Roe v.
Wade." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In City of Akron she noted,
"[L]egislatures are better suited to make the necessary factual judgments in this area." City
of Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 456 n.4 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that legislators have superior fact-finding capabilities as compared to
courts). She stated that recognizing the state legislatures' superiority to take the initiative in
setting abortion policy did not constitute judicial nonfeasance:
[Taking initiative] does not mean ... that [the Court should merely] defer to the
judgment made by state legislatures. 'The point is, rather, that when we face a
complex problem with many hard questions and few easy answers we do well to
pay careful attention to how the other branches of Government have addressed
the same problem."
Id. at 465 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973)); see also id. at n.10 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the
amicus curiae brief in support of the City of Akron by the Solicitor General of the United States).
270. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The
characterization of the abortion laws in effect on January 22, 1973 as "severe" is highly debatable.
271. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
272. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
273. Id. at 3077 n.11 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting West
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). Justice Blackmun seems to have
forgotten, however, how the Bills of Rights came into being. It was not, like the abortion
privacy doctrine, by ipse dixit or judicial fiat. The Bill of Rights resulted from a great political
compromise, following intense national debate. A two-thirds vote of Congress passed the Bill of
Rights, which consisted of 12 proposed amendments. State legislatures ratified 10 of those
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politically devisive domestic legal issue of our time,"' 4 but maintained
the Court has a "constitutional duty" to place that issue "beyond the
reach of the democratic process" and "beyond the will or the power

of any transient majority."' '
B.

5

The Rule of Law and the Structure of Liberty
1. Self-Government

By making room for reasonable legislative judgment, the Webster
Court reaffirmed the separation of powers and strengthened the liberty

envisioned by the Founders. The drafters of the Constitution sought
to establish what John Adams called "a government of laws and not
of men."'' The Founders believed that separation of powers was "essential to the preservation of liberty."' - As Robert H. Jackson later
wrote, "[T]he rule of law is in unsafe hands when courts cease to

amendments in the requisite three-fourths of the states. The other two proposed amendments,
which did not receive requisite state ratification, did not become part of the Bill of Rights. See
generally H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 64-70 (1981).
274. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3079 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
275. Id. at 3077 n.11 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Given the
centuries of consistent proscription of abortion in Anglo-American common law and statutes,
see supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text, Justice Blackmun's reference to 'transient"
majorities was rather curious.
Justice Stevens's partial dissent did not discuss directly the proper role of the legislature.
See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3079-85 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). But, in
Thornburgh he stressed the importance of protecting the right of individuals 'to make decisions
that have a profound effect upon their destiny" free from 'the will of a transient majority."
Thonzburgh, 476 U.S. at 781-82 (Stevens, J., concurring).
276. Adams, Massachusetts Bill of Rights: 1780, in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY
110 (H. Commager ed. 1968). The heart of this concept is that persons exercising governmental
authority are subject to definite legal limitations on the exercise of that authority. See A.
McLAUGHLIN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 104 (1961).
277. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (A. Hamilton) ('The regular distribution of power
into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks;... the representation of the people in the legislature ... these ... are means ... by which the excellencies
of republic government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided"); id. No. 47
(J. Madison) ("No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the
authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty[,J than that [the separation of powers is essential
to liberty]."); id. No. 47 ('"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."); id. No. 48 (J. Madison)
("It is agreed on all sides that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought
not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments."); id. No.
51 (J. Madison) ("[That well-established maxi... requires a separation between the different
departments of power."); id. No. 66 (A. Hamilton) ("[Tihe preservation of liberty requires that
the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct.").
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function as courts and become organs for control of policy."8 The
Founders were mindful of this risk. Their hope that the judiciary
would "always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the
Constitution" because it would possess "neither FORCE nor WILL
but merely judgment"' 9 presupposed judicial respect for the Court's
institutional boundaries. As Hamilton declared, "[T]he general liberty
of the people can never be endangered from [the judiciary] . . . so
long as the judiciary remains truly distinctfrom both the legislature
and the executive .... '[T]here is no liberty if the power of judging

be not separated from the legislative and executive powers."'
Besides the need to maintain separation of powers, the need to
preserve public confidence in the federal judiciary also mandates judicial self-restraint.2 1 When the Court creates new constitutional rights,
and then proceeds to interpret and measure the scope of its own
creation, the Justices invariably violate James Madison's first principle
'
of impartial justice by becoming "judge[s] in their own cause."

278. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 322 (1941).
279. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); see also id. No. 81 (A. Hamilton) ("It may
in the last place be observed that the supposed danger of judiciary encroachments on the
legislative authority, which has been upon many occasions reiterated, is in reality a phantom.").
280. Id. No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (quoting 1 C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
186) (edition unknown) (emphasis added); see also id. No. 48 (J. Madison) ("It is equally evident
that none of [the three branches of government] ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an
overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective powers."). For
this reason the drafters of the Constitution rejected the suggestion that the federal judiciary
serve in a "Council of Revision" to pass upon the wisdom of "every act of the National Legislature
before it shall operate." M. FARRAND, 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 21 (1911). Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts argued that he "did not see the advantage
of employing the Judges in this way ....
because [judges] are not to be presumed to possess
any peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of public measures." 2 id. at 73 (quoting Nathaniel
Gorham). It also was argued that it was 'necessary that the Supreme Judiciary should have the
confidence of the people" and this confidence would "soon be lost, if [judges] are employed in
the task of remonstrating against popular measures of the Legislature." Id. at 76-77. Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts asserted that "[hie relied for his part on the Representatives of the
people as the guardians of their Rights and interests." Id. at 75 (quoting Elbridge Gerry).
During the darkest days of the Republic, when a decision of the Court had provoked a national
crisis that soon would lead to a bloody civil war, Abraham Lincoln also perceived this danger:
[I]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people
is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are
made in ordinary litigation between parties and personal actions[,] the people will
have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their
Government into the hands of the imminent tribunal.
A. LINCOLN, FirstInauguralAddress, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS, supranote 231, at 262, 268.
281. See A. Cox, supra note 247.
282. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
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Moreover, the absence of a constitutional consensus for the abortion
privacy doctrine compels respect for legislative resolution of such a
controversial issue.28 The legislature can better address controversial
issues and resolve them fairly because of its superior fact-finding capability28 and public accountability (by popular election and direct political accessibility).2 Furthermore, the proper functioning of the open
legislative processes 28 benefits democracy by fostering societal respect
for the lawmaking system. The toll of the abortion cases on the Court's

Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (emphasizing the lack of a constitu28.
tional consensus in a minority set-aside equal protection program, which might demand legislative
resolution). That is what government "of the people, and by the people, and for the people" is
all about. A. LINCOLN, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg, in
7 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 231, at 22-23 (final text version).
284. As Justice Black once stated, "When a 'political theory' embodied in our Constitution
a majority ... of this Court are not only without constitutional power
becomes outdated ...
but are far less qualified to choose a new constitutional theory than the people of this country
proceeding in a manner provided by Article V." Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 678 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Ely, supra note 178, at 935 n.89 ("[B]ecause the
claims involved [in the abortion controversy] are difficult to evaluate, I would not want to
entrust to the judiciary authority to guess about them - certainly not under the guise of
enforcing the Constitution."). See generally Schneider, Moral Discourseand the Transformation
of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1867 (1986).
285. Justice Powell warned in his concurring opinion in United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 188 (1974): "We should be ever mindful of the contradictions that would arise if a
democracy were to permit general oversight of the elected branches of government by a nonrepresentative, and in large measure insulated, judicial branch." Id. The political process provides
a means to secure the "continuing consent" necessary for the government to maintain its claim
to contemporary moral validity. Id. (Powell, J., concurring); see generally D. ELAZAR, supra
note 212, at 100.
286. One commentator noted,
[T]he exercise of [the judiciary's power of review], even when unavoidable, is
always attended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative
mistakes comes from the outside, and the people thus lose the political experience,
and the moral education and stimulus that come from fighting the question out in
the ordinary way .... The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great
function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of the
people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.
J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHAL 106-07 (1901); see also Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 373 (1981)
(Powell, J., concurring) (state legislatures, responsive to the interests of all the people, normally
are better qualified to make judgments concerning local problems than the federal courts); infra
text accompanying notes 326-28.
In this sense the "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the
people in as great a degree as the courts." Missouri K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270
(1904), cited in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977). As Judge Learned Hand wrote,
"For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I
knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not." L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70 (1958).
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institutional integrity demonstrates the wisdom of judicial deference
to the policy decisions of the legislative branch when a controversial
policy has not reached the level of constitutional consensus.2
2. Federalism
Webster also reflects the influence of the revival of federalism on
the abortion privacy doctrine.2 Federalism recognizes the fact that
the things that matter most in life matter differently to different
people. Thus, the genius of our Constitution is that it is "made for
people of fundamentally differing views." ' 9 Federalism, the form of
American government,-9 checks concentrated governmental power,2 1

facilitates participatory self-government, 2 and protects the right of

287. The abortion privacy doctrine has jeopardized the institutional boundaries of the judicial
branch. Every year antiabortion protestors rally in Washington, D.C. on January 22, the anniversary of the Roe decision. In 1989 police estimated that 67,000 protestors gathered despite
midwinter conditions. See Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1989, at Al, col. 1. The Webster decision created
even more chaos. Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators marched to influence the Court's
decision. Id., Apr. 10, 1989, at Al, col. 2. The Court received "carts full of mail from the
public." Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3065 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
The New York Times reported that at one point during the pendency of the Webster case the
Court was receiving 40,000 letters (40 times the normal number) and hundreds of phone calls
each day from prolife and prochoice supporters. N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1989, at A 23, col. 1.
Moreover, the intense popular media interest caused a "circuslike atmosphere" to prevail at the
Court. Wall St. J., June 16, 1989, at Al, col. 5. And, as Justice Scalia noted, the Court was
inundated by "organized public pressure" directed toward influencing the Justices' vote. Webster,
109 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment); see also supra
note 12 (unprecedented number of amicus briefs). If our constitutional system of government
were functioning properly, those protestors, letter-writers, lobbyists, and journalists would have
been focusing their attention on the statehouses, not at a courthouse.
288. See generallyAmar, Of Sovereignty andFederalism,96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987) (healthy
competition among limited federal and state governments spurs the race toward constitutional
remedies); Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardiansof IndividualRights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986); Cox, Federalismand Individual
Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1978) (strongest and most consistent
trend of Court is a policy of limiting federal power); Merritt, The Guarantee Clause in State
Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988) (the political process
gives states their primary protection against destructive federal intrusions); Rapaczynski, From
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudenceof Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV.
341; Spaeth, Toward a New Partnership:The FutureRelationshipof Federal and State Constitutional Law, 49 U. PiTT. L. REV. 729 (1988) (partnership between federal and state courts
would greatly strengthen and enrich the law).
289. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
290. D. ELAZAR, supra note 212, at 6, 14.
291. See Merritt, supra note 288, at 4-6; Rapaczynsld, supra note 288, at 380-95.
292. See Merritt, supra note 288, at 7-8; Rapaczynski, supra note 288, at 395-408.
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state governments to experiment in social progress.m Federalism also
guarantees pluralism.2

293. See Merritt, supranote 288, at 9-10; Rapaczyynski, supra note 288, at 408-14. Justice
Brandeis's classic statement of the proposition merits reiteration:
To stay experimentation and things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court
has the power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute which
embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable. But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our
guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Likewise,
Justice Holmes wrote,
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compilation of its words to prevent the making of social
experiments that an important part of the community desires, in the insulated
chambers afforded by several States, even though the experiments may seem futile
or even noxious to me and to those whose judgments I most respect.
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter echoed
that concern when he wrote,
The veto power of the Supreme Court over the social economic legislation of
the states, thus exercised through the due process clause, is the most vulnerable
aspect of undue centralization. It is . . . the most destructive, because judicial
nullification on grounds of constitutionality stops experimentation at its source,
and bars increase to the fund of social knowledge by scientific tests of trial and
error . . . . The inclination of a single Justice or two, the tip of his mind or his
fears, may determine the opportunity of a much needed social experiment to survive, or may frustrate for a long time intelligent attempts to deal with the social evil.
F. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 50, 51 (1930). More recently, in
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977), another privacy decision, the Court emphasized that
individual states must "have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems
of vital local concern." Id. As the Court noted in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973) (ironically, the same year it decided Roe):
The ultimate wisdom as to these [issues] is not likely to be divined for all time
even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate [them]. In such circumstances,
the judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible
constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research
and experimentation so vital to keeping even partial solutions to [such] problems
and to keep abreast of ever changing conditions.
Id. at 42-43.
294. One scholar has noted,
For the United States it can fairly be said that federalism has been of the
utmost importance in maintaining pluralism. Federalism has worked in both directions at various times: in the ability of the states to resist federal encroachments
and in the ability of the federal government to assault state-fostered or sanctioned
encroachments on the legitimate pluralism. What is important about federal ar-
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In one sense Roe v. Wade and its progeny furthered pluralism by
mandating radical individualism.29 However, radical individualism is
not the only, or necessarily the best, form of pluralism. By forcing a
policy of strict individualism regarding abortion in every state, the
Court abolished all other forms of pluralism. By insisting on uniform
radical individualism, the Court's abortion decisions subverted other
manifestations of pluralism, including the open-minded eclecticism of
state legislation on criminal, family, and moral matters that has characterized American law.
By disregarding state legislation even when no overriding federal
interest exists, federal courts erode the constitutional allocation of
lawmaking functions between state and federal governments.
By
constitutionalizing the abortion issue in derogation of federal principles and by imposing its expansive abortion privacy doctrine on the
states, the Court drifted away from that federalism and disregarded

the reality of diversity, plurality, and evolving morality in American
society.2 7 The Supreme Court has a primary responsibility to preserve
the structure of constitutional government, which has fostered an unprecedented enjoyment of human liberty. By circumventing the federal
structure, the abortion decisions paradoxically undermined pluralism
in the name of pluralism.2ss By imposing on all states a policy of
unrestricted previability abortion, the Court obliterated the genius of

structural pluralism.2 9 By mandating a national abortion policy despite
the lack of a national consensus regarding abortion, the Court thwarted
the process by which consensus emerges from pluralism2 °
rangements is not a simple matter of power devolved by the more complex matter
of power shared, allowing different avenues of recourse for injured parties or for
those who wish to protect themselves against injury.
D. ELAZAR, supra note 212, at 51.
295. See id. at 45-47.
296. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (two conflicting systems of law controlling the primary activity of citizens gives rise to a debilitating uncertainty in the planning of every day affairs).
297. The fact is that the world is "'more like a federal republic than like an empire or a
kingdom."' Levinson, William James and the Federal Republican Principle, PUBLIUS, Fall
1979, at 65 (quoting W. JAmEs, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE 145 (1977)).
298. Id. at 50 ("In other words, pluralism is not enough [to preserve pluralistic values]
because sentiments for pluralism are not enough. Only constitutional barriers will overcome the
natural propensity of ambitious men to consolidate power"); see also id. at 17-18, 22, 47, 52,
134-38, 140-47, 159, 166-77.
299. D. ELAZAR, supra note 212, at 159 (structural pluralism is an organization with
"multiple channels, intelligent redundancy, fail-safe mechanisms, and cells linked together so
that not every cell has to function perfectly for the system to work').
300. See Sandalow, Federalismand Social Change, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1980, at 1, 29-36. At the time the Court decided Roe, "a national consensus plainly had not
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IV. THE

CREATION AND CONSTRAINTS OF CONSENSUS
AND TOLERANCE

A.

Constitutional Consensus

Since the Founders gathered in Philadelphia in May of 1787, the
underlying and overarching goal of American "government by the
people" has been to achieve "a more perfect Union."301 The American
constitutional system depends upon the states to foster shared moral
values and conceptions of the common good. 302 The Constitution's
shared sovereignty scheme of federalism guarantees that in the absence of a constitutional consensus, i.e., a clearly manifest, sustained,
super-majoritarian solidarity, a policy may not be enforced as the
303
supreme law of the land.
1. The Constraint of Consensus in Constitutional Adjudication

Constitutional consensus is the only plausible source of authority
for the abortion privacy doctrine enunciated by the Court in Roe and
its progeny.3 °4 Despite the lack of evidence of proper constitutional
consensus in the text or history of the Constitution3 °5 Roe and its

evolved regarding abortion." Id. at 36. If the States are liberated from the stifling abortion
privacy doctrine that treats them as if they are "subordinate governmental agencies subject to
societal norms determined at the national level," id., "the law might come to reflect a tolerable
accommodation of competing views, differing from state to state in accordance with the differences among their citizens." Id.
301. U.S. CONST. preamble.
302. See generally D. ELAZAIR, supra note 212, at 168-72 (discussing the interrelationship
between the federal Constitution and state constitutions). On some notable occasions when the
federal government has tried to foster a moral community, it generally has failed. Id. (using
prohibition as an example).
303. A principle does not rise to the level of constitutional law unless it has been proposed
by two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress, or a convention requested by two-thirds of the
state legislatures, and been ratified by the state legislatures or constitutional conventions in
three-fourths of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V. The public support represented by such a
process is a "constitutional consensus." Alternatively, the Supreme Court occassionally declares
principles or practices to be constitutional "liberties" because of long, deep, consistent historical
practice or recognition as being essential to ordered liberty. These tests, too, should evidence
solid, sustained, supermajoritarian support.
304. In American constitutional theory, the consent of the governed is the exclusive and
ultimate source of all just governmental authority. The Declaration of Independence para. 2
(U.S. 1776); THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 49 (J. Madison); id. No. 78 (A.
Hamilton).
305. See, e.g., Ely, supranote 178, at 943, 947; Sandalow, supranote 300, at 36; Wellington,
Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83
YALE L.J. 221, 311 (1973).
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progeny might be legitimate if the doctrine forbidding restriction of
previability abortion enjoyed the support of a real, sustained, de facto
constitutional consensus in contemporary America. While article V of
the Constitution identifies the proper method for determining whether

such a constitutional consensus exists for a proposed new constitutional

liberty, 3°6 the Court is in the postion, because of its power of judicial

review, effectively to institutionalize a new constitutional liberty, provided that a bona fide constitutional consensus exists.
In other contexts the Court has acknowledged explicitly that it
looks to whether a "national consensus" exists to determine the "evolving standards" that provide the contemporary perception of the broad
normative concepts embodied in the Bill of Rights.3 However, judicial
interpretationof the meaning of the Constitution's broad, normative
terms differs drastically from judicial invention of new, unwritten
constitutional liberties. The legitimate method of effecting the latter
must be at least as constrained as that of the former. Since consent
of the governed is the ultimate, validating principle of American constitutionalism, a real and abiding national consensus may legitimate
judicial creation despite the circumvention of the constitutional process.308

See U.S. CONST. art. V.
307. Regarding interpretations of the due process clause, Justice Frankfurter explained,
The judicial judgment in applying the due process clause must move within the
limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies
306.

of a merely personal judgment ....

An important safeguard against ...

merely

individual judgment is an alert deference to the judgment of the state court under
review.
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). For a discussion of the scope of the ninth amendment, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493-96 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). For a discussion of the meaning
of the eighth amendment, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2974-75 (1989); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2953 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2691 (1988)
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id. at 2706, 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2715, 2718
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986); Edmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-89 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277-79 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion).
308. The consent of the governed is, after all, the short answer to charges that the Constitution itself is illegitimate inasmuch as it was drafted by delegates convened "'for the sole and
express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation"' and inasmuch as it authorized the
replacement of those Articles upon ratification by only 9 of the 13 states, whereas the Articles
themselves required unanimous state ratification. C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 4,
226-33. "The convention succeeded because its usurpation was accepted by national consensus
every step along the way." D. ELAZAR, supra note 212, at 246.
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When an actual, albeit latent, "constitutional consensus" exists regarding a new, unwritten constitutional liberty, judicial review may
facilitate the constitutional expression of that consensus. Supreme
Court decisions in recent decades effectuating equal rights for racial
minorities and women offer a prime example of the Court's power to
invoke a nonformalized constitutional consensus to support constitutional rights.309 Supreme Court decisions invalidating laws denying
equal rights to racial minorities and women coalesced the existing,
latent national consensus by stimulating the other branches of government into action. The effect was to produce unequivocal evidence
verifying the Court's conclusion that a constitutional consensus really
existed. Within a matter of a few years, Congress and state legislatures embraced, implemented, and extended the new constitutional
principles.310
Thus, the Supreme Court may play a significant role in creating
constitutional consensus.31 The range of the Court's role in creating
constitutional rights is limited, however.3

12

The Court erodes its own

credibility as an institution and the integrity of the constitutional system of self-government when it uses its judicial power to restrict
legislative power by creating new constitutional liberties not clearly
supported by a constitutional consensus. This situation has existed
since Roe with respect to the abortion privacy doctrine.
2. Evidence of Constitutional Consensus Opposing the
Expansive Roe Abortion Privacy Doctrine
No constitutional consensus has ever supported the Roe abortion
privacy doctrine of unrestricted (for any reason) access to previability
abortion. The most reliable objective evidence of nonformal constitutional consensus is state legislation.31 3 Most state abortion legislation,

before and after Roe, has been at odds with the abortion privacy
doctrine.

309. In both of these instances, however, both the text and the history of the Civil War
amendments to the Constitution provided powerful support for (if not a mandate for) the new
rule of law.
310. See Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relationto Roe v. Wade,
63 N.C.L. REv. 375, 376 (1985); Wardle, supra note 181, at 249-51.
311.

See generally S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 83-116, 131 (1974) (law

shapes the context in which American politics is conducted); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976).
312. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 81 (A. Hamilton).
313. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2975 (1989); Penry v. Lynaush, 109
S. Ct. 2934, 2953 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2691 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion); id. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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When the Court decided Roe, abortion legislation in all states provided substantial restrictions and regulations of abortion. Previability
abortion generally was prohibited in 47 states and the District of
Columbia; in fact, 46 states and the District of Columbia prohibited

'3 4
abortion throughout pregnancy except in specified "hard cases. 1

Moreover, these laws were not stale and forgotten remnants of an
earlier era. Debate over the legality of abortion had swept the country
for more than a decade before the Court decided Roe, and more than
one-third of the states adopted modernizing amendments to prior abortion statutes in the six years immediately preceding Roe. In most
other states, legislatures had debated the abortion issue. 315 Roe invalidated, in whole or in large part, all of these laws.
Since Roe was decided, virtually all state legislatures have persisted in enacting laws restricting or regulating abortion.3 6 For sixteen
years, during which the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts
have decided hundreds of cases expanding the Roe doctrine,3 7 state
legislatures and Congress have continued to enact abortion restrictions.3 8 In the face of consistent judicial hostility to abortion regulation, state legislatures have enacted more than 300 separate bills regulating abortion since Roe. 3' 9 Currently, all states have existing stat-

utes regulating at least some aspects of abortion. 32° Even Congress
32 has enacted eighteen new abortion regulations since Roe. '

314. See generally J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE, supra note 217, at 33-34; L. WARDLE
& M. WOOD, supra note 260, at 33-44; Comment, A Survey of the PresentStatutory and Case
Law on Abortion: The Contradictionsand the Problems, 1972 U. ILL. L. FORUM 177, 178-83.
315. J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE, supra note 217, at 33-34; L. WARDLE & M. WOOD,
supra note 260, at 33-44; Lampe, The World in Perspective, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
89, 94-98 (1972).
316. See Appendix A.
317. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also L. WARDLE, THE ABORTION
PRIVACY DOCTRINE (1980).
318. Thus, to say that the Webster decision 'nvited" legislation to restrict abortion, see
Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3067, 3077 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), is like
saying the Court invited the sun to rise or the surf to roar.
319. For the bills enacted from 1973 to 1984, see Wardle, supra note 181, at 247 n.83. For
the period since then, see The Alan Guttmacher Institute, Washington Memo, June 2, 1989, at
2-3 (by April 1989, five separate pieces of abortion legislation enacted by state legislatures); id.
Jan. 12, 1989, at 4 (in 1988, nine separate pieces of abortion legislation were enacted by state
legislatures); id. Jan. 21, 1988, at 7 (in 1987, eight pieces of abortion legislation were enacted
by state legislatures); id. Jan. 14, 1986, at 5 (in 1985, 18 separate abortion bills were enacted
by state legislatures). The extent of sentiment in favor of restricting abortion, and the degree
of screening that is done in state legislatures, is indicated by the bills introduced, but not
passed. For example, in 1988 200 bills regulating abortion were introduced in state legislatures,
but only nine were enacted into law that year. Id. Jan. 12, 1989, at 4.
320. For a comprehensive list of state statutes regulating abortion, see Tables A-1 through
A-15 in Appendix A. Notably, the Missouri legislature adopted the Missouri law challenged in
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Along with the lack of a national legislative consensus supporting
the abortion privacy doctrine, 32 public opinion surveysm consistently
have revealed strong public sentiment against legalizing abortion except in the three "hard cases": when the mother's life or health is
endangered, when rape or incest caused the pregnancy, or when the
fetus would be born with a severe birth defect. As the Supreme Court
prepared to hear oral arguments in Webster, newspapers published
the results of the most recent nationwide polls confrming this consensus against unrestricted legal previability abortion.m The consensus
in public opinion surveys, over time and over the broad range of polls,
reveals that the American people do not support the Roe abortion
privacy doctrine of unrestricted (for any reason) previability abor-

Webster by an overwhelming vote. The Missouri Senate voted 23 to 5 in favor of the legislation.
J. SEN. OF Mo., Apr. 16, 1986, at 1159. The Missouri House of Representatives voted 119 to
36. J.H. REP. OF Mo., Apr. 23, 1986 at 1512-13.
321. See Appendix B.
322. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2953 (1989).
323. Ordinarily, public opinion surveys are not reliable evidence of national consensus for
a number of reasons. The Court noted in Penry that "public sentiment expressed in ... polls
and resolutions may ultimately find expression in legislation, which is an objective indicator of
contemporary values upon which [the Court] can rely." Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2955. However,
in the abortion context, not only do the general findings of opinion surveys corroborate the
indication of a national consensus evidenced by state legislation, but the results have been so
consistent, over such a long period of time, in so many different surveys, that their general
tenor cannot be dismissed.
324. The Boston Globe reported,
When pregnancy results from rape or incest, when the mother's physical health
[life] is endangered, and when there is likely to be a genetic deformity in the fetus,
those queried strongly approve of legal abortion. But when pregnancy poses financial or emotional strain, or when the women is alone or a teenager - the reasons
that are given by most women seeking abortions - an overwhelming majority of
Americans believes that abortion should be illegal.
Bronner, Most in U.S. Favor Ban on Majority of Abortions, Poll Finds, Boston Globe, Mar.
31, 1989, at 1, col. 1. A New York Times/CBS News poll found that "Americans strongly favor
legal abortion when a woman's health is in danger but oppose it in cases where a pregnancy
might get in the way of a woman's education or career." N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1989, at Al,
col. 6. A Los Angeles Times poll found that the approval rate for abortions in the three hard
cases ranged from 74% to 88%, while the approval rate for abortion in all other cases ranged
from only 13% to 41%. L.A. Times, Mar. 19, 1989, at II, col. 2. But cf. id. at 26, col. 3 (74%
agreed with the following statement: "I personally feel that abortion is morally wrong, but I
also feel that whether or not to have an abortion is a decision that has to be made by every
woman for herself"); Digest, Majority of Americans Oppose Overturning Roe v. Wade and
Banning Abortion Outright, Polls Show, 21 FAm. PLAN. PERSP. 138 (1989) (interviewer's
misstatement of interviewees' misunderstanding of the holding of Roe may be a significant flaw
in these surveys).
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tion.ms Indeed, the polls reveal a national consensus against deregulation of previability abortion and against "private choice" abortion,
except in the three hard cases.
B.

Toward Moderation and Tolerance

1. Radicalization of the Abortion Debate
The Court is largely responsible for the radicalization of the abortion controversy. First, in Roe and its progeny the Court effectively
shut down the normal channels of democratic resolution of policy conflicts .2 6 Persons affected by the Court's abortion privacy doctrine could
not participate in creating that doctrine in 1973, nor has the general

public since had any opportunity to modify the doctrine. By "constitutionalizing" the abortion issue, the Roe Court removed the issue
from democratic processes and thereby generated a "crisis of legitimacy. ' 3 27 The result has been increasingly hostile confrontation and
"violence born of complete frustration" at the closure of the democratic
processes.m

325. See Blake & Del Pinal, Negativism, Equivocation, and Wobbly Ascent: Public "Support"for the Pro-ChoicePlatform on Abortion, 18 DEMOGRAPHY 309 (1981) (analysis of numerous public opinion surveys taken in the 1960s and 1970s shows that largest group of respondents,
about 50%, consistently endorsed abortion in some circumstances and rejected abortion in other
circumstances; this group of respondents was closer in attitude to respondents who strongly opposed
abortion than they were to respondents who strongly support abortion); Grandberg & Grandberg,
Abortion Attitudes, 1965-1980: Trends and Determinants, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 250 (1980)
(approval of legal abortion increased dramatically between 1965 and 1973, remained stable
through 1977, then showed significant decrease until 1980); Rossi & Sitaraman, Abortion in
Context: Historical Trends and Future Changes, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 273, 274, 274 Fig. 1
(1988); Tedrow & Mahoney, Trends in Attitudes Toward Abortion: 1972-1976, 43 PUB. OPINION
Q. 181 (1979) (approval rate for "hard reasons" rose three percent between 1972 and 1976 and
rose five percent for "soft reasons"). Approval rates peaked in 1974 and have dropped since

then. See generally R.

ADEMEK, ABORTION AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES

(1986) (National Right to Life Education Trust Fund Publication).
326. See M. GLENDON, supra note 216, at 40; supra text accompanying notes 257-58.
327. S. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 202-04 (1985).
328. M. GLENDON, supra note 216, at 2, 40, 45. A notable contrast exists between the
intemperate and hostile nature of the abortion debate in the United States and the more
restrained processes and moderate results in Western Europe. Glendon observed,
[T]he experience of other societies that have been just as deeply divided as
ours, if not more so, on the abortion question, shows that when the legislative
process is allowed to operate, political compromise is not only possible but typical.
These compromises, reached in the usual democratic way, are not entirely satisfactory to everyone .... But the European countries have been able to live relatively
peacefully with these laws without experiencing the violence born of complete
frustration and without foreclosing re-examination and renegotiation of the issues.
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Second, the policy decisions embodied in the Court's abortion decisions have been radical. The Roe abortion privacy doctrine places the
United States on the extreme end of the spectrum of abortion law in
developed nations.3 The abrupt and radical changes in constitutional
law decreed by the Roe Court have invited imitation. For example,
the "rights" language of the abortion decisions and the decisions themselves have tended toward an absolute tone and mentality, encouraging
supporters and critics of these decisions to think and talk in absolutist,
categorical terms.3 °0
Third, the constitutionalization of the abortion privacy doctrine in
Roe absolutely eliminated all competing points of view regarding acceptable policy alternatives. The Court's sharp rejection of moral justifications for abortion legislation in Roe and its progeny invited and
encouraged moral intolerance. 3 Particularly ominous are cases seeking
to "gag" antiabortion protestors,- 2 to intimidate them with coercive

Id. at 40; see also id. at 18, 19 ("Furthermore, the French experience provides strong support
for the proposition that, contrary to what one constantly hears from both sides of the abortion
controversy in the United States, a divided society can compromise successfully on the abortion
issue."). The recent arrests of thousands of antiabortion protestors (most peacefully sitting in
sidewalks and walkways to block access to abortion clinics) signifies the widely shared
perception that political solutions to an intolerable judicially imposed rule are so limited that
massive civil disobedience is the only viable alternative. In fact, in 1988 alone, police arrested
approximately 10,000 antiabortion protesters in the United States. See Sachs, Abortion on the
Ropes, Time, Dec. 5, 1988, at 58-59; Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1988, at A22, col. 3-7; see also, L.A.
Times, Mar. 27, 1989, § I, at 3, col. 1 (more than 700 antiabortion protestors arrested in L.A.);
N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1988, at A26, col. 1 (2,200 abortion protestors arrested in 27 cities in
demonstrations on October 28-29, 1988); N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1988, A22, col. 1 (400 antiabortion
protestors arrested in Atlanta); N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1988, at A33, col. 6 (158 antiabortion
protestors arrested in Reston, Washington); N.Y. Times, Jul. 30, 1988, at A30, col. 3 (13
antiabortion protestors arrested in Atlanta); N.Y. Times, Jul. 6, 1988, at A7, col. 1 (600 protestors
block the entrance to a clinic in Pennsylvania); N.Y. Times, May 3, 1988, at B1, col. 2 (503
antiabortion protestors arrested in Manhattan).
329. See M. GLENDON, supra note 216, at 24 (Roe "Put the United States in a class by
itself, at least with respect to other developed nations"); see also id. at 2.
330. See id. at 39, 55-58.
331. Carl Schneider wrote, "A trend [toward diminution of moral discourse in the law]
becomes one of its own causes. As moral discourse and family law becomes rarer, judges,
legislatures, and the public are increasingly likely to feel that such discourse is inappropriate."
Schneider, supra note 284, at 1874-75.
332. See, e.g., Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic V. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 797 (5th Cir.
1989) (declining to issue injunction against "stark" language that might create a bad atmosphere
outside the abortion clinic); Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life,
Inc., 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988) (modifying injunction to restrict shouting and yelling by
antiabortion protestors only to the extent that it interferes with performance of business within
the abortion clinic); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1250-51
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(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989) (enjoining protestors from blocking access to
the clinic and harassing patients, but specifically allowing expressive activity); Northeast
Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147, 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (entering an
injunction against blocking access, but declining to enter an injunction against expressive activities), affd in part, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
The Supreme Court and lower courts are not unaware of the first amendment controversies
surrounding the public demonstration activities of antiabortion activists. See Frisby v. Shultz,
108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988) (upholding application of law forbidding picketing at any residence or
dwelling); see also Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding prohibition against
use of hand-held amplifier within 150 feet of abortion or medical facility); Markley v. State, 507
So. 2d 1043 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (restriction against priest from going within 500 yards of,
making utterances near, or picketing at abortion clinics as a term of probation upheld); State
v. Elliott, 548 A.2d 28 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (conviction for distributing antiabortion literature
on private property); State v. Scholberg, 395 N.W.2d 454 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (no first
amendment right to distribute antiabortion literature on private property); State ex rel. O'Brian
v. Moreland, 703 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (injunction against protestors from entering
women's clinic); Brown v. Davis, 203 N.J. Super. 41, 495 A.2d 900 (Ch. Div. 1984) (no right to
distribute literature or talk to customers in business complex), affd sub nora. State v. Brown,
212 N.J. Super. 61, 513 A.2d 974 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 107 N.J. 53, 526 A.2d 140 (1986);
People v. Maher, 137 Misc. 2d 162, 520 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Crim. Ct. 1987) (restricting protestors
to area behind barricade on sidewalk did not violate protesters first amendment rights), affd,
142 Misc. 2d 977, 543 N.Y.S.2d 892 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 794, 544 N.E.2d
233, 545 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1989); State ex rel Tiliford v. Crush, 39 Ohio St. 3d 174, 529 N.E.2d
1245 (1988) (defendant class enjoined from screaming, mass picketing, etc.); Fairfield Common
Condominium Ass'n v. Stasa, 30 Ohio App. 3d 11, 506 N.E.2d 237 (1985) (contempt conviction
of antiabortion protestors' violation of an injunction against picketing condominium professional
offices), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987); City of Portland v. Ayers, 93 Or. App. 731, 764
P.2d 556 (1988) (affirming conviction of antiabortion protestor for using loud speaker), review
denied, 308 Or. 79, 775 P.2d 322 (1989); Hoffart v. State, 686 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Ct. App.)
(antiabortion demonstrator convicted of criminal trespass; term of probation forbidding him to
enter any premises to picket did not violate free speech), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986);
Sunnyside v. Lopez, 50 Wash. App. 786, 751 P.2d 313 (1988) (antiabortion demonstrator convicted
of criminal trespass; first amendment does not protect literature distribution on private property);
State v. Horn, 126 Wis. 2d 447, 377 N.W.2d 176 (Ct. App. 1985) (criminal trespass conviction
for entering private property to encourage persons not to have an abortion), affd, 139 Wis. 2d
473, 407 N.W.2d 854 (1987).
In McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, Judge Gee wrote,
The clinic wishes potential clients to be shielded from hearing advocacy with
which it disagrees so that they will obtain abortions .

. .

. Neither we nor the

clinic can cut off the peaceful communication of information, distasteful to some
though it be. Neither in the precedent of the Supreme Court, nor in that of ours,
do we find the faintest hint that the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate
on public issues extolled by Justice Brennan in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270. . . (1964), is to be limited to 'things that do not matter much,"
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642... (1943),
or to the other fellow's cherished ideas and beliefs, not our own.
[I]t is not likely that the public interest would be served by insulating
potential abortion clients from the information, stark and unsavory though it may
be, which these protestors seek to communicate. The right to choose abortion
services at MWMC still exists, though the choice may be made harder because
the wrapping is undone. The First Amendment retains a primacy in our jurispru-
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litigation, and to punish them financially for their antiabortion demonstrations. 3
dence because it represents the foundation of a democracy - informed public
discourse. If the people are to choose wisely what laws they wish to live under
and what rights and privileges are to be maintained, then neither the MWMC nor
this Court must be permitted to cull and censor the information upon which their
choices are to be made.
Id. at 796-97.
Nonetheless, several courts have prohibited antiabortion demonstrators from referring to
abortionists as "killers" or '"murderers." See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Monmouth County,
Inc. v. Cannizzaro, 204 N.J. Super. 531, 499 A.2d 535 (Ch. 1985), affd, 217 N.J. Super. 623,
526 A.2d 741 (A.D. 1987); Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert.
dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 940 (1987). But cf. O.B.G.Y.N. Ass'n v. Birthright of Brooklyn & Queens,
Inc., 64 A.D.2d 894, 407 N.Y.S.2d 903 (App. Div. 1978) (modifying injunction to permit defendants to use words '"murder" or "killer" on placards because prohibition would violate first
amendment). See generally Rasnic, Crying "Foul" on Foul Language on the Picket Line: The
Anomalous Displacernent of Non-Strikers Right to Sue, 25 DUQ. L. REV. 457 (1987) (federal
law protects strikers' right of free speech even when such speech is violative of state law);
Note, Abortion, Protest,and ConstitutionalProtection, 62 WASH. L. REV. 311, 322, 326 (1987)
(describing the restriction of free speech to protect children from its harmful effects as having
"repressive implications" and being "inimical to the marketplace of ideas"); Comment, Bering
v. SHARE: Abortion ProtestorsLose Ground in the State of Washington, 18 CumB. L. REV.
205, 220-30 (1987). Also, financially punitive civil damage suits, alleging violations of federal
racketeering statutes, have curtailed and punished the expressive activities of antiabortion protestors. See infra note 333.
333. One federal court already has awarded damages to abortion clinics under RICO.
McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147 ($887 jury damages trebled); see also PortlandFeminist, 859
F.2d 681 (noting that plaintiff filed suit under, inter alia, Oregon RICO statute); Armes v. City
of Philadelphia, 706 F. Supp. 1156 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (noting RICO suit filed against antiabortion
protestors); McMonagle, 689 F. Supp. 465 (denying motion for new trial; upholding RICO
judgment); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 123 F.R.D. 508 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting probability of
success on RICO claim); National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (N.D. Ill. 1989) (No.
86-C-78888) (first amended class actions complaint).
Other cases have charged antiabortionists with the deprivation of civil rights under color of
state law. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788 (no evidence of state action). Other plaintiffs have argued
that the protestors have conspired to deny civil rights and equal protection. However, the
federal courts have split as to whether 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 can be applied against
antiabortion protestors. The courts that have considered most thoroughly the issue have held
that no cause of action exists. See McMillan, 866 F.2d 788 (no "class," therefore no cause of
action); Roe v. Abortion Abolition Soc'y, 811 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs did not form a
class protected by the statute), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 145 (1987); Portland Feminist Women's
Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 688 (D. Or. 1988) (statute does not apply to
private interference). But cf. Northern Va. Women's Medical Center v. Balch, 617 F.2d 1045
(4th Cir. 1980) (substantial federal claims including § 1985 support pendant jurisdiction); Terry,
704 F. Supp. at 1247 (conspiracy to deprive women seeking abortion of that guaranteed right
is actionable).
Finally, various tort claims are possible. See, e.g., PortlandFeminist, 859 F.2d at 681;
Terry, 697 F. Supp. at 1324; Operation Rescue, 123 F.R.D. at 508; McMonagle, 665 F. Supp.
at 1147.
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Shadows of Intolerance in Webster

Webster evidences how difficult it will be to break the pattern of
intolerance established in the abortion cases. Three of the four lower
court judges and four of the nine Supreme Court Justices ruled that
the Constitution forbids elected officials from making a public declaration
that life begins at conception.
Justice Blackmun wrote an uncommonly vituperative dissenting opinion, filled with ad hominems and
injudicious language. Justice Scalia added his own sharply worded
criticisms.33 But, the most ominous shadow on future abortion debate
and litigation was cast by Justice Stevens, whose dissenting opinion
was interjected with a note of religious animosity. Justice Stevens

334. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3068 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
id. at 3080 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Webster, 851 F.2d at 1076-77;
Webster, 662 F. Supp. at 413. These actions of the lower courts and arguments of the Supreme
Court disenters are uncomfortably reminiscent of such ominously intolerant precedents as the
prosecution of Galileo for daring to espouse the Copernican theory of the solar system and the
ruling of the judge in the Scope trial that the state could outlaw the teaching of evolution
regardless of the scientific merit of the dotrine. See E. LARSON, TRIAL AND ERROR: THE
AMERICAN CONTROVERSY OVER CREATION AND EVOLUTION 63-67 (1985); G. SANTILLANA,
THE CRIME OF GALILEO 237-60 (1955).
335. The primary object of Justice Blackmun's vitriolic language was 'the plurality" which
he accused of acting in a "deceptive fashion" with "feigned restraint." He charged them with
"aggressive[ly] misreading" the precedents, id. at 3069 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), with making a "tortured effort to avoid the plain import" of the Missouri statute
"in the hope of precipitating a constitutional crisis," id. at 3070 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part), and with using "a pretext for scuttling the trimester framework." Id.
at 3071 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). He further accused them of
making a "[b]ald assertion masquerad[ing] as reasoning," id. at 3072 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part), of acting with the sole object "not to persuade, but to prevail," id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), and of raising an issue "merely [as] an
excuse for avoiding the real issues . . .and [as] a mask for its hostility" to Roe. Id. at 3072
n.7 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Finally, he accused them of using
"an attempted exercise of brute force," id. at 3075 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part), of advocating "unadulterated nonsense," id. at 3077 n.11 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part), of being "oblivious or insensitive," id. at 3077 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part), and of 'nvit[ing] charges of cowardice and illegitimacy." Id. at 3079
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
336. Id. at 3064-67 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). He chastised
Justice O'Connor for taking positions inconsistent with those she had taken in earlier cases, id.
at 3064-65 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment), and asserting arguments
that "cannot be taken seriously." Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment). He upbraided both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor for trying to "run
into a corner," id. at 3066 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment), and for
making an indecisive decision that was the "least responsible" of all the options facing the Court.
Id. at 3067 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
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stressed repeatedly that the legislative "finding" that life begins at
conception was a purely "theological" belief and a constitutionally impermissible "endorsement of a particularreligious tradition."' 7 While
perhaps in some other context this kind of finger pointing at a religion
might be excused as the essentially harmless product of mere insensitivity, in the abortion context such aspersions are not so innocuous,
even when they are manifested courteously. Capitalizing on anti-religion (particularly anti-Catholic) sentiment has been a political ploy
long-used by the advocates of unrestricted access to abortion. How337. Id. at 3085 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added); see
also id. at 3083, 3084-85 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I recognize that a powerful theological argument can be
made for [the] position [that there is a governmental interest in protecting fetal life throughout
pregnancy], but I believe our jurisdiction is limited to the evaluation of secular state interests");
id. at 778 n.7 ("The responsibility for nurturing the soul of the newly born, as well as the
unborn, rests with [the] individual parent[,] not the State. No matter how important a sacrament
such as baptism may be, a State surely could not punish a mother for refusing to baptize her
child."). Justice Stevens focused his antitheological criticism by reference 'to the position on
this issue that was endorsed by St. Thomas Acquinas and widely accepted by the leaders of
the Roman Catholic Church for many years," and summarized medieval Catholic Church doctrine
as described in CATHOLIC TEACHING ON ABORTION which has been repudiated by the Catholic

Church. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3083 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing
C. WHITTIER, CATHOLIC TEACHING ON ABORTION: ITS ORIGIN AND LATER DEVELOPMENT

(May 15, 1981), reprintedin Brief for Americans United for Separation of Church and State as
Anicus Curiae, app. A), criticized and repudiatedin CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ABORTION:

HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMI.

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 479 (1981)).
338. See, e.g., L. LADER, ABORTION II: MAKING THE REVOLUTION (1973); L.LADER,
POLITICS,

POWER IN

THE

CHURCH, THE

CATHOLIC

CRISIS AND

ITS CHALLENGE TO

AMERICAN PLURALISM 11, 56-71, 225 (1987) (American pluralism is in jeopardy because

of a political combination of Roman Catholic hierarchy and American conservatives, regarding,
inter aila, abortion); B. NATHANSON, ABORTING AMERICA 51-52 (1979) (describing discussions
and decisions about strategy made by leaders of the National Association for the Repeal of
Abortion Laws and other prochoice activists in the late 1960s and early 1970s); J. NOONAN, A
PRIVATE CHOICE, supra note 217, at 53-57 (perpetuation of the "legend" that opposition to abortion

is essentially religious, especially Catholic; media builds the legend by emphasizing "Roman
Catholic" religious affiliation of leading antiabortion activists; analogy to Conservative Party in
England "play[ing] the Orange Card" to win votes); id. at 74-79 (detailing stories by inter alia
The New York Times, The Associated Press, and CBS Television program); M. OLASKI, THE
PRESS AND ABORTION, 1838-1988, at 104, 128, 137-38 (describing anti-Catholic arguments
published in the Boston Globe, New York Times, etc.).
By lending the prestige of his office to such arguments, Justice Stevens fans the flames of
religious animosity and legitimates a type of argument that is coercive, intolerant, and destructive
of the "more perfect union" which the Constitution he purports to expound was intended to
achieve. Ironically, the dissenting opinions of both Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun demonstrate the nonjudicial, political nature of the issues involved. Personalized, ad hominem argumentation and religious attacks are the hallmarks of political debate, not legal analysis or
judicial reasoning.
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ever, such religious bigotry has no place in legitimate constitutional
discourse.
3.

Finessing the Truth

Exacerbating the intolerance characteristic of the abortion decisions is the tendency of prochoice advocates to "finesse" the facts.
For example, at oral arguments in Webster, the lawyer for the abortion
clinics, after acknowledging that thirty percent of all pregnancies in
America today end in abortion, asserted that the rate 'as not changed
one whit from the time that the Constitution was enacted through the
1800's and through the 1900's. That has always been the rate."' 9 This
assertion is simply false. Reliable data about the number, rate, and
ratio of abortions in the United States shows that the number of
abortions has more than doubled, the rate of abortion has nearly
doubled, and the ratio of abortions has increased by over fifty percent
in the thirteen years since Roe. 40
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Webster also finessed the facts. For
example, his insistence that "the threshold of fetal viability is, and
will remain, no different from what it was at the time Roe was decided ' 'H1 contradicted his own declarations in Roe about when viability
occurs. In Roe he had declared that "[v]iability is usually placed at
about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24
weeks."
In Webster he admitted that viability may occur as early
as 23 weeks gestational age,m five weeks earlier than his general
definition and one week earlier than his earliest estimate he gave in
Roe. Moreover, Justice Blackmun had emphasized twice before that
the concept of viability needed to be "flexible for anticipated advancements in medical skill." 14
Similar factual distortions, by both prochoice and prolife advocates,
have been a part of the abortion debate for many years.3 5 Manipulation
339.

Record at 31, Webster (No. 88-605).

340.

See Appendix D and sources cited therein.

341. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3076 n.9 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
342. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
343. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3075 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
344. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1978); see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976).
345. See M. FAUX, ROE v. WADE 87-88, 217 (1988); B. NATHANSON, supra note 338, at
50-53. Compare Petitti & Gates, Restricting Medicaid Funds for Abortions: Projections of
Excess Mortalityfor Women of ChildbearingAge, 67 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 860 (1977) (predicting
up to 90 deaths annually if publicly funded abortions were restricted by the Hyde Amendment)
with Gold & Cates, Restriction of Federal Funds for Abortion: 18 Months Later, 69 AM. J.
PuB. HEALTH 929 (1979) (finding only three deaths "associated to some degree" with funding
restriction). Justice Blackmun cited Dr. Cates in his dissenting opinion in Webster, 109 S.Ct.
at 3077 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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of the truth can create public appeal.3 and can be profitable.47 Reliance
on "finessed facts" has been a part of the abortion doctrine since
Roe.3-'5 But, such distortions pose a serious danger when presented in
constitutional litigation because the "constitutional facts" provide the
critical foundation for the development of constitutional doctrine.- 9
4. Signs of Moderation in Webster
Despite the remnants of the intolerance that were present in Webster,
Webster represents a significant step in the direction of tolerance and
moderation. By upholding all of the challenged provisions it reviewed, 35 the Webster Court showed tolerance towards state legislation. The Court thus foreshadowed receptivity to reasonable legislative
efforts to regulate abortion.-, Significantly, the Court accepted the
reasonable construction of the Missouri statutes offered by the Missouri Attorney General, reversing the lower court's decision to reject
the state's construction of its own law. 2

346. See, e.g., TIME, Mar. 20, 1989, at 57 (Planned Parenthood ad: "How would you like
the police to investigate your miscarriage"); N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1989, at A25 (Planned Parenthood ad: "Human life is sacred and they'll risk yours to prove it.").
347. See, e.g., Goss, Abortion-Rights Groups Strike a Fundraising'Bonanza' Following
Supreme Court'sDecision to Review the Issue, THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 7,
1989, at 4 (prochoice groups reported "a staggering financial response to their 'public education'
campaign"; Planned Parenthood had 50% jump in contributions in January, 1989; NARAL
brought in $350,000 in one month from a full-page ad; A.C.L.U. had similar response to its
advertisements); Yost, As Abortion-Rights Groups Rally Support, Foes Set Legislative Drive
in 4 States, Wash. Post, July 5, 1989, at A10, col. 1 (NARAL raised $1,000,000 in May 1989,
up from $300,000 a year earlier; substantial increase in membership); see also Kornhauser,
Abortion Case Has Been Boon to Both Sides, Legal Times, July 3, 1989, at 1, col. 4 (NARAL
anticipates 65,000 new members; similar increases in donations or membership by Planned

Parenthood, A.C.L.U., and N.O.W.).
348. For example, the Court in Roe relied upon the suggestion made by Professor Cyril
Means that "abortion was never established as a common-law crime." Roe, 410 U.S. at 135 n.26
(citing Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom:Is a PenumbralorNinth-Amendment Right
About to Arise from the Nineteenth-CenturyLegislativeAshes of a Fourteenth-CenturyCommon
Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971)). This suggestion, however, has been thoroughly discredited. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 262, at 364-407; Destro, supra note 262, at 1267-73.
Likewise, it was asserted that the plaintiff in Roe had become pregnant as a result of being
"gang-raped." Recently, however, she has admitted that she fabricated the story to convince
people to help her get an abortion. M. FAux, supra note 345, at 8, 19, 328; N.Y. Times, Sept.
9, 1987, at A23, col. 1.
349. See generally Pine, supra note 23, at 655-59.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 22-137.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 265-69.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 196-97.
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The Webster Court's analysis of the abortion precedents was more
tolerant and less rigid than in the past. The Court suggested that
a standard of review more moderate than strict scrutiny would apply
to some types of abortion regulations. The Court's apparent adoption
of an objective standard of review, as opposed to a subjective standard
in which the Court determines whether legislators have "bad motives," 3- was a clear step towards tolerance. By applying an objective
standard of review, the Court upheld the right of state legislatures
to express their views as to when human life begins. 6 The Webster
Court's method of analysis also provides hopeful signs of judicial moderation, leaving time and room for further democratic dialogue and
doctrinal development. s57 Overall, Webster represents a significant step
toward open discussion, tolerance, and moderation.
V.

THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

Webster's greatest significance may lie in the Court's prudent approach to constitutional adjudication, particularly relating to the abortion privacy doctrine. The Webster Court deviated substantially from
past abortion cases in both its modest method of addressing constitutional issues and the cautious pace it adopted for making changes in
constitutional doctrine. Despite the dissenters' disagreements regarding the propriety of addressing constitutional issues modestly and
cautiously,m the majority clearly adopted a conservative approach to
constitutional adjudication.
A.

Conservative Method of ConstitutionalAnalysis In
and Beyond Webster

Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Webster provided a striking contrast to the opinions written by the Justices comprising the
new majority. Justice Blackmun's abortion opinions are written in the

353. See supra text accompanying notes 138-44, 198.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 232-39.
355. See supra text accompanying note 202.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
357. See infra text accompanying notes 376-94.
358. While Justice Blackmun sharply criticized the new substantive direction taken by the
Court, his sharpest criticisms focused on the plurality's decisionmaldng process. Webster, 109
S. Ct. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Likewise, Justice Scalia's
sharpest criticism of the plurality and Justice O'Connor focused on their concept of the process
the Court should follow to deal with the dilemma created by the Roe abortion privacy doctrine.
Id. at 3064-65 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
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style of grand, jurisprudential essays. 9 His dissent in Webster was
broadly written, anticipating and answering summarily, but conclusively, a multitude of profound issues. In Webster he repeatedly assailed the plurality for failing to "join, the true jurisprudential debate.,,360
By contrast Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a lean plurality opinion
36
in Webster. His analysis of most issues was specific and businesslike. 1
He aimed to resolve the case before the Court and correct the lower
courts' judgments. He indulged in arguably "unnecessary" analysis
only once, on a carefully selected issue succinctly resolved.32
Justice O'Connor's opinion provided an even sharper contrast to
Justice Blackmun's approach than did Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion.m With precise analysis she succeeded in resolving all of the necessary issues without ever raising any significant doctrinal issues, much
less great jurisprudential questions. Moreover, she vigorously defended deciding the case on narrow grounds and avoided, whenever
possible, discussion of the great jurisprudential questions that might
effect major changes in constitutional doctrine. 3 64
The sharp contrast between Justice Blackmun's approach and those
of Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist reveals the Court's
conflict regarding whether to continue or abandon Roe's broad, jurisprudential approach to deciding abortion cases. Justice Blackmun has
been the author of the Court's opinion in five of the most expansive

359.

See id. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[the plurality's]

deafening silence"); id. at 3077 ("'not with a bang, but a whimper,' the plurality discards a
landmark case of the last generation"); id. at 3078 ("[The plurality] utters not a word. This

silence is callous. It is also profoundly destructive of this Court as an institution."); id. at 3079
("The plurality invites charges of cowardice and illegitimacy to our door.").
360. See id. at 3072 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The great
jurisprudential issue was "whether the Constitution includes an 'unenumerated' general right
to privacy . .. , and, more specifically, whether and to what extent such a right to privacy
extends to matters of childbearing and family life, including abortion." Id. (Blackmun, J., con-

curring in part, dissenting in part).
361. For example, he answered Justice Blackmun's broad complaint about the narrowness
of his opinion by simply distinguishing the case upon which Justice Blackmun relied. Id. at

3057-58 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
362. See supra text accompanying notes 160-65.
363. Justice Scalia also declined the invitation to write an advisory opinion on the great
issues. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).

But he strongly criticized the majority, and especially Justice O'Connor, for making resolution
of any constitutional issue academic. Id. at 3064-66 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring
in the judgment).
364. Id. at 3060-61 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
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abortion cases.3 0 In all of these cases, he wrote sweeping, jurisprudential opinions, substantially extending the abortion privacy doctrine
with broad analysis or applying the doctrine in bold and provocative
ways.
The Webster Court plainly rejected Justice Blackmun's "sweeping
analysis" approach. While Webster was not the first abortion case in
which the Court had taken a cautious approach,3 66 no earlier case had inso many Justices
volved such a range of issues and never before did 67
'
disassociate themselves with the "broad approach.
The "sweeping analysis" approach contains many flaws and engenders profound problems.m The abortion cases illustrate why Dean
Pound stated, "We rate the judge who is only a lawyer higher than
the judge who is only a philosopher. '369 The "sweeping analysis" approach reflects a desire for certainty in areas of law in which certainty
simply does not exist.3 70 Justice Cardozo noted that there are "few
rules; there are chiefly standards and degrees."3 7' Much of the public
opposition to the major abortion decisions has resulted from the provocative language and overbreadth of the Court's analysis in the abor-

365. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747; Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe, 410 U.S.
113. In the other two most expansive cases, Justice Blackmun joined the most expansive opinions,
which were written by Justice Powell. See City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 416; Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979).
366. The Court applied the abortion doctrine narrowly in all five previous funding cases.
See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398 (1981); supra notes 7, 87-94 and accompanying text.
367. Only two other Justices, Brennan and Marshall, signed Justice Blackmun's opinion in
Webster. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3067.
368. As Justice Cardozo noted, "We do not pick our rules of law full-blossomed from the
trees." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103 (1921) [hereinafter B.
CARDOZO, NATURE]. Justice Cardozo also noted that "[u]nique situations can never have their
answers ready made as in the complete letter-writing guides or the manuals of the art of
conversation." B. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 133.
369. A. GOODPHART, The New York Court of Appeals and the House of Lords, in R.
COVINGTON, E. STASON, J. WADE, E. CHEATHAM & T. SMEDLEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
FOR A COURSE ON LEGAL METHODS 56 (1969) (quoting Dean Pound).
370. As Jerome Frank noted, "[L]aw is uncertain and must be uncertain, [and] overeagerness for legal certainty and denials of legal contingency are harmful." J. FRANK, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND 239 (1936) (describing Justice Cardozo's contribution to legal theory); see
also B. CARDOZO, NATURE, supra note 368, at 28 ("Nothing is stable. Nothing absolute. All
is fluid and changeable. There is an endless becoming.").
371. B. CARDOZO, NATURE, supra note 368, at 161. Jerome Frank observed, "It is
unnecessary and undesirable to attack on all fronts at once." J. FRANK, supra note 370, at 251.
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tion cases, rather than from dissatisfaction with the particular result
3r2

of the decision.
Justice Blackmun's error in his "sweeping jurisprudential" Webster
dissent and his opinions in other abortions cases is the same mistake
that many first-year law students make. Fledgling law students yearn
to discover in the law a system of broad coherence and theoretical
tidiness. They favor general propositions, rather than specific ones,
and broad holdings, rather than narrow ones. But, lawyers know that
general propositions in the law inevitably mislead. 37 Thus,
"[s]omewhere along the line, beginning with the first classroom command to state what a case holds, every good lawyer-judge [and law
student] learns to distrust what an appellate court said. ''374 American
courts, even our Supreme Court, have better things to do, and can
do many things better, than engage in "jurisprudential debate," what
Justice Holmes called the "'theological working out of dogma."'3 75
Webster revived the force of these truisms as surely as Roe verified
them.
B.

The Prudential Pace of Judicial Change

The second great dispute about the process of constitutional adjudication in Webster concerned the speed of constitutional change. Most
of the major abortion decisions have entailed abrupt, extensive change
in constitutional doctrine 76 The Webster case illustrated judicial re-

straint, a marked departure from the Roe approach.

372. John Noonan wrote, "Without the courts the [abortion] controversy would have had
a very different, and much smaller, shape." J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE, supranote 217,
at 3.
373. Karl Llewellyn noted, "We have discovered in our teaching of the law that general
propositions are empty. We have discovered that students who come eager to learn the rules,
and who do learn them, and who learn nothing more, will take away the shell and not the
substance." K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRADBLE BUSH 12 (1969). Oliver Wendel Holmes observed
that "general propositions do not decide concrete cases." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes also said, "I always say that I will admit any
general proposition that any one wants to lay down and [still] decide the case either way." 1
HOLAIES-LASKi LETTERS 390 (M. Howe ed. 1953). The late Professor Bickel noted, "[The
compelling force of the judgment goes only to the actual case before the Court. For, as we
have seen, the Court's peculiar capacity to enunciate basic principles inheres in large part in
its opportunity to derive and test whatever generalization it proclaims in the concrete circumstances of a case." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 70 (1957).
374. Craven, Paeanto Pragmatism,50 N.C.L. REV. 977, 982 (1972).
375. J. FRANK, supra note 370, at 254 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes). "'Certitude is
not the test of certainty. We have been cock-sure of many things that were not so."' Id. (quoting
Oliver Wendell Holmes).
376. See supra note 8.
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Webster upheld all of the challenged provisions of the Missouri
statute properly before the Court without abrupt, fundamental
changes in the abortion privacy doctrine. The plurality would not have
reversed Roe, but would have expressly repudiated the trimester
framework and would have expressly recognized the state's compelling
interest in protecting prenatal life before viability.3 7 For this approach
Justice Scalia criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist for not moving quickly
enough,3 78 while Justice Blackmun attacked the plurality for disregard37 9
ing a landmark constitutional decision.
Justice O'Connor cast the deciding vote, however, and she was
content to uphold the Missouri statutes without substantially changing,
or endorsing, the Roe abortion privacy doctrine.0 She vigorously defended her approach, reminding the plurality in their own words that
hastiness was unnecessary; there would be other cases and "time
enough to reexamine Roe. And to do so carefully. "31
As one commentator has noted, "[r]estraint in exercising the judicial power to overrule precedents is essential to the stability of the
law. Yet, abstention from exercising this power defeats stability itself." -' The tension created by these two principles is the tension that
existed between the approach of Justice O'Connor (and, to a large
extent, of Chief Justice Rehnqust) and that of Justice Blackmun (and,
in this case, Justice Scalia also). The question concerns whether judicial
change in constitutional law should be abrupt or gradual, by avulsion
or accretion.m In Webster, due primarily to Justice O'Connor, the
Court opted for the gradual approach.
377. See supra text accompanying notes 160-65.
378. Justice Scalia would have overruled Roe explicitly. See supra text accompanying notes
166-68. He expressed his impatience and frustration with the approach that both the plurality
and Justice O'Connor followed. Id. He would have applied the Roe approach to rapidly change
the Roe abortion privacy doctrine. He criticized the Court for its indecisive decision, the plurality
for its excessive diplomacy, and Justice O'Connor for her "extraordinary reluctance" even to
raise the constitutional issue. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3064, 3066-67 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment).
379. Justice Blackmun accused Justice Rehnquist and the plurality of fomenting disregard
for the law, id. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), and for forcing
an unnecessary change in constitutional law. Id. at 3069-70; see supra note 170 and accompanying
text. However, primarily the direction of the change, not the tempo of the process of court-initiated change in constitutional law, aroused his ire.
380. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3060 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
381. Id. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
382. R. KEATON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 15-17 (1972),
quoted in R. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 837 (1976).
383.

S.

BURTON,

(1985).
384. See B.

AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 221-24, 230-33

CARDOZO, NATURE, supra

note 368, at 161-62.
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In other recent cases dealing with privacy, the Court has adopted
a similar, cautious approach. A cautious approach allows time for
understanding to develop, effects to surface, and the risk of dogmatism
to subside. Judicial restraint further creates incentive for political
responsibility and legislative accountability.
Yet, to entirely abandon judicial review of abortion legislation
would distort the political process because Roe already has distorted
the political balance substantially. Roe introduced into American society the profitmaking legal abortion industry. In 1982 America spent
an estimated $500,000,000 on abortion services.. Thus, while prolife
and prochoice organizations have seen significant growth in public
awareness and grassroots political support since Roe, politically powerful economic and institutional interests have created a huge medicalreproductive-control industry that supports and perpetuates the Roe
ethics with financial resources, influence, prestige, organization, and
institutional credibility. Repairing the distortion of the political process will take time, and the Court should begin the reparations care-

fully.
The gradual approach to changing the abortion privacy doctrine
also represents a return to the common law process. The ability of
judges to work incremental changes in common law is one of the
historic sources of legitimacy for the Supreme Court's claim to participation in the process of constitutional evolution through judicial decision-

385. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989); DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Serv., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
386. M. GLENDON, svpra note 216, at 20.
387. Contraception & Abortion Costs Are a Tiny Portion of U.S. Health Spending, 18
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 37 (1986). In 1985 more than $66,000,000 of public funds were used to
subsidize abortions. Gold & Macias, Public Funding of Contraceptive,Sterilizationand Abortion
Services, 1985, 18 FAm. PLAN. PERsP. 259, 263 tab. 3 (1986) (188,000 abortions paid for or
subsidized).
388. Thus, in the Webster case, while several ad hoc or issue-oriented associations of medical
practitioners filed amicus briefs in support of the Missouri prolife position, virtually every
prominent national medical organization filed or joined amicus briefs in support of the abortion
clinics prochoice position. See Overwhelming and Broad-Based Support of Right to Abortion
Shown in Amicus Briefs, March, Washington Memo, Apr. 19, 1989, supra note 12, at 1 ("More
than 300 organizations, including virtually every major medical and health association in the
country... signed one of the 31 prochoice briefs ....The list includes such prominent national
organizations as the American Medical Association, American Public Health Association, American College of Ob/Gyns, American Nurses Association, American Academy of Pediatrics, American Psychiatric Association .... "). Of course, similar organizations have filed amicus briefs
in most of the previous abortion cases. For instance, the last major abortion decision of the
Supreme Court before Webster was filed by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747; see also supra note 347 (describing profitability
of exploiting the abortion issue).
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making.3 9 The common law process, however, operated gradually over
centuries.3 10 Thus, the Court strays furthest from its source of legitimacy when it attempts abrupt, revolutionary change in constitutional
adjudication 91
An important difference separates changing law and changing legal
doctrine. By reading the abortion cases narrowly, Justice O'Connor's
conservative approach changed law, not legal doctrine. After the Court
has had enough experience working out the applications of the law,
"time enough" will remain to recast the legal doctrine. By then, the
Court will have a sound grounding in the practical dimensions of the
3
cases and law on which to premise a legal doctrine that is workable. 2
Finally, a subtle difference exists in writing the Court's opinion
versus writing a concurring or dissenting opinion. The author of the
Court's opinion must observe constraints that other opinion authors
do not have to observe. The author of the Court's opinion must first
actually decide the case and determine the rights, liberties, and legal
interests of real persons, the parties to the controversy. The author
of the Court's opinion also may engage in "conversation" about the
theory or doctrine of the law, which influences future decisions by
stating the principles endorsed by the majority of the justices. Thus,
the author of the Court's opinion may exercise great influence upon
the development of "law as doctrine" or "law as theory."
In contrast, the authors of concurring or dissenting opinions are
unconstrained by the responsibilities of rendering judgment. The authors of such opinions are concerned only with influencing the prospective evolution of the "law as doctrine" or "law as theory." The main
purpose for writing a concurring or dissenting opinion is to engage in
the "conversation" regarding the evolving doctrine and theory of the
law. Concurring and dissenting opinions often are written more broadly

389. Corwin, The "HigherLaw" Background of American ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARv.
L. REv. 149, 169-85 (1928); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353,
391-95 (1981); see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 81 (A. Hamilton).
390. Cardozo noted, "Little by little the old doctrine is undermined." B. CARDozo, NATURE,
supra note 368, at 178. He also observed that 'the duty of a judge becomes itself a question
of degree, and he is a useful judge or a poor one as he estimates the measure accurately or
loosely." Id. at 161-62. See generally H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12-13 (3d ed. 1975).
391. "Great constitutional provisions must be administered with caution." Missouri, K &
T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 772 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
392. For a discussion of the radicalization of the Roe abortion privacy doctrine, see supra
notes 326-33. Again, the prudence of a moderate approach is particularly apparent when the
abrupt gyrations of constitutional law have created enormous practical problems for the lower
courts and a crisis of legitimacy for the Supreme Court.
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to clarify, correct, and moderate the theory and doctrine of the law,
to influence the development of the 'qaw as judgment" in future
cases.393 But, that approach is seldom appropriate in the opinion for
the Court.
In the pre-Webster abortion cases, the authors of the Court's opinions often failed to accept the greater responsibilities and narrower
constraints of writing the Court's opinion. The Webster Court, especially Justice O'Connor, stepped off the treadmill of making abrupt,
radical changes in the abortion privacy doctrine. Perhaps by refocusing
attention on deciding the cases one at a time, the Court will not feel
compelled to extend precipitously and unwisely the logic of its past
jurisprudential ruminations to excessive and damaging extremes.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Webster is a major decision because it is a modest decision. While
the Webster Court made important adjustments to the abortion privacy
doctrine and revealed that further changes are likely and while the
decision revived concern for matters of constitutional system and structure, the Webster decision is more important for the greater changes
the Court could have made but did not make. Paradoxically, the Webster Court's conservative vision of the process of constitutional adjudication reveals Webster's true significance. The rejection of the "sweeping jurisprudential" approach to deciding abortion cases and the adoption of an incremental approach in effecting change in constitutional
doctrine through litigation may prove to be the most significant facets
of the Webster decision.
The Supreme Court does not have to overrule bad decisions in
order to make good decisions, nor does the Court have to reformulate
legal doctrine in order to disregard bad law. (Has Lockner v. New
York 39- ever been overruled? Does it really matter?) Sometimes the
Court is wise to allow constitutional doctrine to take care of itself for
a while. If the Court can make a reasonable decision in each abortion
case that it hears, the Court will have "time enough" to rewrite the
abortion privacy doctrine. But then, if the Court does its job well,
that may not be necessary.

393. In this sense Justice Blackmun's dissent in Webster was a more appropriate opinion
than his majority opinions in cases such as Roe, Doe, and Danforth.
394. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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APPENDIX A*
STATE STATUTES REGARDING ABORTION
(MARCH 1990)
(Current Legislation Regulating, Restricting, or Prohibiting Abortion in All 50 States)

A-1

Trimester/Health Regulations

AK ALAsKA STAT. § 08.64.105 (1987) (state medical board to regulate); id. § 18.16.010(a)(1)
(1986) (licensed physician); id. § 18.16.010(a)(2) (hospital or approved facilities).
AR

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-61-101 (1987) (medical license necessary); id. § 5-61-102 (unlawful
after quickening); id. § 20-9-302 (clinics licensed, registered; regulated by Department of
Health; fines).

CA

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (West 1984) (authority to perform; requirements);
id. § 25952 (pregnancy resulting from rape or incest); id. § 25953 (medical staff committee);
id. § 25954 (mental health defined); id. § 25955.5 (system for reporting); id. § 25955.9
(rights of infant born alive).

CO

COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-6-101 (Repl. vol. 1986) (definitions); id. § 18-6-101(1)(b) (less than
16 weeks of gestation); id. § 18-6-101(4) (hospital board); id. § 25-1-666 (sale of drug only
through prescription).

DE

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a) (Repl. vol. 1987) (licensed physician; hospital); id. §
1790(b)(1) (no more than 20 weeks gestation); id. § 1790(c) (written report from hospital
board); id. § 1795 (protect live birth).

FL

FLA. STAT. § 390.001(2) (1989) (no termination in last trimester; when allowed); id. §
390.001(3) (physician required); id. § 390.001(4)(c) (in emergency may terminate with one
corroborative opinion); id. § 390.002 (records, reporting); id. § 797.03(1)-(2) (hospital, clinic,
required; license required for clinic); id. § 797.03(3) (no third-trimester abortions unless
in hospital).

GA

GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-116 (Supp. 1989) (medical emergency); id. § 16-12-141(a) (1988)
(physician); id. § 16-12-141(b) (licensed hospital or facility after first trimester); id. §
16-12-141(c) (two physicians certify, health of mother after second trimester; medical aid
rendered if born alive); id. § 16-12-141(d) (certificate of abortion).

HI

HAW. REv. STAT. § 338-9 (Repl. vol. 1988) (record of fetal death filed); id. § 453-16(a)(1)
(licensed physician or surgeon); id. § 453-16(a)(2) (hospital; attorney general opinion says
not enforceable during first trimester).

ID

IDAHO CODE § 18-608(1) (Repl. vol. 1987) (physician; hospital; clinic, first trimester); id.
§ 18-608(2) (second trimester); id. § 18-608(3) (third trimester); id. § 18-609(3) (confirmed
pregnancy test); id. § 18-609(4) (report); id. § 39-261 (Repl. vol. 1985) (induced abortion
reporting form).

IL

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-23.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (medical judgment); id.
para. 81-30 (reports); id. para. 81-30.1 (report of abortion complications); id. para. 81-32
(analysis of fetal tissue); id. para. 81-54 (abortions allowed on minors); id. ch. 111 , para.
157-8.1 to -8.16 (Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act).
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IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2(1) (Burns 1985) (first trimester); id. § 35-1-58.5-2(1)(A)
(physician); id. § 35-1-58.5-2(2) (after first trimester; before viability); id. § 35-1-58.5-3
(determination of trimester and viability); id. § 35-1-58.5-5 (forms submitted to state board
of health).

IA

IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979) (feticide after end of second trimester); id. § 707.10
(duty to preserve live fetus).

KS

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407(2) (Repl. vol. 1988) (license to practice medicine); id. §
21-3407(2)(a) (licensed hospital or other place designated); id. § 65-445 (Repl. vol. 1985)
(hospital keeps records).

KY

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.723 (Baldwin 1989) (when physician may perform) (subsection
1 unconstitutional); id. § 311.750 (licensed physician); id. § 311.760 (minimum standards);
id. § 311.770 (no saline after first trimester); id. § 213.055 (Baldwin 1982) (abortion reporting) (attorney general opinion determined unconstitutional).

LA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2 (West Supp. 1989) (abortion by physician); id. §
40:1299.35.3 (abortion after first trimester must be in hospital); id. § 40:1299.35.8 (records);
id. § 40:1299.35.10 (reports); id. § 40:1299.35.11 (forms); id. § 40:1299.35.12 (emergency);
id. § 40:1299.35.15 (instructions after abortions).

ME

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1596(2) (Repl. vol. 1980) (reports); id. § 1598(3) (persons
who may perform abortions).

MD

MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-208 (Repl. vol. 1987) (physician required in hospital;
no more than 26 weeks of gestation; authorization by hospital review board; records and
reports) (subsections (a)-(c) unconstitutional).

MA MASS. ANN. LAW ch. 38, § 6 (Law. Co-op 1983) (duty to report death); id. ch. 112, §
12L (Law. Co-op 1975) (physician if less than 24 weeks); id. § 12M (1985) (after 24 weeks);
id. § 120 (protection of unborn child); id. § 12P (preservation of life/health of child); id.
§ 12Q (further restrictions under 12L and 12M); id. § 12R (written statements of reason;
tests on pregnant patients; report).
MI

MICH. CohP. LAWS ANN. § 52.202 (West Supp. 1989) (county medical examiner investigates death by abortion); id. § 52.203 (notice to county medical examiner); id. § 333.2835
(West 1980) (reports, abortion defined).

MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(1) (West 1989) (physicians); id. § 145.412(2) (hospital or
abortion facility after first trimester); id. § 145.413 (recording, reporting); id. § 145.416
(licensing and regulating).
MS

MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-3(1) (1973) (duly licensed, practicing physician).

MO Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020 (Vernon 1983) (physicians required); id. § 188.025 (Vernon
Supp. 1990) (subsequent 16 weeks, hospital required); id. § 188.052 (Vernon 1983) (physician's report); id. § 188.055 (forms to be supplied to facilities and physicians).
MT

MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109(1) (1989) (licensed physician; after three months, hospital);
id. § 50-20-110 (reporting).

NE

NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-335 (1985) (licensed physician); id. § 28-336 (accepted medical
procedures); id. § 28-343 (Bureau Vital Statistics reporting form); id. § 28-345 (Department
of Health file).
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NV

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.250(1)-(2) (Michie 1986) (licensed physician, within 24 weeks;
after 24 weeks, in hospital); id. § 442.256 (records); id. § 442.260 (health division adopts
regulations); id. § 442.265 (hospital must submit vital statistics).

NJ

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-6.1 (West 1981) (must be performed in hospital; physician must
submit report).

NM

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14-18 (1978) (report of induced abortion).

NY

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney 1987) (duly licensed physician; within 24 weeks).

NC

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1986) (physician's license; first 20 weeks in hospital or facility;
after 20 weeks; statistical reports).

ND

N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04(1) (Rep. vol. 1981) (licensed physicians); id. § 14-02.1-04(2)
(first 12 weeks, but before viability; licensed hospital); id. § 14.02.1-07 (records required);
id. § 14.02.1-07.1 (forms available at Department of Health).

OH

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.341 (Anderson 1988) (public health rules on abortion shall
be adopted by Public Health Council).

OK

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-731(A) (West 1984) (physician's license); id. § 1-731(B)
(must be in hospital after first trimester); id. § 1-733 (self-induced abortion; advice of
physician); id. § 1-737 (hospitals which may perform); id. § 1-738 (form to be completed);
id. § 1-739 (records required).

OR

OR. REV. STAT. § 435.496 (Supp. 1987) (report to Vital Statistics Unit).

PA

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3207(a)-(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989) (abortion facilities, reports);
id. § 3214 (reporting) (held unconstitutional).

SC

S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20 (Law. Co-op. 1988) (legal abortions first, second, third trimesters); id. § 44-41-60 (reported to State Registrar); id. § 44-41-70 (promulgation of rules
for hospitals); S.C. CODE REGS. 61-12 §§ 101-609 (1976) (rules and regulations for abortion
clinics, minimum licensing standards).

SD

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-3 (1986) (during first 12 weeks); id. § 34-23A-4
(during second 12 weeks, place of performance); id. § 34-23A-5 (after 24 weeks for medical
necessity); id. § 34-23A-6 (blood supplies and testing facilities); id. § 34-23A-19 (reports
required).

TN

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(c)(1) (Repl. vol. 1982) (first three months with consent and
pursuant to medical judgment of physician); id. § 39-4-201(c)(2) (after three months before
viability; hospital); id. § 39-4-203 (records and reports required).

TX

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.8 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (Texas Abortion Facility
Reporting and Licensing Act).

UT

UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-2-23(3) (Repl. vol. 1989) (records kept); id. § 76-7-302 (Repl. vol.
1978) (performed by a physician, 90 days after, must be in hospital); id. § 76-7-303 (concurrence of attending physician); id. § 76-7-309 (pathologist's report); id. § 76-7-313 (Supp.
1989) (physician's report).

VA VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-72 (Repl. vol. 1988) (when lawful in first trimester); id. § 18.2-73
(when lawful in second trimester); id. § 18.2-74 (when lawful after second trimester); id.
§ 18.2-74.1 (when necessary to save life of woman); id. § 32.1-264 (Repl. vol. 1985) (reports
required).
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WA WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.060 (West 1988) lawful termination); id. § 9.02.070 (not
quick, not more than four months after conception; accredited hospital); id. § 43.20A.625
(West 1983) (records required by Registrar).
WV W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-6 (Repl. vol. 1985) (reporting requirements).
WI

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 69.186 (West Supp. 1989) (induced abortion reporting required).

WY Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-107 (Michie 1977) (forms for reporting); id. § 35-6-108 (complications
of abortion; reports required).
A-2

Viability and Post-Viability Regulations

AK

ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(d) (1986) (abortion defined; terminate nonviable fetus).

AZ

ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-329 (Repl. vol. 1986) (postviability fetal death registration);
id. § 36-2301 (doctor's duty to preserve life of viable fetus; postviability reasons; duty;
methods; second physician; definition viability).

AR

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-16-703 (1987) (presume nonviable to end of 25 week); id. § 20-16-704
(penalty); id. § 20-16-705 (postviability abortion prohibition; rape and health exceptions);
id. § 20-16-706 (method or technique); id. § 20-16-707 (attendance of second physician).

FL

FLA. STAT. § 390.001(5) (1989) (standard of medical care during viability).

GA

GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141 (1988) (medical aid if capable of life).

HI

HAw. REV. STAT. § 453-16(b) (Repl. vol. 1985) (abortion is defined as termination of
unviable fetus).

ID

IDAHO CODE § 18-608(3) (Repl. vol. 1987) (third trimester; if possible, save fetus).

IL

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-25 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (preservation of life and
health of mother; viability of fetus); id. para. 81-26 (preservation of life and health of
viable fetus); id. para. 81-26(2)(a) (attending physician); id. para. 81-32 (evidence of live
birth, viability reported); id. ch. 110, para. 11-107.1 (injunctive relief for father after
viability).

IN

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2(3) (Burns 1985) (after viability); id. § 35-1-58.5-7(3) (after
viability, two physicians; preserve life of fetus born alive; legal status of fetus born alive).

IA

IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.10 (West 1979) (duty to preserve viable fetus).

KY

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.780 (Baldwin 1986) (prohibition after viability; exceptions).

LA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.5 (West 1986) (intentional failure to sustain life of aborted
viable infant); id. § 40:1299.35.4 (West Supp. 1989) (no abortion after viability; exceptions;
additional physician; preserve life).

ME

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598(4) (1964) (abortions after viability are criminal).

MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.415 (West 1989) (live fetus after abortion); id. § 145.412 subd.
3 (abortion unlawful when fetus potentially viable; exceptions).
MO

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.029 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (physician determination of viability); id.
§ 188.030 (Vernon 1983) (abortion of viable child; when permitted).

MT MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108 (1987) (protection of premature infants born alive); id. §
50-20-109(c) (no abortions after viability).
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NE

NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-329 (1985) (no abortion after viability); id. § 28-330 (abortion
procedure; protection of viable child).

NY

N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4164 (McKinney 1985) (induced viable births).

ND

N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04(3) (Repl. vol. 1981) (after viability, no abortion except in
hospital); id. 14.02.1-05 (preserving life of viable child).

OK

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-732 (West 1984) (viable fetus; grounds to abort; procedure);
id. § 1-734 (live-born fetus, care and treatment).

PA

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3210 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (abortion after viability); id. §
3211 (viability determination) (held unconstitutional).

UT

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302 (Repl. vol. 1978) (after viability; when necessary for mother's
health); id. § 76-7-307 (medical procedures to save unborn child); id. § 76-7-308 (medical
sils).

WI

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.15(2) (West Supp. 1988) (no abortion after viability, unless necessary to preserve life of woman, then, in hospital; method).

WY Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-102 (Michie 1988) (no abortion after viability); id. § 35-6-103 (viability
not affected by abortion); id. § 35-6-104 (means of treatment for viable infant).
A-3

Informed Consent

DE

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794 (Repl. vol. 1987) (consent of woman).

FL

FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4) (1989) (informed consent); id. § 390.025(2) (abortion referral and
counseling agencies).

GA

GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112(a)(2) (Supp. 1988) (minor signs consent).

ID

IDAHO CODE § 18-609 (Repl. vol. 1987) (informed consent); id. § 18-610 (refusal to consent
by pregnant woman).

IL

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (inform woman of pain
reliever for fetus); id. para. 81-54(2) (informed consent of minor).

IN

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2(1)(B) (Burns 1985) (woman's consent filed).

IA

IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8 (West 1979) (nonconsensual termination).

KY

Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.726 (Baldwin 1986 & Supp. 1988) (voluntary, informed
consent); id. § 311.729 (information on alternatives) (probably unconstitutional).

LA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.33(D) (West 1977) (written consent); id. § 40:1299.35.6
(West Supp. 1989) (informed consent).

ME

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1599 (Supp. 1988) (informed consent; 48-hour waiting
period).

MD

MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-211(d) (Repl. vol. 1987) (information before abortion;
signed recognition).

MA

MASS. ANN. LAW ch. 112, § 12S (Law Co-op. 1985) (informed written consent).

MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(4) (West 1989) (informed consent).
MO

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.027 (Vernon 1983) (informed consent); id. § 188.039 (Vernon 1983
& Supp. 1989) (consent form).
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MT MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-104(3)(c) (disclosure of alternatives); id. § 50-20-106 (1987)
(informed consent; when not required; coercion).
NE

NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-327 (1985) (informed consent required).

NV

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.252 (Michie 1987) (physician to certify informed consent);
id. § 442.253 (requirements).

NY N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.053 (McKinney 1987) (consent).
ND N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03(1) (Repl. vol. 1981) (full informed consent).
OH

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(A) (Anderson 1987) (informed consent).

OK

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738 (West 1984) (consent).

PA

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (informed consent) (held unconstitutional); id. § 3208 (printed information) (held unconstitutional).

RI

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-2 (1985) (informed written consent required); id. § 23-4.7-3
(required disclosures); id. § 23-4.7-5 (consent form).

SC

S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (first, second, third trimesters; woman's
consent); id. § 44-41-30(a) (persons from whom consent is required).

SD

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-7 (1986) (consent of patient); id. § 34-23A-10 (information of counseling services required); id. § 34-23A-10.1 (statement of informed consent).

TN

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(c) (Repl. vol. 1982) (woman's consent); id. § 39-4-202 (informed, written consent).

UT

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305.5 (Supp. 1989) (informed consent).

VA VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (Repl. vol. 1988) (informed consent required).
WA WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (1988) (prior consent).
WI

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.78 (West 1989) (informed consent).)

A-4

Parental Participation Requirements

AL

ALA. CODE § 26-21-1 (Supp. 1988) (legislative purpose); id. § 26-21-2 (definition); id. §
26-21-3 (written consent; notice; incest; emancipation; waiver); id. § 26-21-4 (procedure for
waiver); id. 26-21-5 (emergency exception); id. § 26-21-6 (penalties); id. § 26-21-7 (nonliability of physicians); id. § 26-21-8 (confidentiality; reports).

AK

ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(a)(3) (1986) (parental consent).

AZ

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152 (Supp. 1988) (parental consent; emergency exception;
penalties); id. § 36-2153 (parental consent waiver proceedings).

CA

CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.5 (West Supp. 1989) (unemancipated minor consent); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE id. § 2435 (West Supp. 1989) (attorney in fact; authority to consent);
id. § 25958 (unemancipated minors; consent).

CO

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101(1) (Repl. vol. 1986) (parental consent requirements).

DE

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(b)(3) (Repl. vol. 1987) (two parents if minor resides in
same household; otherwise one parent).

FL

FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (1989) (if unmarried, under 18, parent or court).
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GA

GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1988) (parental notification required); id. §
15-11-112(b) (waiver provision).

ID

IDAHO CODE § 18-609(6) (Repl. vol. 1987) (unmarried minor, 24-hour notice to parents).

IL

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-54(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (parental consent for
minor); id. para. 81-64 (notice required for unemancipated minor); id. para. 81-65 (waiver
of notice); id. para. 81-66 (medical emergency, exceptions); id. para. 81-67 (other exceptions); id. ch. 40, para. 1015 (no parental liability for expense incurred because abortion
performed without consent).

IN

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5(a) (Burns Supp. 1988) (unemancipated minor; consent of
one parent); id. § 35-1-58.5-2.5(b) (petition juvenile court); id. § 35-1-58.5-2.5(c) (waiver).

KY

Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(2) (Baldwin 1986) (written consent of minor, both parents);
id. § 311.733 (severability).

LA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.33(D) (West 1977) (unemancipated minor, written parental
consent); id. § 40:1299.35.5(A) (West Supp. 1989) (parental consent; court permission).

ME

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597 (Repl. vol. 1980) (parental notification; consent not
required).

MD

MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (1987) (notice required for unmarried minor;
incomplete notice; waiver; evidence of notice).

MA

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12S (Law Co-op. 1985) (minor, unmarried, her consent;
parents or judge's order).

MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 subd. 6 (substitute notification) (West 1989); id. § 144.344
subd. 2 (parental notice for unemancipated minor; 48 hours).
MS

Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-53(1) (Supp. 1989) (unemancipated minor; written consent both
parents); id. § 4-41-53(3) (petition for waiver).

MO

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.1(1)-(3) (Vernon 1989) (written consent; minor and one parent;
consent of emancipated minor; court order).

MT MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-405 (1989) (self-consent of minors not applicable to abortion);
id. § 50-20-107 (written notice to spouse or parent required; parent if under 18 and

unmarried).
NE

NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-347 (1985) (minor; notice required; exceptions; waiver).

NV

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.255 (Michie 1987) (unemancipated minor, notify parent;
court order); id. § 442.2555 (appeal court ruling).

ND

N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03(1) (Repl. vol. 1981) (notification to parents of unemancipated minor; before viability); id. § 14-02.1-03(2)(a) (consent of husband subsequent to
viability); id. § 14-02.1-03(2)(b) (unmarried minor, consent of parent); id. § 14.02.1-03.1
(1981 & Supp. 1987) (parental consent or judicial authorization).

OH

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(B)(1)(a) (Anderson 1987) (unemancipated minor, 24hour notice to one parent; juvenile court waivers; notice to others besides parents).

OK

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738 (West 1984) (consent of parents); id. § 2602 (right of
self-consent, minor).

PA

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1989) (parental consent).
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R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (1985) (minors, parental consent); id. § 234.8-2 (notify husband);
id. § 23-4.8-3 (exceptions).

SC

S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20(c) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (third trimester, husband's consent);
id. § 44-41-30(b)(c) (unmarried minor, incompetent).

SD

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-7 (1986) (unmarried minor, consent of parents;
married minor, consent of husband).

TN

TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-303 (Supp. 1988) (unemancipated minor, written consent of
parents; waiver); id. § 37-10-304 (applicability to minors); id. § 394-202(f) (Repl. vol. 1982)
(notice required to parents of unemancipated, emancipated minors).

UT

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (Repl. vol. 1978) (notify minor's parents or husband, if
married).

VA

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (Repl. vol. 1988) (when consent of parent required).

WA WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070(a) (1988) (married, consent of husband; under 18
unmarried, consent of legal guardian).
WV W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3 (Repl. vol. 1985) (parental notice required, unemancipated minors;
waiver); id. § 16-2F-4 (waiver of notice; petition); id. § 16-2F-5 (emergency exception).
WI

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.78(5) (West 1989) (parental notice for minor).

A-5

Spousal Participation Requirements

CO

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101(1) (Repl. vol. 1986) (spousal consent requirements).

FL

FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(b) (1989) (if married, husband gets notice).

IL

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1015 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (no spousal liability without
consent).

KY

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.735 (Baldwin 1986) (notice to spouse) (probably unconstitutional).

LA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.33(D) (West 1977) (minor emancipated by marriage,
spousal consent).

MT

MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107 (1987) (written notice to spouse or parent required; parent
if under 18 and unmarried).

RI

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.8-2 (1985) (notify husband); id. § 23-4.8-3 (exceptions).

SC

S.C. CODE ANN. § 4441-20(c) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (third trimester, husband's consent).

SD

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-7 (1986) (married minor, consent of husband).

UT

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (Repl. vol. 1978) (notify minor's parents or husband, if
married).

WA WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070(a) (West 1988) (if married, consent of husband).
A-6

Conscience Protection Provisions

AK

ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(b) (1986) (no requirement for hospital or person to participate;
no liability if refuse).

AZ

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (Repl. vol. 1986) (hospital, person's right to refuse).
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ARY. STAT. ANN. § 20-16-601 (1987) (refusal to participate; immunity from liability).

CA

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955 (West Supp. 1989) (refusal to participate); id.
§ 25955.3 (West 1984) (no loss of public benefits).

CO

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-104 (Repl. vol. 1986) (failure to comply; no discipline).

DE

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (Repl. vol. 1987) (refusal to perform).

FL

FLA. STAT. § 390.001(8) (1989) (refusal to participate).

GA

GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142 (1988) (no requirement for physician or hospital).

HI

HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16(d) (Repl. vol. 1985) (no participation required).

ID

IDAHO CODE § 18-612 (Repl. vol. 1987) (refusal to perform; effective upon governor's
proclamation).

IL

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-33 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (conscientious objections);
id. ch. 111 , para. 5201 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (refusal to recommend or participate);
id. para. 5301-5314 (Right of Conscience Act).

IN

IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1-5-8 (hospitals not required to provide abortion services) (Burns
1983); id. § 16-10-3-1 (no private denominational hospital required to use facilities for
abortions); id. § 16-10-3-2 (performance not required).

IA

IOWA CODE ANN. § 146.1 (West 1989) (no requirement for persons to assist abortions);
id. § 146.2 (nonpublic hospital not required to assist abortions).

KS

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65443 (Repl. vol. 1985) (performance not required, persons); id. §
65-444 (refusal to permit, hospital).

KY

Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(3)-(4) (Baldwin 1986) (no private hospital, physician or
staff required).

LA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.31 (West 1977) (discrimination against persons); id. §
40:1299.32 (discrimination against hospital).

ME

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1591-92 (Repl. vol. 1980) (immunity and employment
protection; discrimination for refusal).

MD

MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-214 (Repl. vol. 1987) (participation not required by
doctors, hospitals, patients).

MA

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 121 (Law. Co-op. 1983) (refusal to participate); id. ch. 272,
§ 21B (Law. Co-op. 1989) (private hospital).

MI

MICE. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.20181-.20182 (West 1980) (hospital, physician, staff not
required); id. § 333.20183 (refusal to give advice); id. § 333.20184 (discrimination).

MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.414 (West 1989) (abortion not mandatory); id. § 145.42 (nonliability for refusal to perform).
MO

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.105 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (discrimination by employer); id. § 188.110
(discrimination by colleges); id. § 197.032 (Vernon 1983) (hospital and medical person may
refuse).

MT

MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (1989) (right to refuse to participate).

NE

NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-337 (1985) (not required to admit in hospital clinic); id. § 28-338
(not required to perform); id. §§ 28-339 to -341 (discrimination).
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NJ

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:65A-1 to -2 (West 1987) (no person or hospital required to perform
abortion); id. § 2A:65A-3 (nonliability for refusal to perform).

NM N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (Repl. vol. 1984) (persons, hospitals not required to perform
abortions).
NY

N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-i (McKinney 1976) (discrimination against person refusing
to perform abortion).

NC

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e) (1981) (physician, nurse not required to participate); id. §
1445.1(f) (hospital not required to participate).

ND

N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (Repl. vol. 1978) (participation in abortion not mandatory).

OK

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741 (West 1984) (refusal to perform).

OR

OR. REV. STAT. § 435.475 (1987) (refusal to admit for abortion); id. § 435.485 (medical
persons not required to participate).

PA

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3202(d) (Purdon 1983) (right of conscience); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 955.2 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (hospital immunity from requirement to perform).

RI

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (1985) (protection of nonparticipants).

SC

S.C. CODE ANN. § 4441-40 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (certain hospitals or clinics may refuse);
id. § 4441-50 (medical employees not required to aid in abortions).

SD

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-11 (1986) (counselor not liable); id. § 34-23A-12 (no
liability for refusal to perform); id. § 34-23A-13 (discrimination by medical facility); id. §
34-23A-14 (hospital not required to perform).

TN

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-204 (Repl. vol. 1982) (right to refuse to perform); id. § 39-4-205
(rights of hospital to refuse).

TX

TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (right not to perform).

UT

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (Repl. vol. 1978) (physicians, hospital employees, hospitals
not required to participate).

VA

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (Repl. vol. 1988) (conscience clause).

WA WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.080 (West 1988) (objecting to participation).
WV W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-7 (Repl. vol. 1985) (physicians, persons not required to perform).
WI

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 448.03(5) (West 1988) (no civil liability).

WY Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-105 (1988) (private institutions not required; no liability for refusal);
id. § 35-6-106 (persons not required).
A-7

Public Funding, Participation Restrictions

AZ

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1630 (Repl. vol. 1984) (nonlifesaving abortion at state
education facility prohibited); id. § 35-196.02 (Supp. 1989) (prohibits use of any public
funds).

CA

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955.3 (West 1984) (no loss of privileges or public
benefits).

CO

COLO. CONST. art. V, § 50; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 26-4-105.5, 26-15-104.5 (Supp. 1987)
(no public funds for abortion; exception).
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ID

IDAHO CODE §§ 41-2142, 41-2210A (Supp. 1988) (insurance, limitation elective abortions);
id. § 56-209c (denial of payments for abortions).

IL

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 5-5 (Smith-Hurd 1988) (no medical payment for abortions
from Department of Medical Assistance); id. para. 6-1 (no financial aid); id. para. 7-1 (no
local aid).

IN

IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3-3 (Burns 1983) (state funding of abortion prohibited); id. §
35-1-58.5-2.5(e) (Burns Supp. 1988) (county pays for minor's attorney in abortion proceeding).

KY

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (Baldwin 1988) (use of public funds prohibited); id. §
311.810 (Baldwin 1986) (no denial of government assistance for accepting or rejecting
abortion).

LA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.34 (West Supp. 1989) (no state employee may counsel
abortion); id. § 40:1299.34.5 (no use of public funds).

MD

MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-208 comment (1987) (state funding not required).

MA MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 29, § 20(B) (Law Co-op. 1983) (no payment for appropriation for
abortion); id. ch. 258A, § 3(a) (Supp. 1989) (no emergency rape funds for abortion or
abortion counseling).
MN

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.925 subd. 2 (West 1989) (family planning grants, not for abortion);
id. § 261.28 (West Supp. 1989) (subsidy for abortions prohibited); id. § 256B.40 (subsidy
prohibited); id. § 393.07 subd. 11 (no welfare funding).

MO

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.205 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (use of public funds prohibited); id. §
188.210 (use of public employees prohibited); id. § 188.215 (use of public facilities prohibited); id. § 208.152(14) (family planning services; no payment for abortions).

NJ

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-6.1 (West 1981) (funding of abortions, restrictions).

ND

N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-01 (Repl. vol. 1981) (use of public funds restricted); id. §
14.02.3-02 (use of family planning, referrals prohibited); id. § 14.02.3-04 (abortion in government hospitals restricted).

OH

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.55(B) (Anderson 1989) (no loss of public benefits for refusal
to consent to abortion); id. § 5101.55(C) (restrictions on state or public funds).

PA

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (publicly owned facilities, public
officials, public funds); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 453 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (expenditure
of public funds for abortion limited).

SD

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 28-6-4.5 (1934) (public funds not to be used).

UT

UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-18-4 (Repl. vol. 1989) (no Medicaid); id. § 76-7-322 (Supp. 1989)
(public funds for provision of contraceptives or abortion services restricted); id. § 76-7-323
(public funds for support entities restricted).

VA

VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-92.1 (Repl. vol. 1985) (funding when pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest); id. § 32.1-92.2 (funding when physical deformity or mental deficiency in
fetus).

WI

WIs. STAT. ANN. § 46.24 (West 1987) (assistance to minors concerning abortion notification); id. § 59.07(136) (West 1988) (county subsidy restricted); id. § 66.04(1)(m) (West
Supp. 1989) (municipal subsidy restricted).

WY Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-117 (Michie 1988) (use of appropriated funds, exceptions).
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A-8

Private Advertising, Promotion, Speech Restrictions

AZ

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3605 (Repl. vol. 1989) (advertising, misdemeanor).

CA

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 601 (West 1974) (advertisement a felony).

CO

COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-665 (Repl. vol. 1982) (unlawful to sell or advertise abortion
drugs, substances).

CT

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-31 (West 1985) (fine for encouraging abortion by public
advertisement, lecture, etc.).

FL

FLA. STAT. § 797.02 (1989) (advertising drugs, etc., penalty).

ID

IDAHO CODE § 18-603 (Repl. vol. 1987) (limiting advertising); id. § 18-607 (unauthorized
sales of abortifacients).

LA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.4 (West 1986) (abortion advertising).

MD

MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-201 (Repl. vol. 1987) (no advertising of abortions;
no abortion referral services);

MA MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 20 (Law. Co-op. 1970) (penalty for advertising).
MI

MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 750.15 (West 1968) (advertising, selling); id. § 750.34 (immoral
advertising); id. § 750.40 (publications).

MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.25 (West 1987) (indecent articles and information); id. § 617.26
(mailing, carrying obscene matter).
MS

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-5 (1973) (advertising, sale or gift).

MT

MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109(4) (1987) (no soliciting, advertising).

NV NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.200 (Michie 1987) (advertising goods and services to produce
miscarriage).
ND N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-06 (Repl. vol. 1981) (soliciting for abortions prohibited).
OK

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-736 (West 1984) (advertisement of counseling to pregnant
women).

VT

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 104 (Supp. 1988) (advertising).

VA

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76.1 (Repl. vol. 1988) (encouraging, promoting abortions prohibited).

WI

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.145 (West Supp. 1988) (criminal trespass to medical facility).

WY Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-116 (1988) (advertising).
A-9

Legislative Purpose, Public Policy, Declaration

AL

ALA. CODE § 26-21-1 (Supp. 1988) (legislative purpose for parental participation).

AR

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-16-701 (1987) (intent to regulate abortion consistent with Supreme
Court decisions).

CT

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-31a (West 1985) (abortion or miscarriage public policy);
id. § 53-31b (severability) (both sections unconstitutional).

IL

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (legislative intent); id.
para. 81-51 (legislative intent, parental consent); id. para. 81-62 (legislative purpose and

findings).
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IN

IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3-4 (Burns 1983) (childbirth preferred over abortion).

KY

Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.710 (Baldwin 1986) (legislative finding).

LA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.0 (West Supp. 1989) (legislative intent).

ME

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1596 (Supp. 1989) (abortions).

[Vol. 41

MA MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 15FF (Law Co-op 1988) (prolife month).
MI

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 256B.011 (West 1982) (policy for childbirth and abortion
funding); id. § 333.9131(2) (West 1980) (clinical abortions not family planning).

MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 393.07 subd. 11 (West Supp. 1989) (public policy, childbirth over
abortion).
MO

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (life begins at conception); id. § 188.010 (Vernon Supp. 1989)
(intent of general assembly).

MT

MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-102 (1987) (statement of purpose); id. § 50-20-103 (legislative
intent).

NE

NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-325 (1985) (abortion; declaration of purpose).

ND

N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-01 (Repl. vol. 1981) (purpose of the Abortion Control Act).

PA

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3202 (Purdon 1983) (legislative intent).

RI

R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2 (no right granted relating to abortion); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.8-1
(1985) (declaration of purpose for spousal notice).

TN

TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-301 (Supp. 1988) (legislative intent for parental consent).

UT

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-23 (Repl. vol. 1987) (right-to-life policy).

WV W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-1 (Repl. vol. 1985) (legislative findings and intent; parental notice).
A-10 Disposition of Aborted Fetuses Regulations
AZ

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-329 (Repl. vol. 1986) (fetal death registration; delayed
report; interment; disposal).

AR

ARK. STAT. ANN. 88 20-17-801, 20-17-802(a) (1987) (doctor's choice; dispose like other
tissue).

CA

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25957 (West 1984) (disposal, storage).

FL

FLA. STAT. § 390.001(7) (1989) (fetal remains).

GA

GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141.1 (1988) (disposal of fetus).

LA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.14 (West Supp. 1989) (disposal of remains) (held
unconstitutional in Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986)).

MN

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.1621 (West 1989) (disposition of fetus).

MS

MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-39-1 (1981) (disposal of fetus).

MT

MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-105 (1987) (disposition).

NY

N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4162 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1989) (fetal deaths, burial);
id. § 4164(4) (McKinney 1985) (disposal of aborted child).
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ND N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-09 (Repl. vol. 1981) (humane disposal).
WY Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-109 (1988) (disposal).
A-11 Fetal Experimentation and Transplantation Restrictions
AZ

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (Repl. vol. 1986) (experimentation prohibition); id. §
36-2303 (violation class-five felony).

AR

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-802(b)(1) (1987) (no experiments if born alive); id. § 20-17802(b)(2) (no experiments if born dead, without mother's permission); id. § 20-17-802(c)-(d)
(no sale, exchange).

CA

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West 1984) (research restrictions, fetal remains);
id. § 25957 (fetal remains, experimentation).

FL

FLA. STAT. § 390.001(6) (1989) (experimentation prohibited; exceptions).

IL

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (no sale or experimentation of fetus); id. para. 81-31 (analysis of fetal tissue); id. para. 81-32.1 (use not prohibited
if fetal tissue not result of abortion).

IN

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1986) (experimentation, transport prohibited; class
A misdemeanor).

KY KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.026 (Baldwin 1986) (sale, transportation of viable aborted
child for experimentation prohibited).
LA
ME

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1986) (human experimentation, live fetus); id. §
40:1299.35.13 (West Supp. 1989) (experimentation).
IE. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (Repl. vol. 1980) (sale or use of fetus).

MA MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)(I)-(IV) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (experimentation prohibited; no sale or transfer of fetus).
MI

MICH. Coip. LAWS ANN. §9 333.2685-.2687, .2689 (West 1980) (human research); id.
§ 333.2690 (sale, transfer).

MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West 1989) (experimentation or sale).
MO Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.036 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (prohibited abortions); id. § 188.037
(Vernon 1983) (fetal experimentation).
MT

MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108(3) (1987) (no experimentation of premature infant born
alive).

NE NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-246 (1985) (experimentation prohibited); id. § 28-342 (aborted child).
NV NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.015 (Michie 1987) (commercial use prohibited).
NM N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1 to -7 (1986) (Maternal, Fetal, and Infant Experimentation
Act).
ND N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.02.2-01 (Repl. vol. 1981) (live fetal experimentation); id. § 14.02.202 (experiments on dead fetus).
OH

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Anderson 1987) (experimentation, selling aborted fetus
prohibited).

OK

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (West 1984) (sale, experimentation).
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PA

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Purdon 1983) (fetal experimentation).

RI

R:I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-54-1 to -2 (Supp. 1988) (experimentation on fetus prohibited).

SD

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1986) (consent required for experimentation).

TN

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208 (Repl. vol. 1982) (research, sale, experimentation).

UT

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (Repl. vol. 1978) (experimentation prohibited); id. § 76-7-311
(selling, buying prohibited).

WY Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1988) (penalty for giving away live or viable child for experimentation).
A-12 Feticide Restrictions
CA

CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1987) (unlawful killing of fetus is murder); id. § 270
(failure to provide necessaries for preborn child).

GA

GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1988) (feticide if quick; life imprisonment).

IA

IowA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979) (feticide, class C felony; attempted feticide is a
class D felony).

LA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(7) (West 1986) (person, for criminal purposes, includes
unborn from conception).

ME

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1594 (Supp. 1988) (failure to preserve life, subject to
homicide laws).

MI

MICH. COmp. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West 1968) (willful killing of unborn quick child);
id. § 750.323 (death of quick child; medicine).

MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.21(3) (West 1987) (vehicular homicide of unborn child); id. §§
609.266-.2691 (crimes against unborn; murder; manslaughter).
MS

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1972) (homicide, killing of unborn quick child).

NM

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (Supp. 1988) (injury to pregnant woman); id. § 66-8-101.1
(1978) (vehicular).

OK

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 713 (West 1983) (manslaughter to kill quick unborn child).

PA

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3212 (Purdon 1983) (infanticide).

RI

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1981) (manslaughter if quick unborn child).

A-13 Wrongful Birth/Life/Death Regulation
CA

CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982) (parental immunity from liability).

ID

IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (Supp. 1988) (act or omission preventing abortion not actionable).

IL

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 2.2 (Smith-Hurd 1988) (no wrongful death action).

IN

IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-11 (Burns Supp. 1988) (no actions for wrongful life).

ME

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1594 (Repl. vol. 1964) (failure to preserve life, wrongful
death).

MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West 1989) (prohibition of tort actions for act or omission
causing no abortion).
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MO Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (no cause of action for not causing
abortion).
NV

NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.270 (Michie 1987) (failure to exercise reasonable care to
preserve life, wrongful death).

ND N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (Supp. 1987) (wrongful life action prohibited).
SD

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-55-1 to -4 (1987) (action for damages for not causing
abortion prohibited).

UT

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (Repl. vol. 1987) (act or omission not causing abortion not
actionable).

A-14 General Criminal Prohibitions
AL

ALA. CODE § 13A-13-7 (1975) (inducing abortion, fine and prison); id. § 26-21-6 (Supp.
1988) (penalties for violating parental participation, class A misdemeanors).

AK

ALASKA STAT. § 18.16010(c) (1986) (knowing violation of abortion restrictions, fine, imprisonment).

AZ

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603 (Repl. vol. 1989) (nonlifesaving abortion prohibited,
two to five years in prison); id. § 13-3604 (solicitation, submission, one to five years); id.
§ 36-2152(C) (Supp. 1989) (failure of parental notification, class one misdemeanor).

AR

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-61-101 (1987) (nondoctor abortion); id. § 5-61-102(b) (unlawful abortion, one to five years); id. § 20-16-704 (viability violation, class A misdemeanor); id. §
20-17-802(f) (experimentation, class A misdemeanor).

CA

CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988) (murder defined; death of fetus); id. § 274 (supplying
or administering abortifacient; exception; punishment); id. § 275 (soliciting or submitting
to abortifacient; exception; punishment); id. § 276 (soliciting use of abortifacient); id. §
1108 (West 1985) (abortion, corroboration of testimony); id. § 11413 (West Supp. 1989)
(terrorism, arson, proabortion or antiabortion facilities); id. § 12022.9 (termination of
pregnancy without consent of woman).

CO

CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-6-102 (Repl. vol. 1986) (elements of offense of criminal abortion);
id. § 18-6-103 (pretended criminal abortion); id. § 18-6-105 (distributing abortifacients,
class 1 misdemeanor).

CT

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-29 (West 1985) (attempt to procure abortion; fine or
imprisonment); id. § 53-30 (woman may be fined or imprisoned) (all held unconstitutional);
id. § 53-31 (encouraging abortion, class D felony).

DE

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 651 (Repl. vol. 1987) (abortion, class D felony); id. § 652
(self-abortion, class A misdemeanor); id. § 653 (issuing abortional articles, class B misdemeanor); id. tit. 24, § 1795 (live birth, violation, class A misdemeanor); id. § 1766(b)
(felony if title 24 violated).

FL

FLA. STAT. § 390.001(10)(a) (1989) (penalties for violations, third-degree felony); id. §
390.001(10)(b) (if results in death of woman, second-degree felony); id. § 390.025 (penalty
first degree misdemeanor for violation, referral agencies); id. § 797.03 (1989) (second-degree
misdemeanor for willful violation of prohibited acts).

GA

GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-118 (Supp. 1989) (violations of parental notification); id. § 16-12-140
(1988) (criminal abortion, penalty); id. § 16-12-143 (failure to file reports misdemeanor).
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HI

HAw. REV. STAT. § 453.16(c) (Repl. vol. 1985) (knowing violation; fine, imprisonment).

ID

IDAHO CODE § 18-605 (Repl. vol. 1987) (unlawful abortions, procurement; felony); id. §
18-606 (unlawful abortion; accomplice felony); id. § 18-607 (abortifacients, unlawful sale,
misdemeanor); id. § 18-614 (abortion, procurement; effective upon governor's proclamation);
id. § 18-615 (submission to abortion; effective upon governor's proclamation).

IL

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-23.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (violation, class-two
felony); id. para. 81-25 (violation, class two felony); id. para. 81-26 (violation, class-three
felony); id. para. 81-31 (violation, class A misdemeanor violations, unprofessional conduct);
id. para. 81-31.1 (abortion referral fee, class-four felony); id. para. 81-55 (violations); id.
para. 81-68 (penalty).

IN

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-4 (Burns 1985) (penalties for performing illegal abortions).

IA

IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979) (performing abortions without license, class C
felony); id. § 707.8 (nonconsensual termination); id. § 707.9 (murder of fetus aborted alive,
class B felony).

KS

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407 (Repl. vol. 1988) (criminal abortion, class D felony).

KY

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.990 (Baldwin 1986) (criminal, civil penalties); id. § 436.026
(imprisonment for experimentation).

LA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West 1986) (imprisonment for committing abortion); id.
§ 14:87.1 (killing a child during delivery); id. § 14:87.2 (human experimentation); id. §
14:87.4 (advertising); id. § 14:87.5 (aborted viable fetus); id. § 14.88 (distribution of abortifacients); id. § 40:1299.35.18 (West Supp. 1989) (penalties); id. § 40:66 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1989) (failure to complete form, misdemeanor); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
465 (West 1966 & Supp. 1989) (indictment form).

ME ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (Repl. vol. 1980) (punishment, sale or use of fetus);
id. § 1598(4) (abortions after viability, criminal).
MD MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-206 (Repl. vol. 1987) (penalty for abortion referral
services violations); id. § 20-210 (1987 & Supp. 1988) (unlawful acts); id. § 20-211(e) (1987)
(penalty for not giving information).
MA

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)(V)-(VII) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (violation, imprisonment,
defense); id. § 12N (punishment for violation of 12L or 12M); id. § 12T (violations of 120
to 12R, punishment); id. ch. 272, § 19 (procuring miscarriage); id. 20 (Law. Co-op.
1980) (penalty for advertising); id. § 21 (instruments for abortion); id. ch. 277, § 79
(indictment, form).

MI

MICH. COMip LAws ANN. § 333.2691 (West 1980) (violations of §§ 333.2685 to .2690); id.
§ 333.20199(2) (violations of §§ 333.20181 to .20184); id. § 750.14 (West 1968) (intent to
procure); id. § 750.15 (drugs, medicine); id. § 750.34 (immoral advertising); id. § 750.40
(publications); id. § 750.149 (compounding offenses); id. § 750.322 (willful killing unborn
quick); id. § 750.323 (death of quick child, medicine); id. § 767.2 (West 1982) (manslaughter).

MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 subd. 5 (West 1989) (penalty); id. § 145.412 (criminal acts);
id. § 617.20 (West 1987) (drugs to produce miscarriage); id. § 617.25 (indecent articles
and information); id. § 617.26 (mailing and carrying obscene matter).
MS

MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-61 (Supp. 1988) (penalties for violations of confidence); id. §
97-3-3 (1972) (abortion): id. § 97-3-5 (advertisement, etc.).
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MO Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.035 (Vernon 1983) (death of child aborted alive); id. § 188.070
(breach of confidentiality); id. § 188.075 (violation of §§ 188.010-.085); id. § 188.080 (Vernon
1983 & Supp. 1989) (abortion by person other than physician).
§ 50-20-106 (1987) (violation is misdemeanor); id. § 50-20-108 (protection
of premature infants born alive, felony); id. § 50-20-109 (violation of (1)-(3) felony; violation
of (4), misdemeanor); id. § 50-20-110 (violation of reporting requirements, misdemeanor);
id. § 50-20-112 (penalties).

MT

MONT. CODE ANN.

NE

NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-328 (1985) (abortion without informed consent, class II misdemeanor); id. § 28-332 (penalty for violations); id. 28-335 (licensed physician); id. § 28-336
(unaccepted medical procedures); id. § 28-339 (discrimination); id. § 28-342, -346 (experimentation); id. § 28-344 (reporting form violation); id. § 28-706 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (criminal
nonsupport).

NV

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.220 (Michie 1987) (woman taking drugs to terminate preg-

nancy); id. § 201.120 (abortion, punishment); id. § 201.130 (selling drugs to produce miscarriage); id. § 202.200 (advertising, misdemeanor); id. § 442.257 (criminal penalty).
NH N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:12 (1986) (attempt to procure miscarriage); id. § 585.13
(intent to destroy quick child); id. § 585.14 (penalty for causing death to woman); id. §
630.1(IV) (fetus not included under capital murder statute).
NM

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-6 (Repl. vol. 1986) (penalties); id. § 125.15(2) (manslaughter
second degree); id. § 125.20(3) (manslaughter first degree); id. § 125.40 (abortion in second
degree); id. § 30-5-3 (1984) (criminal abortions).

NY N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1987) (homicide definition includes abortion); id.
§ 125.45 (abortion in first degree); id. § 125.50 (self-abortion in second degree); id. § 125.55
(self-abortion in first degree); id. § 125.60 (unlawfully procuring miscarriage); id. §
265.00(17)(b) (McKinney 1980) (serious offense includes issuing abortion articles); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.05 (IcKinney 1984) ("designated offense").
NC N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-44 to -46 (1981) (using drugs or instruments to destroy unborn
child, to produce miscarriage, or to injure pregnant woman; concealing birth of child).
ND

N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-02 (Supp. 1987) (murder of unborn child); id. § 12.1-17.1-03
(manslaughter of unborn child); id. § 12.1-17.1-04 (negligent homicide of unborn child); id.
§ 12.1-17.1-05 (aggravated assault of unborn child); id. § 12.1-17.1-06 (assault of unborn
child); id. § 12.1-17.1-07 (exceptions); id. § 14-02.1-04(4)-(5) (Repl. vol. 1981) (penalties,
unlawful abortions); id. 14-02.1-05 (penalties, failure to preserve viable child); id. § 14-02.108 (protection of viable fetus born alive); id. § 14-02.1-10 (concealing stillbirth); id. §
14-02.1-11 (general penalty); id. § 14-02.3-05 (penalty).

OH

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(D) (Anderson 1987) (unlawful abortion); id. § 2919.13

(abortion manslaughter).
OK

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 713 (West 1983) (killing unborn quick child; manslaughter);
id. § 714 (procuring destruction of unborn child); id. § 861 (procuring an abortion); id. §
862 (submitting to, soliciting attempt to commit abortion); id. § 863 (concealing stillbirth;
death); id. tit. 63, § 1-731(A) (West 1984) (persons who perform; violations, penalties); id.
§ 1-732(F) (homicide).

OR

OR. REV. STAT. § 435.990 (1987) (penalties).

PA

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1989) (prohibited acts); id. §
3218 (criminal penalties).
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RI

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-18 (Supp. 1988) (care of babies born alive during attempted
abortions); id. § 11-54-2 (penalties); id. § 23-4.8-4 (1985) (penalties).

SC

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-10 (Law. Co-op. 1988) (illegal abortion is felony); id. § 44-41-80

(Law. Co-op. 1985) (performing, soliciting unlawful abortion).
SD

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-17-5 (1988) (unauthorized abortion is felony); id. § 22-17-6
(intentional killing of fetus by injury to mother); id. § 34-23A-10.2 (1986) (statement of
informed consent, misdemeanor report of physician's conviction).

TN

TENN. CODE ANN.

TX

TEx.

§ 37-10-306 (Supp. 1988) (violations); id. § 39-4-201 (Repl. vol. 1982)
(criminal abortions); id. § 39-4-206 (violation of section is felony); id. § 39-4-208 (violation
of section is felony).
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.

art. 4512.5 (Vernon 1976) (destroying unborn child).

UT UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-314 (Repl. vol. 1978) (violations); id. § 76-7-324 (Supp. 1989)
(violation of restriction of public funds).
VT

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1974) (definition and punishment); id. § 103 (joining with

murder indictment).
VA VA.
WA

CODE ANN.

§ 18.2-71 (1988) (penalty for producing abortion).

§ 9.02.010 (West 1988) (definition of punishment); id. § 9.02.020
(pregnant women attempt abortion); id. § 9.02.030 (selling drugs, instruments to procure
abortion); id. § 9.02.050 (concealing birth).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

WV W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-8 (Repl. vol. 1985) (penalties for performing abortions on uneman-

cipated minors); id. § 61-2-8 (Repl. vol. 1989) (abortion, homicide as result of; penalty);
id. § 62-9-5 (form of indictment).
WI

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West 1982) (abortion); id. § 940.13 (West Supp. 1988) (abortion

exception for women); id. § 940.15 (abortion); id. § 943.145 (criminal trespass).
WY Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-110 (1988) (penalty for violations); id. § 35-6-111 (penalty for person
other than physician who performs abortion); id. § 35-6-112 (penalty for using other means);
id. § 35-6-113 (penalty).
A-15 Miscellaneous Regulations
AL

ALA. CODE § 26-21-3 (Supp. 1988) (written consent to perform abortion on unemancipated
minor).

AK

ALASKA STAT.

§ 18.16.010(a)(4) (Supp. 1988) (domicile or presence, 30 days).

AR ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-16-702 (1987) (definitions); id. § 26-65-302 (court permission if
guardian consents for incapacitated person).
CA CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2660 (discipline of physical therapists); id. § 2746.6 (West
Supp. 1989) (discipline of nurse-midwife for aiding); id. § 2761(2)(c), 2878(2)(c) (discipline
of nurses for aiding); id. § 4521 (discipline of psychiatric technicians); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 429.50 (West 1979) (California Department of Health Services may compile
data for study); id. § 464 (Chapter 11: Therapeutic Abortion Act; lists of family planning
clinics); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 13121-13130 (West 1986) (Birth Defect Prevention
Act); id. § 13122 (prevent pesticide-induced abortions); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3405, 4028
(West Supp. 1989) (restrictions on prisoners); CAL. WELF. &

INST. CODE

§§ 220, 1773

(West 1984) (no restrictions for inmates).
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COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-117(b) (Repl. vol. 1985) (unprofessional conduct to aid in
criminal abortion).

DE

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 222(22) (Repl. vol. 1987) (therapeutic abortion defined); id. §
654 (defined); id. fit. 24, § 1792 (no person shall assist in unlawful abortion); id. § 1793
(residency requirements).

FL

FLA. STAT. § 390.001(1) (1989) (definitions); id. § 406.11(1)(a)(9) (exam by medical examiner
when criminal abortion); id. § 462.14(z) (revocation of naturopathy license for unlawful
termination of pregnancy).

GA

GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-110 (Supp. 1988) (Parental Notification Act); id. § 15-11-111
(definitions); id. § 15-11-113 (time and notice of waiver hearing); id. § 15-11-114 (conduct
of hearing, appeal); id. § 15-11-115 (applicability to nonresident minors); id. § 15-11-117
(immunity of healthcare providers acting in good faith); id. § 43-34-37(a)(8) (1988) (discipline
physician for criminal abortion).

HI

HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-8(1) (Repl. vol. 1985) (revocation of license to practice medicine
for criminal abortion); id. § 453-16(a)(3) (domicile required; attorney general opinion says
this requirement is unconstitutional).

ID

IDAHO CODE § 18-604 (Repl. vol. 1987) (definitions); id. § 18-611 (physicians may accept
patient's representations); id. § 18-613 (statutory changes effective upon governor's proclamation; §§ 18-604 to -611 repealed); id. § 18-612 to -615 (effective); id. § 19-2115 (abortion
and abduction, corroborating testimony); id. § 32-102 (unborn child as existing person);
id. § 39-241(c) (definition of fetal death); id. § 54-1814 (grounds for medical discipline).

IL

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-22 (Smith-Hurd Supp. .1989) (definitions); id. para.
81-26(8) (no abortion based on sex of fetus); id. para. 81-30.1 (violation, revocation of
license); id. para. 81-34 (severability); id. para. 81-35 (short title); id. para. 81-52 (title of
act); id. para. 81-53 (abortion defined); id. para. 81-61 (short title; parental notice); id.
para. 81-63 (definitions); id. para. 81-68.1 (invalidity, severability); id. ch. 111, para. 4267
(physical therapists, disciplinary actions for aiding); id. para. 4400-22 (disciplinary grounds;
elective abortion); id. ch. 111 1.2, para. 87-9 (1988) (abortion services not required by act);
id. ch. 127, para. 526 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (health benefits do not include expenses
of abortion).

IN

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-1 (Burns 1985) (definitions).

IA

IOWA CODE ANN. § 205.1 (West 1987) (sale of abortifacients); id. § 205.2 (exception); id.
§ 707.10 (West 1979) (duty to preserve life of fetus).

KS

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2837(b)(5) (Supp. 1988) (professional incompetency).

KY

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.027 (Baldwin 1986) (rules and regulations by cabinet for
human resources); id. § 304.5-160 (insurance rider for elective abortions); id. § 311.720
(definitions) (subsections (6), (8) unconstitutional); id. § 311.790 (birth and death certificates
for child born alive after attempted abortion); id. § 311.820 (no fee for counseling on
abortion); id. § 311.830 (severability).

LA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West 1986) (definition of abortion); id. § 37:1285 (West
1985) (physicians, revocation of license for aiding after viability); id. § 40:1299.35.1 (West
Supp. 1989) (definitions); id. § 40:62 (1977) (abortion; purpose of section); id. § 40:63 (forms
for collection of data); id. § 40:65 (completion of forms).

ME ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1595 (Repl. vol. 1980) (definition of live born and live
birth); id. § 1596 (Supp. 1989) (abortion data).
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MD MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-202 (Repl. vol. 1987) (no agreement with abortion
referral service in another state); id. § 20-203 (registration of abortion referral services);
id. § 20-204 (fee-splitting prohibition); id. § 20-205 (rules, regulations, referral services);
id. § 20-207 (physician defined).
MA MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 15FF (Law. Co-op. 1988) (prolife month); id. ch. 32A, 99 4,
10C, 14 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (insurance, state employees); id. ch. 32B, §§ 3, 16
(insurance, policy subdivision); id. ch. 112, § 12J(b) (Law. Co-op. 1987 & 1985) (legal
procedures); id. § 12K (definitions applicable to §§ 12L-12U); id. § 12U (enjoining abortion);
id. ch. 176G, § 17 (Law. Co-op. 1987) (health maintenance organizations; no payment for
abortions).
MI

MICH. Com. LAws ANN. § 380.1507 (West 1988) (schools and school districts, reproductive health education programs); id. § 767.72 (West 1982) (dying declarations).

MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62D.20 (West Supp. 1989) (rules; health maintenance organizations;
abortions); id. § 145.411 (West 1989) (definitions); id. § 145.421 (definitions); id. § 145.423
(abortions; live births); id. § 147.091(c) (physician; conviction of felony); id. § 148.75(d)
(physical therapist revocation); id. § 390.32 subd. 1(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1989) (investigation of deaths arising from criminal abortion); id. § 617.21 (West 1987) (evidence).
MS

Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-51 (Supp. 1988) (definitions); id. § 41-41-55 (applicability; court
proceedings, standard for waiver of consent requirement); id. § 41-41-57 (exception for
medical emergencies); id. § 41-41-59 (violation as prima facie unprofessional conduct); id.
§ 41-41-61 (confidentiality of records); id. § 41-41-63 (severability); id. § 41-61-59 (report
death to medical examiner); id. § 73-25-29(5) (physician, revocation of license if abortion
not medically indicated).

MO

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 58.451 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1989) (death by criminal action); id. §
58.455 (death certificate); id. § 188.015 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1989) (definitions); id. §
188.047 (Vernon 1983) (tissue sample); id. § 188.060 (records retained 7 years); id. § 188.065
(revocation of license); id. § 188.085 (not exclusive); id. § 188.100 (Vernon Supp. 1989)
(definitions); id. § 188.115 (severability clause); id. § 188.120 (cause of action); id. § 188.200
(definitions); id. § 188.220 (taxpayer standing); id. § 376.805 (elective abortion, insurance).

MT

MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-3-322 (1987) (unprofessional conduct; performing abortion against
law); id. § 41-1-103 (rights of unborn children); id. § 50-20-101 (short title "Montana
Abortion Control Act"); id. § 50-20-104 (definitions).

NE NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326 (Supp. 1988) (terms defined); id. § 28-331 (1985) (care and
treatment of child aborted; born alive); id. § 71-148(8) (1986 & Supp. 1988) (license revocation).
NV

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.301 (Michie 1987) (trial for unlawful abortion; corroborative
evidence); id. § 201.120 (abortion; definition); id. § 201.140 (evidence; witness must testify);
id. § 442.240 (defined); id. § 442.268 (civil immunity for judicially authorized abortion); id.
§ 630A.370(4) (homeopathic physicians, unlawful abortion); id. §§ 632.220(6)(b), .320(6)(b)
(nurses, aiding abortions); id. § 633.131(1)(i) (osteopathic physician; unlawful abortions);
id. § 634.018(2) (chiropractic unprofessional conduct: aiding criminal abortion).

NJ

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-4 (West 1987) (severability); id. § 45:9-16(c) (Supp. 1989)
(medical license revoked for criminal abortion).

NM N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1 (Repl. vol. 1984) (definitions); id. § 61-6-14(B)(1) (Repl. vol.
1986) (physician license revoked for performing criminal abortion); id. § 61-10A-5(A) (Repl.
vol. 1980) (osteopathic physician's assistant; license revoked for criminal abortion).
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NY

N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291(3) (McKinney 1982) (opportunity for medical treatment for aborted
infant born alive); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 394-e (McKinney 1984) (report on request for
abortion services); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1983) (court not open to public for
abortion); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney 1987); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 17
(McKinney Supp. 1989) (release of medical records concerning abortion not to parents).

NC

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14(a)(2) (Supp. 1988) (revocation of license for unlawful abortion).

ND

N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (Repl. vol. 1981) (definitions); id. § 14-02.3-03 (payment
by health insurance policies).

OH

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.15 (Anderson 1981) (court may not order abortion); id. §
2919.11 (Anderson 1987) (definitions); id. § 2919.12(E) (civil liability); id. § 4731.22(21)
(physician, discipline for violating abortion rules); id. § 4734.09 (chiropractor cannot perform
abortions).

OK

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 509(1) (West 1971 & Supp. 1989) (unprofessional conduct
definition); id. § 524 (West Supp. 1989) (abortion, infant prematurely born alive right to
medical treatment); id. tit. 63, § 1-730 (West 1984) (definitions); id. tit. 63, § 938(a) (types
of deaths to be investigated).

OR

OR. REV. STAT. § 432.120 (1987) (records, disclosure rule); id. § 485.435 (effect of refusal
to consent to termination); id. § 465.110 (places used for unlawful abortion, nuisance); id.
§ 659.029 (employment discrimination); id. § 685.110(4) (revocation of naturopath license
for performing abortion).

PA

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3201 (Purdon & Supp. 1989) (Abortion Control Act); id. §
3203 (definitions); id. § 3217 (civil penalties); id. § 3219 (State Board of Medical Education
and Licensure Act); 42 id. § 6144 (Purdon 1982) (dying declarations in case of abortion).

RI

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-1 (1985) (abortion defined); id. § 23-4.7-4 (emergency); id. §
23-4.7-7 (liability of physician); id. § 23-4.7-8 (severability); id. § 23-4.8-5 (severability);
id. § 27-18-28 (Supp. 1988) (health insurance); id. § 36-12-2.1 (1986) (health insurance for
employees; abortions excluded).

SC

S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (definitions).

SD

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-1 (1986) (definitions); id. § 34-23A-2 (lawful only
under specified conditions); id. § 34-23A-16 (birth certificate for live birth resulting from
abortion); id. § 34-23A-16.1 (right to life of babies born alive); id. § 34-23A-18 (abortion
as evidence in termination of parental rights case); id. 34-23A-20 (severability); id. §
34-23A-21 (repeal of chapter when states given exclusive authority); id. § 36-4-30(1) (unprofessional conduct).

TN

TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-302 (Supp. 1988) (definitions); id. § 37-10-305 (medical emergencies); id. § 37-10-307 (civil actions); id. § 39-4-201(d) (Repl. vol. 1982) (residency); id. §
394-206 (rights to medical treatment; infant born alive during abortion; no cause of action
for wrongful death); id. § 39-4-207 (custody of infant prematurely born alive during abortion); id. § 63-1-120(14) (Repl. vol. 1986) (revocation of license); id. § 63-9-111(b) (revocation
of license, osteopath); id. § 68-11-201(1) (Supp. 1988) (definition of ambulatory surgical
treatment center).

TX

TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 12.05 (Vernon 1986) (rights of living child after abortion); id.
§ 15.022 (definition; termination of parental rights of child born alive during abortion); id.
§ 17.011 (living child after abortion); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b (Vernon
Supp. 1989) (revocation of license).
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UT

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301 (Supp. 1989) (definitions); id. § 76-7-312 (Repl. vol. 1978)
(no intimidation, coercion); id. § 76-7-315 (emergency exceptions); id. § 76-7-316 (actions
not precluded); id. § 76-7-317 (Repl. vol. 1989) (separability clause); id. § 76-7-321 (Supp.
1989) (definitions); id. § 78-11-25 (Repl. vol. 1987) (failure, refusal to prevent birth not a
defense).

VT

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 102 (1974) (dying declaration as evidence in prosecutions under
§ 101).

VA

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-8 (Supp. 1988) (limitation of prosecution); id. § 54.1-2914(A)(1)
(Repl. vol. 1988) (unprofessional conduct).

WA WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.010 (West 1988) (defined); id. § 9.02.040 (evidence,
abortion prosecutions); id. § 9.02.070(b) (residence requirement); id. § 9.02.090 (act submitted to electorate); id. § 18.130.180(18) (West 1989) (unprofessional conduct).
WV W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-2 (Repl. vol. 1985) (abortion not approved method of family planning);
id. § 16-2F-2 (definitions); id. § 16-2F-3 (referral of minor for counseling); id. § 16-2F-9
(severability).
WY Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-101 (1988) (definitions).
*Prepared by Randall Richards, J.D.
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APPENDIX B:
CURRENT FEDERAL STATUTES
REGARDING ABORTION
1.

10 U.S.C. § 1093 (1988) (defense appropriations may not be used for abortions).

2.

18 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (crime for federal officer to violate abortion importation law).*

3.

18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1988) (crime to mail information about abortion).*

4.

18 U.S.C. § 1462(a) (1988) (crime to import abortifacient).*

5.

19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1988) (Tariff Act, importation of illegal abortion material prohibited).*

6.

20 U.S.C.A. § 1687 note (West Supp. 1989) (education, discrimination based on sex or
blindness, abortion-neutral).

7.

20 U.S.C.A. § 1688 (West Supp. 1989) (education, discrimination based on sex or blindness,
abortion-neutral).

8.

22 U.S.C. § 2151b (1982) (international development funds may not be used for abortion
promotion).

9.

22 U.S.C.A. § 2151n (West Supp. 1988) (international development report on international
abortion coercion required).

10.

22 U.S.C.A. § 2304 (Supp. V 1987) (international military assistance human rights violation
reports include coerced abortion).

11.

29 U.S.C.A. § 706 note (West Supp. 1989) (rehabilitation services antidiscrimination law;
abortion neutral). See supra 20 U.S.C.A. § 1688 (West Supp. 1989).

12.

29 U.S.C.A. § 794 note (West Supp. 1989) (nondiscrimination under Federal Rehabilitation
grants; abortion neutral).

13.

42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1982) (Public Health Service prohibition against funding programs
using abortion as family-planning method).

14.

42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)-(c) (1982) (Public Health Service prohibition of public officials requiring
grant recipients to perform, assist, or provide facilities for abortion or discriminating in
employment because of beliefs about abortion).

15.

42 U.S.C. § 300a-8 (1982) (Public Health Service penalty for government officer or employee
endeavoring to coerce abortion upon beneficiary of federal program).

16.

42 U.S.C. § 300z-5 (1982) (Adolescent Family Life Act demonstration projects; parental
consent not required if parents compel abortion).

17.

42 U.S.C. § 300z-10 (1982) (Adolescent Family Life Act demonstration project grants
available only to programs not providing abortion counseling).

18.

42 U.S.C. § 1975c(f) (Supp. V 1987) (Civil Rights Commission denied authority to study
abortion).

19.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a note (1982) (university civil rights requirements in federally assisted
programs; abortion neutral). See supra 20 U.S.C.A. § 1688 (West Supp. 1989).

20.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982) (Equal Employment Opportunities provisions do not require health
insurance to cover abortion).
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21.

42 U.S.C. § 2996(b)(8) (1982) (Legal Services Corporation prohibited from handling abortion
litigation).

22.

42 U.S.C.A. § 6107 note (West Supp. 1989) (age discrimination provisions in federally
assisted programs; abortion-neutral). See supra 20 U.S.C.A. § 1688 (West Supp. 1989).
*Apparently, pre-1973.
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APPENDIX C
CHARTS OF GALLUP AND
NORC PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS
TABLE C-1
Summary of the Gallup Polls 1975-1988: National Trends in American Public Opinion Regarding
Abortion
Question: "Do you think abortions should be legal under any circumstances, legal only under
certain circumstances, or illegal in all circumstances?"

Any Circumstances
Certain Circumstances
Illegal
No Opinion

1975

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1983

1988

21%
54%
22%
3%

22%
55%
19%
4%

22%
55%
19%
4%

22%
54%
19%
5%

25%
53%
18%
4%

23%
52
21%
4%

23%
58%
16%
3%

24%
57%
17%
2%

Sources: G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL at 28 (1978); G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP REPORT,
No. 281, at 17 (Feb. 1989).

TABLE C-2
GALLUP POLLS, 1978-79
ABORTION: CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN FAVORED
Question: "Now, thinking about the [first] three months of pregnancy, under which of these
circumstances do you think abortions should be legal?:
(Respondents were handed a card with six circumstances listed; asked of those who said abortion
should be legal only under certain circumstances)
1977-1st Trimester

1977-2nd Trimester

1977--3rd Trimester

1979--lst Trimester
78%
59%
52%
44%
42%
15%

1979-2nd Trimester
66%
32%
46%
37%
31%
9%

1979-3rd Trimester
59%
19%
33%
28%
22%
4%

Life Endangered
Rape, Incest
Health Damage
Deformity
Mental Health
Financial
Life Endangered
Rape, Incest
Health Damage
Deformity
Mental Health
Financial

Sources: G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL 134-42 (1979); G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL 32-33

(1978).
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TABLE C-3
National Opinion Research Council (University of Chicago): Percentage of Respondents Favoring
Specific Circumstances As Legal Grounds For Abortions.*
Question: "Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman
to obtain a legal abortion...
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

If
If
If
If
If
If
If

the woman's own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy?"
she became pregnant as a result of rape?"
there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?"
the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children?"
she is not married and does not want to marry the man?"
she is married and does not want any more children?"
the woman wants it for any reason?" (not asked prior to 1977)

1965 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1987 1988
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

-

-

90
83
83
52
48
45

90
80
82
52
47
46

88
74
74
46
40
38

73
59
57
22
18
16

-

-

89
80
82
51
48
45

88
80
80
50
46
44
-

-

88
80
83
52
47
44
36

88
80
80
45
40
39
32

88
80
80
50
46
45
39

89
83
81
50
47
46
39

85
78
75
41
37
37
32

87
77
77
44
43
41
37

87
78
76
42
40
39
36

88
80
79
45
41
41
39

86
77
76
40
38
39
35

*The above results represent the number of "yes" answers to the total number of "yes," "no,"
"don't know," and "no response" answers.
Sources: J. DAVIS, GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS 1972-84 (1984); Telephone interview with T.W.
Smith, Director of General Social Surveys, National Opinion Research Center (June 27, 1989)
(for 1982, 1985-88); Letter from T.W. Smith, Director of General Social Surveys, National
Opinion Research Center (July 5, 1989) (raw data for the years 1972-1988).
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APPENDIX D
ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES
The following chart was compiled from data published by researchers affiliated with the prochoice
Alan Guttmacher Institute. They have compiled the most complete and reliable data about
abortion in the United States. (The Center for Disease Control publishes abortion statistics
also, but it uses state-gathered information, whereas A.G.I. also obtains data from abortion
providers). Thus, some C.D.C. annual abortion reports have been 15% underinclusive. See C.
TIETZE, INDUCED ABORTION: A WORLD REVIEW, 1981, at 19-26 (1981).
Number of
Abortions
Late
a
**** b

Abortion
Rate
*a

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

587,000
745,000
899,000
1,034,000
1,179,000
1,317,000
1,410,000
1,498,000
1,554,000
1,577,000
1,574,000+
1,575,000+ +
1,577,000
1,589,000

16.3
19.3
21.7
24.2
26.4
27.7
28.8
29.3
29.3
28.8
27.4
28.1
28.0

•

Per 1,000 women 15-44

Year
Married

•*
•**

Abortion
Ratio
**a

%
Repeat
***b

193
220
249
265
286
294
297
300
300
299
294
297
298

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

15.2
20.5
22.7
26.6
29.5
31.7
33.0
35.1
36.8
38.8

32.8
32.5
32.9
32.1
31.3
30.8
30.8
29.6
28.5
27.5
27.1
-

-

.
-

42.9

%
Not
Married
b

71.0
72.4
73.7
75.4
77.2
76.5
78.5
79.4
81.1
80.9
81.3
-

14.6
12.0
10.8
9.8
9.0
8.9
8.8
8.7
8.8
8.1
9.5
-

...
-

25.5

-

81.5

****

Per 1,000 known pregnancies (live births plus abortions)
Women having second or more abortion
Thirteen or more weeks from last menstrual period

a

CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, ABORTION SURVEILLANCE, ANNUAL

b

Past 1st
Trimester
****b

-

-

-

-

%
Under
19 Yrs.
b

SUMIARY,

1978, at Table 1 (1980) (for 1972); Henshow, Trends in Abortion, 1982-84, 18 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 34 (1986); Henshaw, Forrest & Blaine, Abortion Services in the United States,
1981 and 1982, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 119, 121 (1984) (for 1981-82); Henshaw, Forrest
& Van Vort, Abortion Services in the United States, 1984 and 1985, 19 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 63 (1987) (for 1985); Henshaw, Forrest, Sullivan & Titeze, Abortion Services in
the United States, 1979 and 1980, 14 FAm. PLAN. PERSP. 1, 6 (1982) (for 1973-80)
estimated 3%-6% shortfall in data); Contraceptionand Abortion Costs Are Tiny Portion
of U.S. Health Spending, 18 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 37 (1986).
Forrest, Sullivan & Tietze, Abortion in the United States, 1977-78, 11 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 329 (1979) (for 1973-78); Henshaw, The Characteristicsand PriorContraceptive
Use of U.S. Abortion Patients, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 158 (1988) (for 1987); Henshaw,
Characteristicsof U.S. Women Having Abortions, 1982-1983, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 5
(1987) (for 1982-83); Henshaw, Binkin, Blaine & Smith, A Portraitof American Women
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Who Obtain Abortions, 17 Fsi. PLAN. PERSP. 90 (1985) (for 1980-81); Henshaw &
O'Reilly, Characteristicsof Abortion Patients in the United States, 1979 and 1980, 15
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 5 1983) (for 1979-80).
Total cost for all abortions in 1982-$484 million.
Average amount paid for 1,068,000 first-trimesterabortions in 1983-$200 per abortion.
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